The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game
Open accessAbstract
Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish defectors with class-specific probabilities and subsequently share the associated costs of sanctioning. We show that in the presence of different punishing cooperators the highest level of public cooperation is always attainable through a selection mechanism. Interestingly, the selection does not necessarily favor the evolution of punishers who would be able to prevail on their own against the defectors, nor does it always hinder the evolution of punishers who would be unable to prevail on their own. Instead, the evolutionary success of punishing strategies depends sensitively on their invasion velocities, which in turn reveals fascinating examples of both competition and cooperation among them. Furthermore, we show that under favorable conditions, when punishment is not strictly necessary for the maintenance of public cooperation, the less aggressive, mild form of sanctioning is the sole victor of the selection process. Our work reveals that natural strategy selection cannot only promote, but sometimes also hinders competition among prosocial strategies.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Szabó, G., & Fáth, G. (2007) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004 · Cited by 2,974
Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games
Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., & Pacheco, J. M. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06940 · Cited by 1,442
Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review
Perc, M., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Szolnoki, A., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2012.0997 · Cited by 1,340
Self-citationRand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1123633 · Cited by 997
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02978 · Cited by 865
Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.77.011904 · Cited by 774
Self-citationVia Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1141588 · Cited by 725
SuperCooperators: altruism, evolution, and why we need each other to succeed
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-2054 · Cited by 619
Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1183665 · Cited by 613
Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature09203 · Cited by 580
How Did Cooperative Behavior Evolve?
Pennisi, E. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.309.5731.93 · Cited by 486
Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games
Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Szabó, G. (2009) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.80.056109 · Cited by 458
Self-citationPunishment and reputation in spatial public goods games
Brandt, H., Hauert, C., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2003.2336 · Cited by 419
Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Szabó, G. (2010) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/12/8/083005 · Cited by 417
Self-citationPhase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment
Szolnoki, A., Szabó, G., & Perc, M. (2011) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.83.036101 · Cited by 414
Self-citationEvolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions
Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Szabó, G. (2010) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758 · Cited by 389
Self-citationCentralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans
Baldassarri, D., & Grossman, G. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105456108 · Cited by 330
Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans
Sigmund, K. (2007) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.06.012 · Cited by 309
Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2014) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016 · Cited by 285
Self-citationSelf-organization of punishment in structured populations
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2012) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/14/4/043013 · Cited by 259
Self-citationCooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions
Henrich, J. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1126398 · Cited by 233
Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.014 · Cited by 232
Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games
Szolnoki, A., Szabó, G., & Czakó, L. (2011) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.84.046106 · Cited by 198
Self-citationThe role of diversity in the evolution of cooperation
Santos, F. C., Pinheiro, F. L., Lenaerts, T., & Pacheco, J. M. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.003 · Cited by 197
Diffusive Clustering in the Two Dimensional Voter Model
Cox, J. T., & Griffeath, D. (1986) · The Annals of Probability · doi:10.1214/aop/1176992521 · Cited by 192
A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate1927 · Cited by 183
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
Sasaki, T., Brännström, Å., Dieckmann, U., & Sigmund, K. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1115219109 · Cited by 176
Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008 · Cited by 173
Self-citationFraming and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games
Cubitt, R. P., Drouvelis, M., & Gächter, S. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9266-0 · Cited by 170
Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tat prevails
Rand, D. G., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015 · Cited by 165
Does strong heterogeneity promote cooperation by group interactions?
Perc, M. (2011) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/13/12/123027 · Cited by 165
Self-citationEgalitarian motive and altruistic punishment
Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., & Smirnov, O. A. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03256 · Cited by 112
Human punishment is motivated by inequity aversion, not a desire for reciprocity
Raihani, N., & McAuliffe, K. (2012) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2012.0470 · Cited by 111
Colman, A. M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/440744b · Cited by 104
Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., Röhl, T., & Milinski, M. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1315273111 · Cited by 90
Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
Janssen, M. A., & Bushman, C. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017 · Cited by 85
Milinski, M., & Rockenbach, B. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/452297a · Cited by 44
Shimao, H., & Nakamaru, M. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059894 · Cited by 35
Punishment in public goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis
Hintze, A., & Adami, C. (2015) · Physical Biology · doi:10.1088/1478-3975/12/4/046005 · Cited by 28
Cui, P.-B., & Wu, Z.-X. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.021 · Cited by 24
Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation
Wolff, I. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.09.012 · Cited by 14
Cited by
Statistical physics of human cooperation
Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., & Szolnoki, A. (2017) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2017.05.004 · Cited by 1,590
Self-citationInterdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01183 · Cited by 485
Self-citationWu, J., Balliet, D., Peperkoorn, L. S., Romano, A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02956 · Cited by 156
Böckler, A., Tusche, A., Schmidt, P., & Singer, T. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-31813-8 · Cited by 107
The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional peer exclusion
Quan, J., Li, X., & Wang, X. (2019) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5119395 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M.
- Venue
- Physical Review E
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2015-07-27
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 012819-012819
- ISSN
- 1539-3755 (ISSN-L)
- 1550-2376
- OpenAlex
- W1758342214
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 96.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.