Cited by 478Misinformation and Its ImpactsMedia Influence and PoliticsElectoral Systems and Political Participation

What Drives Conspiratorial Beliefs? The Role of Informational Cues and Predispositions

Uscinski, Joseph E., Klofstad, Casey, Atkinson, Matthew D.·2016·Political Research Quarterly

Abstract

Why do people believe in conspiracy theories? This study breaks from much previous research and attempts to explain conspiratorial beliefs with traditional theories of opinion formation. Specifically, we focus on the reception of informational cues given a set of predispositions (political and conspiratorial). We begin with observational survey data to show that there exists a unique predisposition that drives individuals to one degree or another to believe in conspiracy theories. This predisposition appears orthogonal to partisanship and predicts political behaviors including voter participation. Then a national survey experiment is used to test the effect of an informational cue on belief in a conspiracy theory while accounting for both conspiratorial predispositions and partisanship. Our results provide an explanation for individual-level heterogeneity in the holding of conspiratorial beliefs and also indicate the conditions under which information can drive conspiratorial beliefs.

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Crossref · 10.1177/1065912915621621

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  • Extreme and entrenched attitude positions are associated with conspiracy beliefs.

    “On one hand, extreme and entrenched attitude positions are associated with conspiracy beliefs, suggesting that they may help people defend beliefs from disconfirmation (Uscinski, Klofstad, & Atkinson, 2016).”

    From The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories (2017) · cites this paper as Uscinski, Klofstad, & Atkinson, 2016

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Authors
Uscinski, J. E., Klofstad, C., & Atkinson, M. D.
Affiliations
  • University of Miami (US)
  • Miami University (US)
Corresponding author
Uscinski, Joseph E.
Venue
Political Research Quarterly
Published
2016-01-13
Volume
69
Issue
1
Pages
57-71
ISSN
  • 1065-9129 (ISSN-L)
  • 1938-274X
OpenAlex
W2337241778
Cited by
478
References
20
Citations by year
2026: 24 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 52 · 2022: 89 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 64 · 2018: 54 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 2
FWCI
128.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Political Research Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
conspiracy beliefs, conspiracy theories, informational cues, opinion formation, partisanship, electoral participation, political behavior, individual heterogeneity, belief formation

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