The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Information Disclosure
Abstract
A sender randomly draws a “prospect” characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver. The receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and accepts the prospect if his Bayesian inference about the prospect’s relevance exceeds his opportunity cost. The sender’s profits are typically maximized by partial information disclosure, whereby the receiver is induced to accept less relevant but more profitable prospects (“switches”) by pooling them with more relevant but less profitable ones (“baits”). Extensions include maximizing a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus and allowing the sender to use monetary incentives.
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Citations
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Cited by
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Information Design: A Unified Perspective
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rayo, L., & Segal, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2010-10
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 949-987
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2111364868
- Cited by
- 484
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 21.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.