Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
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Abstract
Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically—its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
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![Figure 3. Extendedness in phenomenology and cause–effect structures. A) The phenomenal properties that characterize spatial extendedness and B) the physical properties that correspond to them. The polytope in the bottom center depicts the unfolded cause–effect structure of a seven-unit grid. The distinctions “d,” “cd,” “de,” and “cde” are singled out to illustrate the four types of causal relations that make up extendedness. Cyan edges indicate partial overlap between causes and/or effects, purple edges asymmetric full overlap, and magenta edges symmetric full overlap [see Haun and Tononi (2019)]. “Reflexivity”: each phenomenal spot overlaps itself; similarly, distinctions in the cause–effect structure fully overlap (by virtue of the overlap between their cause and effect). “Connection”: spots partially overlap other spots, and the overlap corresponds to another spot; similarly, distinctions partially overlap with their causes and effects, and the overlap corresponds to the cause and effect of other distinctions. “Fusion”: the union of two connected spots corresponds to another spot; similarly, the union of two connected distinctions is also a distinction. “Inclusion”: every spot includes and is included by other spots; similarly, every distinction includes and is included by other distinctions. For a more detailed analysis, see a companion paper (Grasso et al. 2021).](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/4dbb3e5bd9cf4faaab22ed2df2d27032/consciousness-and-the-fallacy-of-misplaced-objectivity-figure-3.jpg)
![Figure 2. Unfolded cause–effect structures for three “brain-like” physical substrates. A) A highly integrated eight-unit network in state ABcdEfgH (where uppercase indicates ON and lowercase OFF) unfolds into a rich cause–effect structure with many distinctions and relations. The cause–effect structure of this eight-unit network is meant to illustrate a small part of a much larger cause–effect structure (grayed out in background) that is presumably specified by the physical substrate of human consciousness. The overlay highlights how a distinction (brown) specified by a mechanism (black) comprises a cause (red) and/or an effect (green). Relations among causes and/or effects (overlaps among them) are shown as lines, faces, and volumes, with colors denoting different types of relations. The figure indicates that during wakefulness, the physical substrate of consciousness—constituted of a large number of neurons arranged as “pyramids of grids” and located predominantly in posterior cortical areas (outlined in blue)—can specify a cause–effect structure with high Φ (Tononi et al. 2016). B) When eight units are connected pairwise as parallel modules with minimal intermodular connectivity, the network specifies four separate, minimal cause–effect structures, each with very low Φ. Modular connectivities are found, for instance, in the cerebellum. C) Even when units are interconnected as in A, their causal interactions can be disrupted by changes in neuromodulation and excitability (dashed connections) that lead to a breakdown of causal interactions, severely reducing the network’s capacity for integrated information. As a consequence, the single, rich cause–effect structure of high Φ (Panel A) “disintegrates” into multiple disjoint ones, each with low Φ (Panel C). According to IIT, this breakdown in the capacity for integrated information, consistent with the breakdown of perturbational complexity, accounts for the loss of consciousness during deep sleep early in the night (Massimini et al. 2005; Pigorini et al. 2015). While the purpose of this figure is purely illustrative, the cause–effect structures shown were obtained by computationally unfolding the associated networks of units in their particular state, obtaining their irreducible causal mechanisms with their causes, effects, and relations [for details, see Haun and Tononi (2019)].](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/42ae86b0413441bea42e30a25866262a/consciousness-and-the-fallacy-of-misplaced-objectivity-figure-2.jpg)
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“The theory then formulates these five essential phenomenal properties in terms of corresponding causal properties-IIT's five postulates of physical existence-which a substrate must have to support consciousness.These five postulates-intrinsicality, information, integration, exclusion, and composition-can be formulated mathematically and assessed algorithmically for any substrate, given the system’”
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“A complex and its intrinsic units must comply with IIT's postulates of physical existence”
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“A complex and its intrinsic units must comply with IIT's postulates of physical existence [18].”
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“Claim 1. Systems that are not strongly connected are reducible.”
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“Such an analysis was possible because, at the micro grain, the computer is sparsely connected and contains externally determined units, which both decreases φ s and simplifies its computation by eliminating the need to evaluate all possible partitions to identify the minimum partition (MIP) [18].”
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Cited by
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Storm, J. F., Klink, P. C., Aru, J., Senn, W., Goebel, R., Pigorini, A., Avanzini, P., Vanduffel, W., Roelfsema, P. R., Massimini, M., et al. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · Cited by 114
“50 The seed of this consciousness-first approach can be already found in the early paper ‘‘Consciousness and Complexity’’ published in 1998.”
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Only consciousness truly exists? Two problems for IIT 4.0’s ontology
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A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories
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“IIT defines consciousness as subjective experience (Albantakis et al., 2023; Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016), and uses phenomenology-first introspection and reasoning to isolate the essential phenomenal properties of experience (Ellia et al., 2021; Tononi et al., 2022).”
BackgroundWhy does time feel the way it does? Toward a principled account of temporal experience
Comolatti, R., Grasso, M., & Tononi, G. (2025) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2025.113434 · Cited by 26
“5,29 Nonetheless, as testified by venerable traditions in temporal phenomenology, the fundamental structural properties of temporal experience remain more penetrable by introspection than those of a musical chord, a color, or a smell (for more on the role and limitations of introspection, see Haun & Tononi 5 and Ellia…”
InfluentialSelf-citationNegro, N. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae012 · Cited by 21
“Even if the foundation of IIT is phenomenological (Oizumi et al. 2014, Ellia et al. 2021), the fact that the cerebellum is not necessary for consciousness is often presented by IIT proponents as one of the facts that a theory of consciousness needs to explain, and is therefore part of the empirical…”
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Ellia, F., & Chis-Ciure, R. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281 · Cited by 23
Self-citationGrasso, M., Haun, A. M., & Tononi, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab022 · Cited by 19
“As argued in the companion paper (Ellia et al. 2021), the phenomenal properties of spatial experience must be accounted for independent of whether they are reported or not.”
Self-citationThe unfathomable richness of seeing
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IIT, half masked and half disfigured
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“IIT is especially interesting because it aims to explain the phenomenal, subjective character of experience; not its behavioural, computational or functional correlates [5].”
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“identify a cause-effect structure that corresponds to the phenomenal structure” of a conscious experience, or quale (Ellia et al., 2021).”
BackgroundEmergentist Integrated Information Theory
Negro, N. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00612-z · Cited by 14
“…seem to be the case in IIT, since integrated information is not defined in terms of functional role, but rather in terms of structural properties (Ellia et al., 2021): as the second guideline points out, consciousness does not coincide with an abstract property, but it coincides instead with a…”
Olesen, C., Waade, P. T., Albantakis, L., & Mathys, C. D. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011346 · Cited by 17
“Thus, it is as yet not possible to relate the findings of any given IIT analysis to the concrete phenomenology that we are familiar with, or to concrete human behavior (but see [13,15]).”
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“Leaving aside the reactions to the manners of the letter, such an absurd event reveals something more substantial: redoing science from within consciousness is genuinely difficult, as it requires a shift from the extrinsic to the “ intrinsic perspective ” (Ellia et al., 2021).”
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“As Ellia et al. [22] argue, it is the scientific community ’ s responsibility to investigate and elucidate the source, origins, development, and functionality of these seemingly impossible phenomena.”
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“118,119,120 Overall, according to the IIT, human cerebral organoids (and systems in general) are conscious if and only if they exemplify a global maxima of Φ , and they experience pain if and only if their irreducible cause – effect structure is composed of distinctions and relations mimicking the…”
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“In newer works, in which proponents of IIT attempt to formally describe the experience of space (Haun and Tononi, 2019; Ellia et al., 2021), they seem to go even further, dividing space into small parts (akin to pixels in an LCD screen) that can be related structurally and functionally to the organisation of neurons i…”
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“IIT proposes an ‘explanatory identity’ between experiences and Φ -structures: the phenomenal qualities of an experience can be fully accounted for by the distinctions and relations composing the Φ -structure [5].”
Self-citationHow to be an integrated information theorist without losing your body
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“0”, the central identity has been replaced by an “explanatory identity” (Haun and Tononi, 2019; Ellia et al., 2021; Tononi et al., 2022; Albantakis et al., 2023a,b) that supposedly carries less ontological weight, yet some of the arguments against the previous iteration of the theory seem also to…”
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“…structure of IIT first, and determine (i) whether IIT’s phenomenology-first approach is able to “bootstrap” an explanation of consciousness from consciousness itself (Ellia et al. 2021, p. 10); and (ii) whether such an explanation avoids the impasse faced by the experiment-driven approach.”
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“A scientific theory of consciousness should account for subjective experience objectively (Ellia et al. 2021).”
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“…should provide a principled account of what consciousness is in physical terms, necessary and sufficient condiGons for the presence or absence of consciousness that can be evaluated in a wide range of physical systems, and an account of why an experience feels the way it feels (Ellia et al. 2021).”
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“5,29 Nonetheless, as testified by venerable traditions in temporal phenomenology, the fundamental structural properties of temporal experience remain more penetrable by introspection than those of a musical chord, a color, or a smell (for more on the role and limitations of introspection, see Haun & Tononi 5 and Ellia…”
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“However, theories of consciousness attempt t o explain subjective experience in objective terms (Ellia et al. 2021).”
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“The Integrated Information Theory (IIT; Albantakis et al., 2023; Tononi, Albantakis et al., 2022; Ellia et al., 2021) is currently in the spotlight of consciousness science.”
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Haun, A., & Tononi, G. (2024) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/jmg35 · Cited by 1
Self-citationApplying category theory to the study of consciousness?Preprint
Prentner, R. (2022) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/3vhg9 · Cited by 2
Decoding Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence
Xiong, M. (2024) · Journal of Data Science · doi:10.6339/24-jds1117
Yurchenko, S. B. (2024) · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/svd95
Methodological Issues in Consciousness Research, volume II
(2025) · Frontiers research topics · doi:10.3389/978-2-8325-6243-7
Ellia, F., & Tsuchiya, N. (2025) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/qc5ty_v2
Self-citationCausal ontology and definiteness of consciousness
Moon, K. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05069-5
“9 Ellia et al. (2021, p. 10, fn 15) suggest “inference to a good explanation” instead of IBE, “because in science, as in life, it is often hard to know what is best, but it may be possible to know what is good enough, at least for the moment.””
Trugschluss der unzutreffenden Konkretheit
Schramm, M. (2025) · J.B. Metzler eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-476-06012-9_69
(Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictionsPreprint
Negro, N. (2023) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh)
The Philosophy of Science of Consciousness SciencePreprint
Negro, N., Hohwy, J., Corcoran, A., & Mudrik, L. (2024) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 2
Neuronalne korelaty świadomej treści
Koculak, M. (n.d.) · Jagiellonian University Repository (Jagiellonian University)
Fetal Pain Perception: Legislative Assertions and Developmental Neuroscience
Graf, W. D., Crombleholme, T. M., Epstein, L. G., Gano, D., Pearl, P. L., Salomons, T. V., Scher, M. S., Turk, E., Zimmer, K., & Sarnat, H. B. (2026) · Annals of the Child Neurology Society · doi:10.1002/cns3.70057
Categorical AI Phenomenology: A First-Person Approach
Prentner, R. (2026) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s2705078526500013
“This question gave rise to plenty of debates about the underlying metaphysical picture [Chalmers, 2002], which still continue today [Frankish, 2016; Goff, 2019; Friston et al. , 2020; Ellia et al. , 2021; Graziano, 2022; Prentner & Hoffman, 2024; Kuhn, 2024].”
Embodiment constraint: On how (not) to approach the possibility of consciousness in neural organoids
Cea, I., Villalobos, M., & Paz, A. W. (2026) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-026-09648-2
“2 Consider now the Integrated Information Theory 4.0 [50, 51].”
InfluentialRejecting the “formless stuff” response to the origin of consciousness problem for IIT 4.0
Cea, I. (2026) · Límite · doi:10.64966/rl.1980
“…Theory (Graziano, 2017, 2019), the theoretical starting point of IIT is a description of consciousness itself, as experienced from the first-person perspective, rather than its neural, behavioral, computational, or functional correlates (Chis-Ciure, 2022; Ellia et al., 2021; Negro, 2020, 2022a).”
Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions
de Leon, S. P., & Yoshimi, J. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag037
“…Tononi 2005, Tononi 2008, Balduzzi and Tononi 2009, Tononi 2012, Oizumi et al. 2014, Tononi and Koch 2015, Tononi et al. 2016, Haun and Tononi 2019, Ellia et al. 2021, Bartlett 2022, Seth and Bayne 2022, Albantakis et al. 2023, Gomez-Marin and Seth 2025, Klincewicz et al. 2025, Tononi et al.…”
Completely Measured: Integrated Information Theory and Identity
MacDonald, C. (n.d.) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
Can extrinsic methods reveal intrinsic structure? Complementing IIT with QStrPreprint
Hendren, J., Grasso, M., Ellia, F., & Tononi, G. (2026) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.24928
“And the claim all quality is structure captures the central conjecture of IIT—the theory’s explanatory identity (Albantakis et al. 2023; IIT Wiki/Identity): the quality of every experience can be characterized as an (intrinsic) phenomenal structure, which can be accounted for physically by an (intrinsic) causal struct…”
InfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ellia, F., Hendren, J., Grasso, M., Kozma, C., Mindt, G., P. Lang, J., M. Haun, A., Albantakis, L., Boly, M., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Bologna (IT)
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd , Madison, WI 53719, USA
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- ORCID
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-05-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab032-niab032
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8519344
- OpenAlex
- W3206439174
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 65
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 3
- FWCI
- 8.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Tiny Blue Dot Foundation
- Templeton World Charity Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- consciousness, subjective experience, integrated information theory, qualia, physicalism, phenomenal properties
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