The DOI matches its Crossref record; 139 of the 139 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self
Abstract
In recent years, there has been much focus on the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms. By contrast, this article proposes a unifying account emphasizing basic abnormalities of consciousness that underlie and also antecede a disparate assortment of signs and symptoms. Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity disturbance (ipse is Latin for "self" or "itself") that is characterized by complementary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin to external objects. Diminished self-affection or self-presence refers to a weakened sense of existing as a vital and self-coinciding source of awareness and action. This article integrates recent psychiatric research and European phenomenological psychiatry with some current work in cognitive science and phenomenological philosophy. After introducing the phenomenological approach along with a theoretical account of normal consciousness and self-awareness, we turn to a variety of schizophrenic syndromes. We examine positive, then negative, and finally disorganization symptoms-attempting in each case to illuminate shared distortions of consciousness and the sense of self. We conclude by discussing the possible relevance of this approach for identifying early schizophrenic symptoms.
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In the citing paper
“These disturbances in the minimal self are well-established features and perhaps even core symptoms of schizophrenia (de Vries et al., 2013; Henriksen & Parnas, 2012; Hur et al., 2014; B. Nelson, Whitford, et al., 2014; B. Nelson, Parnas, et al., 2014; Parnas & Handest, 2003; Sass & Parnas, 2003).”
From Narrative identity in the psychosis spectrum: A systematic review and developmental model (2021) · cites this paper as Sass & Parnas, 2003
In the citing paper
“Phenomenologically, individuals with schizophrenia experience dramatic disturbances in the minimal self. The minimal self loses its vitality and stability as a subject of awareness (diminished self-affection) while at the same time aspects of self-experience may seem external or alien (hyper-reflexivity) (Sass & Parnas, 2003).”
From Narrative identity in the psychosis spectrum: A systematic review and developmental model (2021) · cites this paper as Sass & Parnas, 2003
In the citing paper
“This self-disturbance is profound, reaching from basic senses of agency and ownership over experience (de Vries et al., 2013; Henriksen & Parnas, 2012; Hur et al., 2014; B. Nelson, Parnas, et al., 2014; Sass & Parnas, 2003) to lifelong struggles to build personal identity and find meaning amid lost roles, relationships, and internalized stigma (Andresen et al., 2003; Ben-David & Kealy, 2019; Conne”
From Narrative identity in the psychosis spectrum: A systematic review and developmental model (2021) · cites this paper as Sass & Parnas, 2003
Citations
Cites
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
Bornstein, M. H., & Gibson, J. J. (1980) · The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism · doi:10.2307/429816 · Cited by 22,935
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) for schizophrenia.
Kay, S. R., Fiszbein, A., & Opler, L. A. (1987) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/13.2.261 · Cited by 21,378
Vygotsky, L. S. (1964) · Bulletin of the Orton Society · doi:10.1007/bf02928399 · Cited by 20,704
Polanyi, M. (1997) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-7506-9718-7.50010-x · Cited by 12,410
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1982) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203981139 · Cited by 11,945
Tractatus logico-philosophicus
(2021) · Anthem Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv22d4t7n.8 · Cited by 4,884
Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias
(1951) · Journal of the American Medical Association · doi:10.1001/jama.1951.02920270079043 · Cited by 4,407
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 1×
“Much of normal human activity and cognition occurs automatically and out of awareness—as is necessary for efficient functioning (Bargh and Chartrand 1999).”
DSM-IV: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
Bell, C. C. (1994) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.1994.03520100096046 · Cited by 2,608
Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia: Definition and Reliability
Andreasen, N. C. (1982) · Archives of General Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1982.04290070020005 · Cited by 2,247
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The Moral Significance of Recovery
Davidson, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198817338.013.39 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J.
- Affiliations
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
- University of Copenhagen (DK)
- Corresponding author
- Parnas, J.
- ORCID
- Parnas, J.
- Venue
- Schizophrenia Bulletin
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-01-01
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 427-444
- ISSN
- 0586-7614 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-1701
- OpenAlex
- W2159675987
- Cited by
- 1,324
- References
- 139
- Citations by year
- 2026: 90 · 2025: 76 · 2024: 90 · 2023: 87 · 2022: 91 · 2021: 80 · 2020: 93 · 2019: 86 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 74 · 2015: 77 · 2014: 56 · 2013: 80 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 65.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Schizophrenia Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- schizophrenia, consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Affect, Consciousness, Humans, Schizophrenia, Schizophrenic Psychology, Self Concept
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