The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.
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Citations
Cites
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MethodSelf-citation
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Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
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“…several attempts have been made to look for commonalities between the main theories in the field (Shea and Frith 2019; Northoff and Lamme 2020; Wiese 2020; Seth and Bayne 2022), and our approach of assessing commonalities in the evaluation of theories might be informative for such efforts to…”
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Active inference as a computational framework for consciousness
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“Although concrete conceptual attempts have been made to bring different consciousness theories together, or at least to integrate their central claims (e.g. Wiese 2020), a common research agenda has not been agreed upon yet and progress in the field appears in many ways to have stagnated.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Wiese, W.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2020-01-01
- Volume
- 2020
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niaa013-niaa013
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3041332494
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 7.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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