Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations
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Abstract
International-relations scholars tend to focus on the formation, design, and effects of international organizations (IOs). However, the vitality of IOs varies tremendously. I argue that IOs end up in one of three situations. They could die off altogether, though this happens infrequently. More commonly, many IOs become “zombies.” They continue to operate, but without any progress toward their mandates. A third category includes IOs that are alive and functioning. I develop a theory to explain an organization's vitality, hinging on the quality of the bureaucracy. In an environment where IOs with similar goals, and with many overlapping members, compete for bureaucrats, the ability of the secretariats to attract talented staff and to enact policy autonomously are associated with whether organizations truly stay active, simply endure, or die off. I demonstrate this proposition using a new measure of the vitality of international economic organizations from 1950 to the present. Around 52 percent of the organizations in the sample are alive and functioning, around 10 percent are essentially dead, and nearly 38 percent are zombies. Using these original data, tests of these propositions support the theory.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gray, J.
- Venue
- International Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2018-03-01
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-13
- ISSN
- 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2478
- OpenAlex
- W2789817329
- Cited by
- 338
- References
- 74
- FWCI
- 125.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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