The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets
Open accessAbstract
I develop a model of (individually rational) collective reality denial in groups, organizations and markets. Whether participants' tendencies toward wishful thinking reinforce or dampen each other is shown to hinge on a simple and novel mechanism. When an agent can expect to benefit from other's delusions, this makes him more of a realist; when he is more likely to suffer losses from them this pushes him toward denial, which becomes contagious. This general "Mutually Assured Delusion" principle can give rise to multiple social cognitions of reality, irrespective of any strategic payoff interactions or private signals. It also implies that in hierachical organizations realism or denial will trickle down, causing subordinates to take their mindsets and beliefs from the leaders. Contagious "exuberance" can also seize asset markets, leading to evidence-resistant investment frenzies and subsequent deep crashes. In addition to collective illusions of control, the model accounts for the mirror case of fatalism and collective resignation. The welfare analysis differentiates valuable group morale from harmful groupthink and identifies a fundamental tension in organizations' attitudes toward free speech and dissent.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Simple Model of Herd Behavior
Banerjee, A. V. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118364 · Cited by 6,556
Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority
Asch, S. E. (1956) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093718 · Cited by 4,267
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x · Cited by 3,669
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction☆
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 · Cited by 2,754
A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences
Koszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/121.4.1133 · Cited by 2,728
This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
REINHART, C. M., & ROGOFF, K. S. (2009) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4gqx · Cited by 2,357
From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance
Shiller, R. J. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164967 · Cited by 1,835
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory
Kreps, D. M., & Porteus, E. L. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913656 · Cited by 1,821
Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193913 · Cited by 1,539
Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption
Loewenstein, G. (1987) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232929 · Cited by 1,326
Motivated inference: Self‐serving generation and evaluation of causal theories
Kunda, Z. (1987) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.53.4.636 · Cited by 1,059
Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets *
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr002 · Cited by 1,042
Self-citationBelief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.699 · Cited by 1,036
Kindleberger, C. P., & Aliber, R. Z. (2005) · doi:10.1057/9780230628045 · Cited by 821
Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings
Caplin, A., & Leahy, J. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556347 · Cited by 808
Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (2004) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1023/b:sore.0000027411.35832.53 · Cited by 799
The evolution and psychology of self-deception
von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10001354 · Cited by 736
Brunnermeier, M. K., & Parker, J. A. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825493 · Cited by 718
The Wrong Kind of Transparency
Prat, A. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201297 · Cited by 647
The ostrich effect: Selective attention to information
Karlsson, N., Loewenstein, G., & Seppi, D. (2009) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/s11166-009-9060-6 · Cited by 622
Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What's Right and What to Do about It
Bazerman, M. H., & Tenbrunsel, A. E. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400837991 · Cited by 611
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421167 · Cited by 610
Self-citationCOGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS
Goetzmann, W. N., & Peles, N. (1997) · Journal of Financial Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6803.1997.tb00241.x · Cited by 524
Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
Chamley, C., & Gale, D. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951507 · Cited by 489
Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interpersonal conflict
Thompson, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1992) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(92)90010-5 · Cited by 463
Optimal Beliefs, Asset Prices, and the Preference for Skewed Returns
Brunnermeier, M. K., Gollier, C., & Parker, J. A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.2.159 · Cited by 448
Social Movements in Organizations: Coup d'Etat, Insurgency, and Mass Movements
Zald, M. N., & Berger, M. A. (1978) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226634 · Cited by 408
The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters
Di Tella, R., Galiant, S., & Schargrodsky, E. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.1.209 · Cited by 358
Confidence-Enhanced Performance
Compte, O., & Postlewaite, A. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052204 · Cited by 300
Limits of Arbitrage: Theory and Evidence from the Mortgage‐Backed Securities Market
GABAIX, X., KRISHNAMURTHY, A., & VIGNERON, O. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01217.x · Cited by 295
Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision
Van den Steen, E. (2005) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewi011 · Cited by 283
Visionaries, Managers, and Strategic Direction
Rotemberg, J. J., & Saloner, G. (2000) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696355 · Cited by 280
Self-Correcting Information Cascades
GOEREE, J. K., PALFREY, T. R., ROGERS, B. W., & McKELVEY, R. D. (2007) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00438.x · Cited by 236
Managing Self-Confidence: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Mobius, M., Niederle, M., Niehaus, P., & Rosenblat, T. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17014 · Cited by 224
Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?
Ottaviani, M., & Sørensen, P. (2001) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00119-5 · Cited by 219
Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis
Foote, C., Gerardi, K., & Willen, P. (2012) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w18082 · Cited by 203
Business as usual: The acceptance and perpetuation of corruption in organizations
Anand, V., Ashforth, B. E., & Joshi, M. (2005) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/ame.2005.19417904 · Cited by 199
Koszegi, B. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/121.1.121 · Cited by 196
Do We Follow Others when We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations
Weizsäcker, G. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2340 · Cited by 194
The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms
Gervais, S., & Itay Goldstein, B. (2007) · European Finance Review · doi:10.1093/rof/rfm022 · Cited by 182
Determinants of selective memory about the self.
Mischel, W., Ebbesen, E. B., & Zeiss, A. M. (1976) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-006x.44.1.92 · Cited by 174
Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
Kőszegi, B. (2010) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-009-0465-x · Cited by 170
Linking groupthink to unethical behavior in organizations
Sims, R. R. (1992) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/bf01686345 · Cited by 142
Optimal Dissent in Organizations
Landier, A., Sraer, D. A., & Thesmar, D. (2009) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00544.x · Cited by 135
Self-deception as self-signalling: a model and experimental evidence
Mijović-Prelec, D., & Prelec, D. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0218 · Cited by 130
Joseph Schumpeter LectureIdeology
Bénabou, R. (2008) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.2-3.321 · Cited by 97
Self-citationFang, H., & Moscarini, G. (2005) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.02.001 · Cited by 84
AIDS Policy and Psychology: A Mechanism-Design Approach
Caplin, A., & Eliaz, K. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593781 · Cited by 74
Can anticipatory feelings explain anomalous choices of information sources?
Eliaz, K., & Spiegler, R. (2005) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.004 · Cited by 70
Bernheim, B. D., & Thomadsen, R. (2005) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.00989.x · Cited by 68
Chapter seven. Behavioral Economics of Organizations
Camerer, C. F., & Malmendier, U. M. (2007) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400829149-009 · Cited by 54
Wishful ThinkingPreprint
Mayraz, G. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1955644 · Cited by 51
The Unthinkable and the Unthought
Kuran, T. (1993) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463193005004005 · Cited by 32
Cited by
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
BÉNABOU, R., & TIROLE, J. (2010) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00843.x · Cited by 2,237
Self-citationIdentity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets *
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr002 · Cited by 1,042
Self-citationShiller, R. J. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.107.4.967 · Cited by 1,004
Golman, R., Hagmann, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151245 · Cited by 831
Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of Beliefs
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2016) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.30.3.141 · Cited by 817
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Bénabou, R.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-10-22
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 429-462
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3021998117
- Cited by
- 319
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 14.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.