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The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
Abstract
This essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions. The model emphasizes the (economically arbitrary, from a welfare point of view) importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation. We explore the implications of a legislator's objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 642-664
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2076316673
- Cited by
- 1,736
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 32.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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