Cited by 293Blockchain Technology Applications and SecurityBlockchain Technology in Education and LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data

A review of secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing

Open access
Jin, Hao, Luo, Yan, Li, Peilong, Mathew, Jomol·2019·IEEE Access

Abstract

In the digital healthcare era, it is of the utmost importance to harness medical information scattered across healthcare institutions to support in-depth data analysis and achieve personalized healthcare. However, the cyberinfrastructure boundaries of healthcare organizations and privacy leakage threats place obstacles on the sharing of medical records. Blockchain, as a public ledger characterized by its transparency, tamper-evidence, trustlessness, and decentralization, can help build a secure medical data exchange network. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art schemes on secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing of the past decade with a focus on blockchain-based approaches. We classify them into permissionless blockchain-based approaches and permissioned blockchain-based approaches and analyze their advantages and disadvantages. We also discuss potential research topics on blockchain-based medical data sharing.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This review surveys secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing schemes, focusing on blockchain-based approaches and classifying them as permissionless or permissioned. It argues blockchain alone is not sufficient, recommending off-chain encrypted storage plus cryptographic access control and careful choice of blockchain type.

Key findings

  • Medical data sharing faces massive data growth (20–40% annually; average US healthcare provider managed 665 TB in 2015, 80% unstructured images; healthcare big data estimated at 25,000 PB by 2020) and frequent breaches (more than one per day).
  • Blockchain schemes split into permissionless (e.g., MedRec, Modelchain) and permissioned/consortium (e.g., MedBlock, Patientory, ChainAnchor); permissioned offers higher throughput (Hyperledger Fabric up to 10,000 TPS vs Ethereum 20 TPS and Bitcoin 7 TPS) but requires a central authority, while permissionless incurs cryptocurrency costs (storing 1 KB costs 640,000 gas, about $2.3 at 20 Gwei and Ether valued at $168 on May 8, 2019).
  • Because on-chain storage is limited/expensive and conflicts with erasure rights (e.g., GDPR), the review concludes medical data should be stored off-chain in encrypted form, with hashes/query strings on-chain; cryptographic primitives (ABE, IBE, PRE, SSE, broadcast encryption) are needed for access control and privacy.
  • Anonymization models (k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness) trade privacy against utility; none fully prevents leakage while maintaining reasonable utility, so integration with other techniques is advised.

Methods

  • Design: narrative survey/review of state-of-the-art secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing over the past decade, with focus on blockchain-based approaches.
  • Data/sample: classifies surveyed schemes into permissionless and permissioned blockchain approaches; Table 2 includes schemes with a complete framework/system addressing secure medical data sharing, excluding schemes focused on a single security functionality.
  • Analysis: compares security metrics (identification, access control, data authenticity, data encryption), architecture metrics (blockchain type, data storage method), and functionality metrics (smart contract, interoperability); also reviews cloud/cryptography, anonymization, blockchain, and software-defined infrastructure approaches.

Limitations

  • The paper states that whether to adopt permissioned or permissionless blockchain remains open, with no strong evidence that one type can completely substitute the other; hybrid architectures may add complexity in consensus, access control, and data provision.
  • It states that global querying across independently managed medical databases remains unaddressed, and compatibility of security mechanisms across healthcare domains is unclear.
  • Evident from the text: this is a narrative review without a stated systematic search strategy, inclusion criteria beyond Table 2’s scope, or quantitative meta-analysis; many surveyed schemes are noted to lack algorithmic or implementation details (e.g., consensus protocol, smart contracts, bABE/PKES details).

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/access.2019.2916503

Cites

70 of 70 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 48 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingcitation

    Chen and Hoang's CPRBAC model does not contain any cryptographic primitive to ensure data confidentiality and integrity.

    “However, their work does not contain any cryptographic primitive to ensure data confidentiality and integrity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [33]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingcitation

    Yue et al.'s healthcare data gateway lacks details of how a service is prevented from knowing the data content when a computation runs on raw medical data.

    “But their scheme lacks the details of how a service is prevented from knowing the data content when a computation runs on the raw medical data.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [49] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingcitation

    Zhang et al.'s PSN-based healthcare environment did not provide details about their consensus protocol and smart contracts.

    “However, the authors did not provide details about their consensus protocol and smart contracts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [54]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingcitation

    Xia et al.'s BBDS limits secure sharing of sensitive medical information to invited and verified users.

    “However, their secure sharing of sensitive medical information is limited to invited and verified users.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [50] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingreasoning

    Most state-of-the-art approaches to medical data sharing store medical information off-chain while storing data query strings and hash values on-chain for authenticity and integrity verification.

    “This explains why most of the state-of-the-art approaches [47], [48], [50]- [52], [55] on medical data sharing chose to store medical information off-chain while data query strings and hash values are stored on-chain for authenticity and integrity verification.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [47] source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [48]

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [50]- [52]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 40
  • May combine two claims. 37
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingreasoning

    HIPAA regulation covers almost every aspect of security.

    “Table 1 lists a collection of technical safeguard standards along with implementation specifications, where we can see that the HIPAA regulation covers almost every aspect of security.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation

    Zhao et al.'s fuzzy vault-based key management scheme lacks details of how their health blockchain works.

    “But their work lack details of how their health blockchain works.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [59]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Peterson et al.'s blockchain-based cross-institutional health information sharing framework does not mention how medical data are organized, stored, and accessed, and its privacy-preserving keyword searches lack algorithmic details.

    “However, the paper does not mention how the medical data are organized, stored, and accessed.The privacy-preserving keyword searches adopted in their framework lack algorithmic details.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [53]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation

    Narayan et al.'s patient-centric EHR system lacked algorithmic details about the adopted bABE and PKES schemes.

    “However, their design lacked algorithmic details about adopted bABE and PKES schemes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [31]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given

    Security and privacy protection of medical information covers confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data in transit and at rest, and access and privacy control.

    “We observed that security and privacy protection of medical information covers confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data in transit and at rest, access and privacy control, etc.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given

    There is no strong evidence showing that one type of blockchain can completely substitute the other type.

    “Despite the debate over permissioned and permissionless blockchains throughout academia and industry, there is no strong evidence showing that one type can completely substitute the other type.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The security and privacy of healthcare information should be protected not only from external attackers, but also from unauthorized access from within the network or system.

    “Generally, the difficulty primarily lies in that the security and privacy of healthcare information should be protected not only from external attackers, but also from unauthorized access from within the network or system [6].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [6]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    t-closeness offers complete privacy but severely impairs the correlations between key attributes and confidential attributes.

    “In contrast, t-closeness offers complete privacy but severely impairs the correlations between key attributes and confidential attributes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The multi-tenancy characteristic of public cloud services exposes data to different types of attacks, and such attacks are difficult to detect or monitor in a shared VM environment.

    “However, the multi-tenancy characteristic of public cloud services decides virtual machines are shared among various applications that expose the data to different types of attacks.Worse still, it is difficult to detect or monitor such attacks in a shared VM environment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Data interoperability remains a significant issue in cloud environments due to the incompatibility of various cloud services.

    “It should be noted that data interoperability remains a significant issue in cloud environments due to the incompatibility of various cloud services.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Secure management of healthcare data is a hybrid approach, which requires various mechanisms and technical means to be incorporated to meet security and privacy targets.

    “This implies that the secure management of healthcare data is a hybrid approach, which requires various mechanisms and technical means to be incorporated to meet these security and privacy targets.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The closed-domain approach has created medical data silos scattered throughout various healthcare institutions, preventing collaborative healthcare treatment and medical research.

    “This has created the medical data silos of today that are scattered throughout various healthcare institutions, preventing collaborative healthcare treatment and medical research.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    The cyberinfrastructure boundaries of healthcare organizations and privacy leakage threats place obstacles on the sharing of medical records.

    “However, the cyberinfrastructure boundaries of healthcare organizations and privacy leakage threats place obstacles on the sharing of medical records.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Whether private or public clouds are adopted for healthcare management to guarantee data security and privacy, a basic requirement is data encryption.

    “Whether private or public clouds are adopted for healthcare management to guarantee data security and privacy, a basic requirement is data encryption.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    More advanced cryptographic primitives with rich access control semantics and strict confidentiality enforcement are required for medical data sharing across multiple healthcare domains.

    “Hence, more advanced cryptographic primitives with rich access control semantics and strict confidentiality enforcement are required.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Storing data on a public blockchain can be very expensive; it is financially impractical to store detailed clinical information of millions of patients on chain.

    “Storing data on a public blockchain can be very expensive.It is financially impractical to store detailed clinical information of millions of patients on chain.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [15] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Blockchain, as a public ledger characterized by transparency, tamper-evidence, trustlessness, and decentralization, can help build a secure medical data exchange network.

    “Blockchain, as a public ledger characterized by its transparency, tamper-evidence, trustlessness, and decentralization, can help build a secure medical data exchange network.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    How to enforce cross-domain access control and secure sharing of medical data in a state-wide or even national scale remains a challenging task.

    “However, how to enforce cross-domain access control and secure sharing of medical data in a state-wide or even national scale remains a challenging task.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The direct consequence of the network defense perimeter is the lack of data interoperability on medical information, which further poses a barrier to medical analytics that require a large amount of clinical information.

    “The direct consequence of this network defense perimeter is the lack of data interoperability on medical information, which further poses a barrier to medical analytics that require a large amount of clinical information.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Letting cloud users manage encryption keys enhances data security and provides better control, but it burdens users with distributing keys to authorized users, limiting scalability of sharing data among many institutions.

    “Letting cloud users manage encryption keys certainly will enhance data security and provide better control; however, it would be a troublesome burden for users to distribute corresponding keys to authorized users, which limits its scalability of sharing data among a large number of institutions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Public clouds support scalability and data sharing well.

    “On the other hand, public clouds support scalability and data sharing well.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Most existing healthcare systems are built on an enclosed domain with a network defense perimeter to prevent outside attacks and threats, which is a huge hurdle to cross-institutional data sharing.

    “Most existing healthcare systems are built on an enclosed domain with a network defense perimeter to prevent outside attacks and threats.This is a huge hurdle to cross-institutional data sharing due to two reasons:”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Permissioned blockchain requires certain permission to access the blockchain; participants are selected in advance and only authorized nodes can access information stored on the blockchain.

    “Instead, consortium blockchain requires certain permission to access the blockchain.This means that participants are selected in advance and only those authorized nodes can be allowed to access information stored on the blockchain.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    The era of cloud computing and big data necessitates that medical data be shared among various users and institutions to allow analysis, so that better healthcare service and new treatment plans can be provided.

    “On the other hand, the era of cloud computing and big data necessitates that medical data be shared among various users and institutions to allow analysis, so that better healthcare service and new treatment plans can be provided.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Public blockchain is usually crypto-currency driven, so a certain amount of cryptocurrency has to be paid for transaction inclusion and block mining.

    “However, public blockchain is usually crypto-currency driven (bitcoins in Bitcoin or ether in Ethereum), which means a certain amount of cryptocurrency 2 has to be paid for transaction inclusion and block mining.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [15] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Data immutability in public blockchain is discounted in consortium blockchain, which opens up the possibility of blockchain rollback by an attacker or a certain authority member.

    “Therefore, the data immutability in public blockchain is discounted in consortium blockchain, which opens up the possibility of blockchain rollback by an attacker or a certain authority member.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    On-chain storage of medical information is not a good choice, due to the limited block size in current blockchains and the bandwidth waste required to achieve network consensus.

    “From the above analysis, it can be seen that on-chain storage of medical information is not a good choice due to the limited block size in current blockchains and the bandwidth waste to achieve network consensus.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The block size in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte, which is insufficient to store medical data such as X-ray images.
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Adopting permissionless blockchain for medical data sharing requires cryptocurrency, and a great amount of money is needed to run the network for healthcare data management.

    “Another challenge of adopting permissionless blockchain for medical data sharing would be cryptocurrency, which is the incentive that makes the behind consensus protocol work.”
    • Also stated in: § 3) PERMISSIONED OR PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAIN? · plain
      “That means a great amount of money (cryptocurrency) is needed to run the network for healthcare data management.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In medical data management, data access happens very frequently.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The permissioned blockchain setting is similar to the medical data sharing scenario, where only healthcare stakeholders (patients, healthcare providers, and authorized medical researchers) can be allowed to access information based on their authorized permissions.

    “Such a setting is similar to the medical data sharing scenario, where only healthcare stakeholders (patients, healthcare providers, and authorized medical researchers) can be allowed to access that information based on their authorized permissions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Once a healthcare system is compromised, all medical information could be leaked.

    “once a healthcare system is compromised, then all medical information could be leaked”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Over 50% of security breaches occur in the medical industry, with up to 90% of healthcare organizations having exposed their data or had it stolen.

    “According to a 2014 study [68], over 50% of security breaches occur in the medical industry, with up to 90% of healthcare organizations having exposed their data or had it stolen.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [68]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Due to HIPAA privacy and security regulations, medical data management should provide secure storage of raw medical information (confidentiality, integrity), privacy-preserving data provision (data authenticity, user authentication, access control), auditability, traceability, and data interoperability.

    “Due to the privacy and security regulations of HIPAA, medical data management should provide secure storage of raw medical information (confidentiality, integrity), privacypreserving data provision (data authenticity, user authentication, access control), auditability, traceability, and data interoperability.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [3]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Storing medical information on-chain leads to poor throughput and performance because on-chain transactions and blocks must be downloaded locally by every peer node, causing great bandwidth waste.

    “However, this naive approach will lead to poor throughput and performance since on-chain transactions and blocks need to be downloaded locally by every peer node, which leads to a great bandwidth waste.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Data encryption can be the last line of defense when a healthcare system is compromised, because an attacker can learn nothing about the encrypted data without the corresponding encryption key.

    “Data encryption can be the last line of defense when a healthcare system is compromised because an attacker can learn nothing about the encrypted data if one cannot obtain the corresponding encryption key.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Broadcast encryption lets an owner encrypt a small piece of data to a subset of users, and only users in the subset can decrypt the broadcast message to recover the data.

    “Broadcast encryption was first introduced in [70] and improved in [71], [72], which let an owner encrypt a small piece of data to a subset of users.Only users in the subset can decrypt the broadcast message to recover the data.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [70]

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [71]

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [72] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Blockchain, as a secured and transparent public ledger, can guarantee the integrity of on-chain stored data (transactions and blocks).

    “Blockchain itself is a secured and transparent public ledger that can guarantee the integrity of on-chain stored data (transactions and blocks).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Li et al.'s ABE-based scheme for personal health records gives patients full control of their medical information but poses too much burden on patients because patient-side applications must generate and distribute keys to authorized users.

    “Despite patients' full control of their medical information, the scheme poses too much burden on patients, since the patient side applications are required to generate and distribute corresponding keys to authorized users.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [27]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Despite a strict access control policy deployed in a healthcare system, an internal IT technical staff member can still easily access the data, which makes data confidentiality difficult to guarantee.

    “despite the strict access control policy deployed in a healthcare system, an internal IT technical staff member still can easily ''touch'' the data, which makes data confidentiality difficult to guarantee.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Encryption of medical data and secured key storage are two necessary steps to enhance the security and privacy of medical information.

    “we believe that encryption of medical data and secured key storage are two necessary steps to enhance the security and privacy of medical information.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Fan et al.'s MedBlock does not explicitly explain the access control policy to allow third-party researchers to access medical data, and its proposal to use asymmetric encryption for medical information is not a good option considering encryption/decryption performance.

    “However, the authors did not explicitly explain the access control policy to allow third-party researchers to access medical data.Moreover, their proposal of using asymmetric encryption algorithms to encrypt medical information does not seem to be a good option considering the encryption/decryption performance of asymmetric encryption.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [52]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Secure sharing of medical data involves patients, healthcare providers, and third-party medical researchers.

    “Secure sharing of medical data involves patients, healthcare providers, and third-party medical researchers.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Guo et al.'s scheme encapsulates and stores health records in on-chain blocks, which limits its scalability because the size of on-chain stored data has a great impact on network throughput.

    “However, their scheme encapsulates and stores health records in on-chain blocks, which limits its scalability since the size of on-chain stored data has a great impact on the network throughput.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [30]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Most data has a life cycle, which makes it unnecessary to store such data permanently.

    “Most data has its life cycle, which makes it unnecessary to store these data permanently.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Permissioned blockchain is far from a perfect solution for secure medical data sharing; its most notable disadvantage is the necessity of a central authority.

    “However, in spite of its high throughput, permissioned blockchain is far from a perfect solution for secure medical data sharing.The most notable disadvantage is the necessity of a central authority, which is usually comprised of a group of companies with a shared interest that will run the blockchain network and oversee the whole system.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning

    On-chain stored data cannot be altered or deleted because blockchain is a continually growing public ledger.

    “On-chain stored data cannot be altered or deleted because blockchain is a continually growing public ledger.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Permissioned and permissionless blockchains primarily differ in their adopted consensus protocols, which in turn greatly affect throughput, block mining time, access policies, and privacy.

    “permissioned and permissionless blockchain primarily differ in their adopted consensus protocols, which in turn have a great impact on throughput, block mining time, access policies, and privacy.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Attribute-based encryption can be divided into key-policy ABE (keys associated with access policies, ciphertext with an attribute set) and ciphertext-policy ABE (keys associated with an attribute set, ciphertext with access policies).

    “Generally, it can be divided into two categories: (a) key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [76] where keys are associated with access policies and ciphertext is associated with an attributes set; and (b) ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption (CP-ABE) [76] where keys are associated with an attributes set and ciphertext is associated with access policies.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [76]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    As a new computing paradigm, blockchain has advantages over traditional technologies.

    “As a new computing paradigm, blockchain has its advantages over traditional technologies.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    In both KP-ABE and CP-ABE a central authority is required to issue and validate private keys, which renders them unsuitable for a distributed environment where data sharing takes place across different administrative domains.

    “In both schemes, a central authority is required to issue and validate private keys, rendering them unsuitable for a distributed environment where data sharing takes place across different administrative domains.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    A secure healthcare system still needs to employ appropriate cryptographic primitives to achieve confidentiality, integrity, access control, and privacy protection.

    “Hence, a secure healthcare system still needs to employ appropriate cryptographic primitives to achieve confidentiality, integrity, access control, and privacy protection.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Advanced cryptographic primitives (e.g., IBE, ABE, PRE) are becoming widely deployed to enforce strict and flexible access control of encryption keys.

    “advanced cryptographic primitives (e.g., IBE, ABE, PRE) is becoming widely deployed to enforce strict and flexible access control of encryption keys.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    Constructing a hybrid blockchain architecture may cause great complexities in the management of consensus executions, including block mining, data access control, and data provision.

    “However, this may cause great complexities in the management of consensus executions, including block mining, data access control, and data provision.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    IBE eliminates the need for a public key distribution infrastructure and allows any pair of users to communicate securely without exchanging private or public keys.

    “IBE eliminates the need for a public key distribution infrastructure.It allows any pair of users to communicate securely without exchanging private or public keys”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    It is difficult to predict the extent to which the security and privacy mechanisms of different healthcare institutes will be compatible with each other.

    “Since each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism, it is difficult to predict the extent to which these mechanisms will be compatible with each other.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    Smart contracts are the core element for implementing the business logic of blockchain-based medical data sharing.

    “Smart contracts, as a series of self-executing contractual states without third parties, are the core element to implementing the business logic of blockchain-based medical data sharing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Medical data should be stored off-chain in encrypted form, for network throughput and security reasons.

    “it is clear that medical data should be stored off-chain in encrypted form due to network throughput and security reasons.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Identity-based encryption was first proposed by Shamir in 1984, who suggested that a public key can be an arbitrary string, and was then improved by Boneh and Franklin using Weil pairing over elliptic curves.

    “The concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) was first proposed by Shamir [73] in 1984, who suggested that a public key can be an arbitrary string, and then improved by Boneh and Franklin [74] using Weil pairing over elliptic curves.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [73]

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [74]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption schemes need no central authority and guarantee collusion resistance.

    “Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (MA-ABE) [77]- [79] schemes are proposed, where no central authority is needed and collusion resistance is guaranteed.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [77]- [79]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The question of whether to adopt permissioned or permissionless blockchain remains open with no apparent solution.

    “Yet the third question-whether to adopt permissioned or permissionless blockchain-remains open with no apparent solution.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Proxy re-encryption is a cryptosystem that allows a third party (proxy) to alter a ciphertext encrypted by one party so that it can be decrypted by another authorized party.

    “Proxy re-encryption (PRE), proposed by Blaze et al. [80] in 1998 and improved by Ateniese et al. [81], [82] in 2006, is a cryptosystem that allows a third party (proxy) to alter a ciphertext encrypted by one party so that it can be decrypted by another authorized party.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [80]

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [81]

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [82]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    A practical approach for medical data sharing may need to integrate many different techniques to achieve its design goals.

    “Therefore, a practical approach for medical data sharing may need to integrate many different techniques to achieve its design goals.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Searchable symmetric encryption can enforce keyword search on outsourced encrypted data, avoiding the decryption process and thereby enhancing query efficiency without the risk of data leakage.

    “Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [83] can enforce keyword search on outsourced encrypted data, which avoids the decryption process and thereby enhances query efficiency without the risk of data leakage.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [83]

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Differentiating various EMR fields by sensitivity is of critical importance for privacy control.

    “However, the differentiation of various EMR fields in sensitivity is also of critical importance for privacy control.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Centralized control by one entity creates a central point of attack, and the programmability associated with the SDN platform adds security risks.

    “However, centralized control by one entity has the disadvantage of creating a central point of attack.Moreover, the programmability associated with the SDN platform adds security risks.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
64 of 64
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The set of surveyed schemes is representative of the state of the art in secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing over the past decade.

    “This paper surveys the state-of-the-art schemes on secure and privacy-preserving medical data sharing of the past decade with a focus on blockchain-based approaches.”
    “Table 2 surveys the state-of-the-art medical data sharing schemes 1 based on blockchain technology.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The classification of blockchain-based medical data sharing schemes into permissionless and permissioned approaches is exhaustive and appropriate for analyzing their advantages and disadvantages.

    “We classify them into permissionless blockchain-based approaches and permissioned blockchain-based approaches and analyze their advantages and disadvantages.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The block size in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte, which is insufficient to store medical data such as X-ray images.

    “For instance, the block size in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte, which is insufficient to store medical data such as X-ray images.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Hyperledger Fabric can process up to 10000 transactions per second, Ethereum 20 TPS, and Bitcoin 7 TPS.

    “For example, Hyperledger Fabric can process up to 10000 transactions per second (TPS), which is much faster than Ethereum's 20 TPS and Bitcoin's 7 TPS.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In medical data management, data access happens very frequently.

    “In medical data management, data access happens very frequently.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism.

    “Since each healthcare institute can be regarded as an independent domain equipped with its own security and privacy mechanism”
6 of 6

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Blockchain technology with high immutable, stable, and trustworthy features can tackle the challenges raised while sharing health information in Cloud ecosystems.

    “Blockchain technology with high immutable, stable, and trustworthy features can tackle the challenges raised while sharing health information in Cloud ecosystems [150].”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Modelchain is classified as public despite a private-blockchain reference

    Minor

    Modelchain [60] is included among the schemes the paper describes as using permissionless or public blockchains, but the cited work's title describes it as using private blockchain networks.

  • The cited breach study has a different year and subject

    Minor

    The text calls reference [68] a 2014 study about security breaches, while the reference is dated 2018 and titled as a survey about mobile-device use.

2 of 2

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 14

  1. fiat, 1993, Broadcast encryption, Proc Annu Int Cryptol Conf, 480
  2. 2018, Survey 90 Percent of Healthcare Organizations use or Plan to use Mobile Devices
  3. 2019, Ethereum 2 0 Phase 0–The Beacon Chain
  4. 2018, Healthcare Industry Ranks 8th for Cybersecurity but Poor DNS Health and Endpoint Security of Concern
  5. 2019, Data Leakage Events
  6. 2018, Architecting for hipaa security and compliance on amazon web services
  7. mcfarlane, 2017, Patientory A healthcare peer-to-peer emr storage network v1 0
  8. peterson, 2016, A blockchain-based approach to health information exchange networks, Proc NIST Workshop Blockchain Healthcare, 1, 1
  9. cachin, 2016, Architecture of the hyperledger blockchain fabric, Proc Workshop on Distributed Cryptocurrencies and Consensus Ledgers, 310, 1
  10. 2016, Solidity Programming Documentation
  11. raja, 2017, Chaincode on the Go—Smart Contracts on the Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain
  12. 2016, General Data Protection Regulation
  13. 2017, Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule
  14. 2014, Proof of Stake FAQ

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Jin, H., Luo, Y., Li, P., & Mathew, J.
Affiliations
  • University of Massachusetts Lowell (US)
  • Elizabethtown College (US)
  • University of Massachusetts Chan Medical School (US)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2019
Volume
7
Pages
61656-61669
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2946102439
Cited by
293
References
70
Citations by year
2026: 25 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 59 · 2023: 63 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 3
FWCI
31.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, public-domain)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
National Science Foundation (1547428, 1738965, 1450996, 1541434)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Keywords
health data sharing, privacy preservation, blockchain, permissionless blockchain, permissioned blockchain, medical records, data security, health data interoperability, decentralized data exchange

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

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