The function of folk psychology: mind reading or mind shaping?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading, is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 1×
“In a series of studies, Chartrand, Bargh, Dijksterhuis, and collaborators have shown that adults automatically conform to stereotypes with which they are verbally primed, as well as to the behavior of persons with whom they interact (Dijksterhuis 2000 ; Chartrand and Bargh 1999 ; Bargh and Chartrand 1999 ).”
BackgroundThe chameleon effect: the perception–behavior link and social interaction
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.893 · Cited by 3,674
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-2412 · Cited by 3,670
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4635.001.0001 · Cited by 3,428
An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1416950 · Cited by 3,340
Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35090060 · Cited by 3,302
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.230 · Cited by 2,736
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A. C., & Ratner, H. H. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0003123x · Cited by 1,891
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195106237.001.0001 · Cited by 1,491
Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory
GOPNIK, A., & WELLMAN, H. M. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00202.x · Cited by 1,158 · cited 1×
“Most theories of folk psychology appeal to this practice as a model of what we do when we ascribe mental states to others (Wellman 1990 ; Gopnik and Wellman 1995 ; Gopnik 1996 ).”
BackgroundPretending and believing: Issues in the theory of ToMM
Leslie, A. M. (1994) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90029-9 · Cited by 740 · cited 1×
“Some theory theorists (Leslie 1994; Fodor 1995; Carruthers 1996) claim the theory underlying development of and competence in mental state”
Background
Cited by
Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture
Veissière, S. P. L., Constant, A., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001213 · Cited by 348
The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?
Peters, U. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1 · Cited by 236
Why should any body have a self?
Hohwy, J., & Michael, J. (2017) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/fm4cr · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Zawidzki, T. W.
- Venue
- Philosophical Explorations
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 193-210
- ISSN
- 1386-9795 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-5918
- OpenAlex
- W2092478563
- Cited by
- 130
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 5.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.