A review of secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing
Open accessAbstract
In the digital healthcare era, it is of the utmost importance to harness medical information scattered across healthcare institutions to support in-depth data analysis and achieve personalized healthcare. However, the cyberinfrastructure boundaries of healthcare organizations and privacy leakage threats place obstacles on the sharing of medical records. Blockchain, as a public ledger characterized by its transparency, tamper-evidence, trustlessness, and decentralization, can help build a secure medical data exchange network. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art schemes on secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing of the past decade with a focus on blockchain-based approaches. We classify them into permissionless blockchain-based approaches and permissioned blockchain-based approaches and analyze their advantages and disadvantages. We also discuss potential research topics on blockchain-based medical data sharing.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This review surveys secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing schemes, focusing on blockchain-based approaches and classifying them as permissionless or permissioned. It argues blockchain alone is not sufficient, recommending off-chain encrypted storage plus cryptographic access control and careful choice of blockchain type.
Key findings
- Medical data sharing faces massive data growth (20–40% annually; average US healthcare provider managed 665 TB in 2015, 80% unstructured images; healthcare big data estimated at 25,000 PB by 2020) and frequent breaches (more than one per day).
- Blockchain schemes split into permissionless (e.g., MedRec, Modelchain) and permissioned/consortium (e.g., MedBlock, Patientory, ChainAnchor); permissioned offers higher throughput (Hyperledger Fabric up to 10,000 TPS vs Ethereum 20 TPS and Bitcoin 7 TPS) but requires a central authority, while permissionless incurs cryptocurrency costs (storing 1 KB costs 640,000 gas, about $2.3 at 20 Gwei and Ether valued at $168 on May 8, 2019).
- Because on-chain storage is limited/expensive and conflicts with erasure rights (e.g., GDPR), the review concludes medical data should be stored off-chain in encrypted form, with hashes/query strings on-chain; cryptographic primitives (ABE, IBE, PRE, SSE, broadcast encryption) are needed for access control and privacy.
- Anonymization models (k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness) trade privacy against utility; none fully prevents leakage while maintaining reasonable utility, so integration with other techniques is advised.
Methods
- Design: narrative survey/review of state-of-the-art secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing over the past decade, with focus on blockchain-based approaches.
- Data/sample: classifies surveyed schemes into permissionless and permissioned blockchain approaches; Table 2 includes schemes with a complete framework/system addressing secure medical data sharing, excluding schemes focused on a single security functionality.
- Analysis: compares security metrics (identification, access control, data authenticity, data encryption), architecture metrics (blockchain type, data storage method), and functionality metrics (smart contract, interoperability); also reviews cloud/cryptography, anonymization, blockchain, and software-defined infrastructure approaches.
Limitations
- The paper states that whether to adopt permissioned or permissionless blockchain remains open, with no strong evidence that one type can completely substitute the other; hybrid architectures may add complexity in consensus, access control, and data provision.
- It states that global querying across independently managed medical databases remains unaddressed, and compatibility of security mechanisms across healthcare domains is unclear.
- Evident from the text: this is a narrative review without a stated systematic search strategy, inclusion criteria beyond Table 2’s scope, or quantitative meta-analysis; many surveyed schemes are noted to lack algorithmic or implementation details (e.g., consensus protocol, smart contracts, bABE/PKES details).
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 48 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingcitation
Chen and Hoang's CPRBAC model does not contain any cryptographic primitive to ensure data confidentiality and integrity.
“However, their work does not contain any cryptographic primitive to ensure data confidentiality and integrity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [33]
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- Findingcitation
Yue et al.'s healthcare data gateway lacks details of how a service is prevented from knowing the data content when a computation runs on raw medical data.
“But their scheme lacks the details of how a service is prevented from knowing the data content when a computation runs on the raw medical data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [49] source
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- Findingcitation
Zhang et al.'s PSN-based healthcare environment did not provide details about their consensus protocol and smart contracts.
“However, the authors did not provide details about their consensus protocol and smart contracts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [54]
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- Findingcitation
Xia et al.'s BBDS limits secure sharing of sensitive medical information to invited and verified users.
“However, their secure sharing of sensitive medical information is limited to invited and verified users.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [50] source
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- Findingreasoning
Most state-of-the-art approaches to medical data sharing store medical information off-chain while storing data query strings and hash values on-chain for authenticity and integrity verification.
“This explains why most of the state-of-the-art approaches [47], [48], [50]- [52], [55] on medical data sharing chose to store medical information off-chain while data query strings and hash values are stored on-chain for authenticity and integrity verification.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [47] source
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- cites [48]
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- cites [50]- [52]
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- Findingcitation
Most existing schemes choose to store encrypted metadata (e.g., query strings and secure indices) indicating data locations on chain.
“Most existing schemes choose to store encrypted metadata (e.g., query strings in [47], [48] and secure indices in [53], [57]) indicating data locations on chain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [47] source
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- cites [48]
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- cites [53]
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- Findingcitation
The state-of-the-art schemes in medical data areas rely more or less on the adoption of certain cryptographic primitives to implement authentication, access control, key management, and privacy protection for medical information.
“The state-of-the-art schemes [30], [47]- [52], [55], [57] in medical data areas rely more or less on the adoption of certain cryptographic primitives to implement authentication, access control, key management, and privacy protection for medical information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Findingreasoning
The problem of efficiently performing a global query on all independently managed databases simultaneously and obtaining an aggregated query result remains unaddressed in existing schemes.
“This problem remains unaddressed in existing schemes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
Some existing methods have adopted advanced cryptographic primitives (e.g., attribute-based encryption) to enforce strict and flexible access control for medical data access.
“Currently, there are some methods [30], [48] that have adopted advanced cryptographic primitives (e.g., attribute-based encryption) to enforce strict and flexible access control for medical data access.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [30] source
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- cites [48]
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- Premisecitation
k-anonymity and l-diversity do not protect anonymity from every attack, such as homogeneity attack, background attack, similarity attack, and skewness attack.
“Specifically, k-anonymity and l-diversity do not protect anonymity from every attack (e.g., homogeneity attack, background attack, similarity attack, and skewness attack etc.) [46].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [46]
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- Interpretationcitation
Allowing cloud providers to control encryption keys could increase risks of data leakage because cloud administrators can access and decrypt data.
“Allowing cloud providers to control the keys could potentially increase the risks of data leakage because cloud administrators have the chance to ''touch'' the keys and further to decrypt data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [22] source
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- Premisecitation
Cloud-based data sharing difficulty lies in how much trust users can place on cloud service providers, due to lack of transparency and loss of data control by users in cloud environments.
“Considering the fact that users and cloud providers usually belong to different administrative or security domains, the difficulty of cloud-based data sharing lies in how much trust users can place on cloud service providers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Data-related behavior in a public blockchain, like access request, access policy validation, and message transferring, can all be costly since they require transactions that describe them to be generated and included in blocks.
“Data-related behavior in a public blockchain, like access request, access policy validation, and message transferring, can all be costly since they require transactions that describe them to be generated and included in blocks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Only a very tiny subset of critical metadata can be stored on the blockchain.
“Instead, only a very tiny subset of critical metadata can be stored on the blockchain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Traditional security means adopted in a single administrative domain are insufficient for medical data sharing across multiple healthcare domains.
“Another trend revealed from these cloud-based data sharing schemes is that traditional security means adopted in a single administrative domain are insufficient for medical data sharing across multiple healthcare domains.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
None of k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness can completely ensure that no privacy leakage occurs while maintaining a reasonable level of data utility.
“Currently, none of k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness can completely ensure that no privacy leakage occurs while maintaining a reasonable level of data utility [37], [38].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [37]
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- cites [38] source
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- Interpretationcitation
Private cloud-based approaches are inconvenient for collaborators who reside outside of the domain perimeter to access data stored in the domain.
“Because building highly scalable private clouds requires a large investment on computing and storage devices, and the rapidly changing volume of clinical data makes it difficult to accurately estimate required cloud capacity in the future [6], private cloud-based approaches are inconvenient for collaborators who reside outside of the domain perimeter to access data stored in the domain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6] source
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- Interpretationreasoning
Ethereum's and Bitcoin's throughput is insufficient to address the data access events that happen in a real-world healthcare management system.
“The last two are insufficient to address the data access events that happen in a real-world healthcare management system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Hyperledger Fabric can process up to 10000 transactions per second, Ethereum 20 TPS, and Bitcoin 7 TPS.
- Premisenone given
Blockchain can only guarantee the security of on-chain stored data.
“blockchain can only guarantee the security of on-chain stored data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Blockchain's data capacity is usually limited because it was originally designed to record small trading transactions.
“Blockchain was originally designed to record small size trading transactions, so its data capacity is usually limited.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Many data privacy protection laws enforce that data need not be stored permanently.
“This is also enforced by many data privacy protection laws [6].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6] source
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- Premisecitation
In cryptographic cloud storage, keys rather than data content are encrypted by broadcast encryption schemes to enforce access control, so that authorized users can recover the key while unauthorized or revoked users cannot decrypt the message.
“In cryptographic cloud storage [24]- [26], instead of directly encrypting data content, keys are encrypted by broadcast encryption schemes to enforce access control where authorized users can recover the key by decrypting the broadcast message, whereas unauthorized or revoked users cannot find sufficient information to decrypt the message.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [24]- [26]
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- Premisecitation
The Casper version of Ethereum (Ethereum 2.0), which adopts the Proof of Stake consensus and a sharding technique, can attain an 8-million TPS throughput.
“the Casper version of Ethereum (Ethereum 2.0) that adopts the Proof of Stake(PoS) consensus and a sharing technique can attain a 8-million TPS throughput [69].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [69]
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- Interpretationcitation
Storing plain-text medical records in a medical database increases leakage risks.
“database undoubtedly will increase leakage risks, which is primarily due to following reasons:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Blockchain itself is not a panacea to solve all security and privacy problems in medical data sharing.
“However, blockchain itself is not a panacea to solve all security and privacy problems in medical data sharing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Relying on blockchain technology to secure off-chain stored medical data is infeasible.
“As we have pointed out, that relying on blockchain technology to secure off-chain stored medical data is infeasible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
With attribute-based encryption, a patient can define an access policy and encrypt medical records with it, so that only users whose attributes match the policy can decrypt the records.
“With attribute-based encryption [75], the patient can define an access policy (''PHYSICIAN'' AND ''RESEARCHER'') and encrypt his medical records with this policy, so that only users with attributes matching this policy can decrypt the records.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [75]
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- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 40
- May combine two claims. 37
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FindingreasoningHIPAA regulation covers almost every aspect of security.
“Table 1 lists a collection of technical safeguard standards along with implementation specifications, where we can see that the HIPAA regulation covers almost every aspect of security.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationZhao et al.'s fuzzy vault-based key management scheme lacks details of how their health blockchain works.
“But their work lack details of how their health blockchain works.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [59]
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FindingcitationPeterson et al.'s blockchain-based cross-institutional health information sharing framework does not mention how medical data are organized, stored, and accessed, and its privacy-preserving keyword searches lack algorithmic details.
“However, the paper does not mention how the medical data are organized, stored, and accessed.The privacy-preserving keyword searches adopted in their framework lack algorithmic details.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [53]
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FindingcitationNarayan et al.'s patient-centric EHR system lacked algorithmic details about the adopted bABE and PKES schemes.
“However, their design lacked algorithmic details about adopted bABE and PKES schemes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31]
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Findingnone givenSecurity and privacy protection of medical information covers confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data in transit and at rest, and access and privacy control.
“We observed that security and privacy protection of medical information covers confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data in transit and at rest, access and privacy control, etc.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThere is no strong evidence showing that one type of blockchain can completely substitute the other type.
“Despite the debate over permissioned and permissionless blockchains throughout academia and industry, there is no strong evidence showing that one type can completely substitute the other type.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe security and privacy of healthcare information should be protected not only from external attackers, but also from unauthorized access from within the network or system.
“Generally, the difficulty primarily lies in that the security and privacy of healthcare information should be protected not only from external attackers, but also from unauthorized access from within the network or system [6].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6]
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Premisenone givent-closeness offers complete privacy but severely impairs the correlations between key attributes and confidential attributes.
“In contrast, t-closeness offers complete privacy but severely impairs the correlations between key attributes and confidential attributes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe multi-tenancy characteristic of public cloud services exposes data to different types of attacks, and such attacks are difficult to detect or monitor in a shared VM environment.
“However, the multi-tenancy characteristic of public cloud services decides virtual machines are shared among various applications that expose the data to different types of attacks.Worse still, it is difficult to detect or monitor such attacks in a shared VM environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenData interoperability remains a significant issue in cloud environments due to the incompatibility of various cloud services.
“It should be noted that data interoperability remains a significant issue in cloud environments due to the incompatibility of various cloud services.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningSecure management of healthcare data is a hybrid approach, which requires various mechanisms and technical means to be incorporated to meet security and privacy targets.
“This implies that the secure management of healthcare data is a hybrid approach, which requires various mechanisms and technical means to be incorporated to meet these security and privacy targets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe closed-domain approach has created medical data silos scattered throughout various healthcare institutions, preventing collaborative healthcare treatment and medical research.
“This has created the medical data silos of today that are scattered throughout various healthcare institutions, preventing collaborative healthcare treatment and medical research.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe cyberinfrastructure boundaries of healthcare organizations and privacy leakage threats place obstacles on the sharing of medical records.
“However, the cyberinfrastructure boundaries of healthcare organizations and privacy leakage threats place obstacles on the sharing of medical records.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenWhether private or public clouds are adopted for healthcare management to guarantee data security and privacy, a basic requirement is data encryption.
“Whether private or public clouds are adopted for healthcare management to guarantee data security and privacy, a basic requirement is data encryption.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningMore advanced cryptographic primitives with rich access control semantics and strict confidentiality enforcement are required for medical data sharing across multiple healthcare domains.
“Hence, more advanced cryptographic primitives with rich access control semantics and strict confidentiality enforcement are required.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningStoring data on a public blockchain can be very expensive; it is financially impractical to store detailed clinical information of millions of patients on chain.
“Storing data on a public blockchain can be very expensive.It is financially impractical to store detailed clinical information of millions of patients on chain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15] source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenBlockchain, as a public ledger characterized by transparency, tamper-evidence, trustlessness, and decentralization, can help build a secure medical data exchange network.
“Blockchain, as a public ledger characterized by its transparency, tamper-evidence, trustlessness, and decentralization, can help build a secure medical data exchange network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenHow to enforce cross-domain access control and secure sharing of medical data in a state-wide or even national scale remains a challenging task.
“However, how to enforce cross-domain access control and secure sharing of medical data in a state-wide or even national scale remains a challenging task.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe direct consequence of the network defense perimeter is the lack of data interoperability on medical information, which further poses a barrier to medical analytics that require a large amount of clinical information.
“The direct consequence of this network defense perimeter is the lack of data interoperability on medical information, which further poses a barrier to medical analytics that require a large amount of clinical information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningLetting cloud users manage encryption keys enhances data security and provides better control, but it burdens users with distributing keys to authorized users, limiting scalability of sharing data among many institutions.
“Letting cloud users manage encryption keys certainly will enhance data security and provide better control; however, it would be a troublesome burden for users to distribute corresponding keys to authorized users, which limits its scalability of sharing data among a large number of institutions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenPublic clouds support scalability and data sharing well.
“On the other hand, public clouds support scalability and data sharing well.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningMost existing healthcare systems are built on an enclosed domain with a network defense perimeter to prevent outside attacks and threats, which is a huge hurdle to cross-institutional data sharing.
“Most existing healthcare systems are built on an enclosed domain with a network defense perimeter to prevent outside attacks and threats.This is a huge hurdle to cross-institutional data sharing due to two reasons:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningPermissioned blockchain requires certain permission to access the blockchain; participants are selected in advance and only authorized nodes can access information stored on the blockchain.
“Instead, consortium blockchain requires certain permission to access the blockchain.This means that participants are selected in advance and only those authorized nodes can be allowed to access information stored on the blockchain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe era of cloud computing and big data necessitates that medical data be shared among various users and institutions to allow analysis, so that better healthcare service and new treatment plans can be provided.
“On the other hand, the era of cloud computing and big data necessitates that medical data be shared among various users and institutions to allow analysis, so that better healthcare service and new treatment plans can be provided.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPublic blockchain is usually crypto-currency driven, so a certain amount of cryptocurrency has to be paid for transaction inclusion and block mining.
“However, public blockchain is usually crypto-currency driven (bitcoins in Bitcoin or ether in Ethereum), which means a certain amount of cryptocurrency 2 has to be paid for transaction inclusion and block mining.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15] source
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InterpretationreasoningData immutability in public blockchain is discounted in consortium blockchain, which opens up the possibility of blockchain rollback by an attacker or a certain authority member.
“Therefore, the data immutability in public blockchain is discounted in consortium blockchain, which opens up the possibility of blockchain rollback by an attacker or a certain authority member.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningOn-chain storage of medical information is not a good choice, due to the limited block size in current blockchains and the bandwidth waste required to achieve network consensus.
“From the above analysis, it can be seen that on-chain storage of medical information is not a good choice due to the limited block size in current blockchains and the bandwidth waste to achieve network consensus.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The block size in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte, which is insufficient to store medical data such as X-ray images.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAdopting permissionless blockchain for medical data sharing requires cryptocurrency, and a great amount of money is needed to run the network for healthcare data management.
“Another challenge of adopting permissionless blockchain for medical data sharing would be cryptocurrency, which is the incentive that makes the behind consensus protocol work.”
- Also stated in: § 3) PERMISSIONED OR PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAIN? · plain
“That means a great amount of money (cryptocurrency) is needed to run the network for healthcare data management.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: In medical data management, data access happens very frequently.
- Also stated in: § 3) PERMISSIONED OR PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAIN? · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe permissioned blockchain setting is similar to the medical data sharing scenario, where only healthcare stakeholders (patients, healthcare providers, and authorized medical researchers) can be allowed to access information based on their authorized permissions.
“Such a setting is similar to the medical data sharing scenario, where only healthcare stakeholders (patients, healthcare providers, and authorized medical researchers) can be allowed to access that information based on their authorized permissions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenOnce a healthcare system is compromised, all medical information could be leaked.
“once a healthcare system is compromised, then all medical information could be leaked”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationOver 50% of security breaches occur in the medical industry, with up to 90% of healthcare organizations having exposed their data or had it stolen.
“According to a 2014 study [68], over 50% of security breaches occur in the medical industry, with up to 90% of healthcare organizations having exposed their data or had it stolen.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [68]
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationDue to HIPAA privacy and security regulations, medical data management should provide secure storage of raw medical information (confidentiality, integrity), privacy-preserving data provision (data authenticity, user authentication, access control), auditability, traceability, and data interoperability.
“Due to the privacy and security regulations of HIPAA, medical data management should provide secure storage of raw medical information (confidentiality, integrity), privacypreserving data provision (data authenticity, user authentication, access control), auditability, traceability, and data interoperability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [3]
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InterpretationreasoningStoring medical information on-chain leads to poor throughput and performance because on-chain transactions and blocks must be downloaded locally by every peer node, causing great bandwidth waste.
“However, this naive approach will lead to poor throughput and performance since on-chain transactions and blocks need to be downloaded locally by every peer node, which leads to a great bandwidth waste.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningData encryption can be the last line of defense when a healthcare system is compromised, because an attacker can learn nothing about the encrypted data without the corresponding encryption key.
“Data encryption can be the last line of defense when a healthcare system is compromised because an attacker can learn nothing about the encrypted data if one cannot obtain the corresponding encryption key.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationBroadcast encryption lets an owner encrypt a small piece of data to a subset of users, and only users in the subset can decrypt the broadcast message to recover the data.
“Broadcast encryption was first introduced in [70] and improved in [71], [72], which let an owner encrypt a small piece of data to a subset of users.Only users in the subset can decrypt the broadcast message to recover the data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [70]
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- cites [71]
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- cites [72] source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenBlockchain, as a secured and transparent public ledger, can guarantee the integrity of on-chain stored data (transactions and blocks).
“Blockchain itself is a secured and transparent public ledger that can guarantee the integrity of on-chain stored data (transactions and blocks).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationLi et al.'s ABE-based scheme for personal health records gives patients full control of their medical information but poses too much burden on patients because patient-side applications must generate and distribute keys to authorized users.
“Despite patients' full control of their medical information, the scheme poses too much burden on patients, since the patient side applications are required to generate and distribute corresponding keys to authorized users.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [27]
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Interpretationnone givenDespite a strict access control policy deployed in a healthcare system, an internal IT technical staff member can still easily access the data, which makes data confidentiality difficult to guarantee.
“despite the strict access control policy deployed in a healthcare system, an internal IT technical staff member still can easily ''touch'' the data, which makes data confidentiality difficult to guarantee.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEncryption of medical data and secured key storage are two necessary steps to enhance the security and privacy of medical information.
“we believe that encryption of medical data and secured key storage are two necessary steps to enhance the security and privacy of medical information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationFan et al.'s MedBlock does not explicitly explain the access control policy to allow third-party researchers to access medical data, and its proposal to use asymmetric encryption for medical information is not a good option considering encryption/decryption performance.
“However, the authors did not explicitly explain the access control policy to allow third-party researchers to access medical data.Moreover, their proposal of using asymmetric encryption algorithms to encrypt medical information does not seem to be a good option considering the encryption/decryption performance of asymmetric encryption.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [52]
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenSecure sharing of medical data involves patients, healthcare providers, and third-party medical researchers.
“Secure sharing of medical data involves patients, healthcare providers, and third-party medical researchers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationGuo et al.'s scheme encapsulates and stores health records in on-chain blocks, which limits its scalability because the size of on-chain stored data has a great impact on network throughput.
“However, their scheme encapsulates and stores health records in on-chain blocks, which limits its scalability since the size of on-chain stored data has a great impact on the network throughput.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [30]
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMost data has a life cycle, which makes it unnecessary to store such data permanently.
“Most data has its life cycle, which makes it unnecessary to store these data permanently.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPermissioned blockchain is far from a perfect solution for secure medical data sharing; its most notable disadvantage is the necessity of a central authority.
“However, in spite of its high throughput, permissioned blockchain is far from a perfect solution for secure medical data sharing.The most notable disadvantage is the necessity of a central authority, which is usually comprised of a group of companies with a shared interest that will run the blockchain network and oversee the whole system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisereasoningOn-chain stored data cannot be altered or deleted because blockchain is a continually growing public ledger.
“On-chain stored data cannot be altered or deleted because blockchain is a continually growing public ledger.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenPermissioned and permissionless blockchains primarily differ in their adopted consensus protocols, which in turn greatly affect throughput, block mining time, access policies, and privacy.
“permissioned and permissionless blockchain primarily differ in their adopted consensus protocols, which in turn have a great impact on throughput, block mining time, access policies, and privacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAttribute-based encryption can be divided into key-policy ABE (keys associated with access policies, ciphertext with an attribute set) and ciphertext-policy ABE (keys associated with an attribute set, ciphertext with access policies).
“Generally, it can be divided into two categories: (a) key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [76] where keys are associated with access policies and ciphertext is associated with an attributes set; and (b) ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption (CP-ABE) [76] where keys are associated with an attributes set and ciphertext is associated with access policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [76]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAs a new computing paradigm, blockchain has advantages over traditional technologies.
“As a new computing paradigm, blockchain has its advantages over traditional technologies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn both KP-ABE and CP-ABE a central authority is required to issue and validate private keys, which renders them unsuitable for a distributed environment where data sharing takes place across different administrative domains.
“In both schemes, a central authority is required to issue and validate private keys, rendering them unsuitable for a distributed environment where data sharing takes place across different administrative domains.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningA secure healthcare system still needs to employ appropriate cryptographic primitives to achieve confidentiality, integrity, access control, and privacy protection.
“Hence, a secure healthcare system still needs to employ appropriate cryptographic primitives to achieve confidentiality, integrity, access control, and privacy protection.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAdvanced cryptographic primitives (e.g., IBE, ABE, PRE) are becoming widely deployed to enforce strict and flexible access control of encryption keys.
“advanced cryptographic primitives (e.g., IBE, ABE, PRE) is becoming widely deployed to enforce strict and flexible access control of encryption keys.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenConstructing a hybrid blockchain architecture may cause great complexities in the management of consensus executions, including block mining, data access control, and data provision.
“However, this may cause great complexities in the management of consensus executions, including block mining, data access control, and data provision.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningIBE eliminates the need for a public key distribution infrastructure and allows any pair of users to communicate securely without exchanging private or public keys.
“IBE eliminates the need for a public key distribution infrastructure.It allows any pair of users to communicate securely without exchanging private or public keys”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningIt is difficult to predict the extent to which the security and privacy mechanisms of different healthcare institutes will be compatible with each other.
“Since each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism, it is difficult to predict the extent to which these mechanisms will be compatible with each other.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenSmart contracts are the core element for implementing the business logic of blockchain-based medical data sharing.
“Smart contracts, as a series of self-executing contractual states without third parties, are the core element to implementing the business logic of blockchain-based medical data sharing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningMedical data should be stored off-chain in encrypted form, for network throughput and security reasons.
“it is clear that medical data should be stored off-chain in encrypted form due to network throughput and security reasons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIdentity-based encryption was first proposed by Shamir in 1984, who suggested that a public key can be an arbitrary string, and was then improved by Boneh and Franklin using Weil pairing over elliptic curves.
“The concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) was first proposed by Shamir [73] in 1984, who suggested that a public key can be an arbitrary string, and then improved by Boneh and Franklin [74] using Weil pairing over elliptic curves.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [73]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [74]
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMulti-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption schemes need no central authority and guarantee collusion resistance.
“Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (MA-ABE) [77]- [79] schemes are proposed, where no central authority is needed and collusion resistance is guaranteed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [77]- [79]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe question of whether to adopt permissioned or permissionless blockchain remains open with no apparent solution.
“Yet the third question-whether to adopt permissioned or permissionless blockchain-remains open with no apparent solution.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationProxy re-encryption is a cryptosystem that allows a third party (proxy) to alter a ciphertext encrypted by one party so that it can be decrypted by another authorized party.
“Proxy re-encryption (PRE), proposed by Blaze et al. [80] in 1998 and improved by Ateniese et al. [81], [82] in 2006, is a cryptosystem that allows a third party (proxy) to alter a ciphertext encrypted by one party so that it can be decrypted by another authorized party.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [80]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [81]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [82]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningA practical approach for medical data sharing may need to integrate many different techniques to achieve its design goals.
“Therefore, a practical approach for medical data sharing may need to integrate many different techniques to achieve its design goals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationSearchable symmetric encryption can enforce keyword search on outsourced encrypted data, avoiding the decryption process and thereby enhancing query efficiency without the risk of data leakage.
“Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [83] can enforce keyword search on outsourced encrypted data, which avoids the decryption process and thereby enhances query efficiency without the risk of data leakage.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [83]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenDifferentiating various EMR fields by sensitivity is of critical importance for privacy control.
“However, the differentiation of various EMR fields in sensitivity is also of critical importance for privacy control.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenCentralized control by one entity creates a central point of attack, and the programmability associated with the SDN platform adds security risks.
“However, centralized control by one entity has the disadvantage of creating a central point of attack.Moreover, the programmability associated with the SDN platform adds security risks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The set of surveyed schemes is representative of the state of the art in secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing over the past decade.
“This paper surveys the state-of-the-art schemes on secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing of the past decade with a focus on blockchain-based approaches.”
“Table 2 surveys the state-of-the-art medical data sharing schemes 1 based on blockchain technology.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The classification of blockchain-based medical data sharing schemes into permissionless and permissioned approaches is exhaustive and appropriate for analyzing their advantages and disadvantages.
“We classify them into permissionless blockchain-based approaches and permissioned blockchain-based approaches and analyze their advantages and disadvantages.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The block size in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte, which is insufficient to store medical data such as X-ray images.
“For instance, the block size in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte, which is insufficient to store medical data such as X-ray images.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Hyperledger Fabric can process up to 10000 transactions per second, Ethereum 20 TPS, and Bitcoin 7 TPS.
“For example, Hyperledger Fabric can process up to 10000 transactions per second (TPS), which is much faster than Ethereum's 20 TPS and Bitcoin's 7 TPS.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In medical data management, data access happens very frequently.
“In medical data management, data access happens very frequently.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism.
“Since each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Blockchain technology with high immutable, stable, and trustworthy features can tackle the challenges raised while sharing health information in Cloud ecosystems.
“Blockchain technology with high immutable, stable, and trustworthy features can tackle the challenges raised while sharing health information in Cloud ecosystems [150].”
From A survey on the adoption of blockchain in IoT: challenges and solutions (2021) · cites this paper as [150]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Modelchain is classified as public despite a private-blockchain reference
MinorModelchain [60] is included among the schemes the paper describes as using permissionless or public blockchains, but the cited work's title describes it as using private blockchain networks.
“These schemes are proposed to adopt a permissionless or public blockchain to secure medical data sharing and various applications (e.g., healthcare sensors, machine learning).”
“''Modelchain: Decentral- ized privacy-preserving healthcare predictive modeling framework on private blockchain networks.''”
The cited breach study has a different year and subject
MinorThe text calls reference [68] a 2014 study about security breaches, while the reference is dated 2018 and titled as a survey about mobile-device use.
“According to a 2014 study [68], over 50% of security breaches occur in the medical industry, with up to 90% of healthcare organizations having exposed their data or had it stolen.”
“68. 2018). Survey: 90 Percent of Healthcare Organizations use or Plan to use Mobile Devices.”
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Self-citation
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A survey on the adoption of blockchain in IoT: challenges and solutions
Uddin, M. A., Stranieri, A., Gondal, I., & Balasubramanian, V. (2021) · Blockchain: Research and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.bcra.2021.100006 · Cited by 365 · see citing works
Ratta, P., Kaur, A., Sharma, S., Shabaz, M., & Dhiman, G. (2021) · Journal of Food Quality · doi:10.1155/2021/7608296 · Cited by 335 · see citing works
- Authors
- Jin, H., Luo, Y., Li, P., & Mathew, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Massachusetts Lowell (US)
- Elizabethtown College (US)
- University of Massachusetts Chan Medical School (US)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 61656-61669
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2946102439
- Semantic Scholar
- 1b64dacf21f67de09953024105eca33a309fca2a
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 70
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 59 · 2023: 63 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 3
- FWCI
- 31.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, public-domain)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1547428, 1738965, 1450996, 1541434)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Keywords
- health data sharing, privacy preservation, blockchain, permissionless blockchain, permissioned blockchain, medical records, data security, health data interoperability, decentralized data exchange
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