Informational cues, partisan-motivated reasoning, and the manipulation of conspiracy beliefs
Abstract
In this article, we examine the relationship between partisan-motivated reasoning and uncertainty-inducing official information cues with respect to conspiracy beliefs. We find that while partisanship matters when it comes to conspiracy beliefs, the uncertainty-inducing and countervailing nature of official cues can further inflame conspiracy beliefs when it is not in the political interest of individuals to subscribe to a given conspiracy theory. Contrary to expectations, we find that cueing Democratic self-identifiers with different types of official responses to conspiracy theories that implicate Republicans has no effect. However, such informational cues do significantly increase conspiracy beliefs among Republicans, even when a Republican is implicated in the conspiracy theory. Although partisan-motivated reasoning has a baseline effect on conspiracy beliefs, the extent to which these beliefs can further be manipulated appears asymmetric across party lines. Simply put, Republicans appear to be more susceptible to conspiratorial cues than Democrats.
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Social identity motives increased participants' likelihood to believe in fake news that represented their own political party as moral.
“social identity motives increased participants' likelihood to believe in fake news that represented their own political party as moral [47].”
From The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories (2020) · cites this paper as [47]
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- Authors
- Enders, A. M., & Smallpage, S. M.
- Corresponding author
- Enders, Adam M.
- Smallpage, Steven M.
- Venue
- Political Communication
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2018-10
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 83-102
- ISSN
- 1058-4609 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-7675
- OpenAlex
- W2895321272
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 10.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Political Communication (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Keywords
- conspiracy beliefs, partisan motivated reasoning, partisan cues, political uncertainty, partisan asymmetry, conspiracy theories, partisanship, Republicans, Democrats
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