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PreprintCited by 54Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of Science

Why should any body have a self?

Hohwy, Jakob, Michael, John·2017
DOI 10.31234/osf.io/fm4cr
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Abstract

We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of behavior. The general framework for brain function on which we base this theory is that the brain is fundamentally an organ for prediction error minimization.There are three related parts to this project. In the first part (Sections 2-3), we explain how prediction error minimization must lead to the inference of a network of deeply hidden endogenous causes. The key concept here is that prediction error minimization in the long term approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference, where the hierarchy is critical to understand the place of the self, and the body, in the world.In the second part (Sections 4-5), we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. We show how a comprehensive prediction error minimization account can accommodate key characteristics of the self. It turns out that, though the modelled endogenous causes are just some among other inferred causes of sensory input, the model is special in being, in a special sense, a model of itself.The third part (Sections 6-7) identifies a threat from such self-modelling: how can a self-model be accurate if it represents itself? We propose that we learn to be who we are through a positive feedback loop: from infancy onward, humans apply agent-models to understand what other agents are up to in their environment, and…

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Crossref · 10.31234/osf.io/fm4cr

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58 of 58 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The mind integrates signals from disparate interoceptive channels by inferring that they have a common origin in a unified bodily self.

    “the mind integrates signals from disparate interoceptive channels by inferring that they have a common origin in a unified entity: a bodily self.”

    From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Hohwy and Michael (2017)

  • Prediction error is best minimized over the long term by attributing internally generated interoceptive sensations to a stable, unified entity, a self.

    “prediction error is best minimized over the long term by attributing internally generated interoceptive sensations to a stable, unified entity, a self”

    From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Hohwy and Michael, 2017

  • Experience of embodied selfhood is the product of an inference about the hidden causes of interoceptive experience.

    “They argue that experience of embodied selfhood is the product of an inference about the hidden causes of interoceptive (representation of states of the internal milieu) experience.”

    From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Hohwy and Michael (2017)

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Authors
Hohwy, J., & Michael, J.
Affiliations
  • Monash University (AU)
  • Central European University (AT)
ORCID
Publisher
Center for Open Science
Published
2017-04-20
DOI
10.31234/osf.io/fm4cr
OpenAlex
W4293780049
Cited by
54
References
58
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
theory of the self, prediction error minimization, hierarchical Bayesian inference, self-model, self-modeling, agent models, social cognition, narrative self, inferentialism

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