Cited by 241Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware SecuritySecurity and Verification in Computing

Neural Trojans

Open access
Liu, Yuntao, Xie, Yang, Srivastava, Ankur·2017·2017 IEEE International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)

Abstract

While neural networks demonstrate stronger capabilities in pattern recognition nowadays, they are also becoming larger and deeper. As a result, the effort needed to train a network also increases dramatically. In many cases, it is more practical to use a neural network intellectual property (IP) that an IP vendor has already trained. As we do not know about the training process, there can be security threats in the neural IP: the IP vendor (attacker) may embed hidden malicious functionality, i.e neural Trojans, into the neural IP. We show that this is an effective attack and provide three mitigation techniques: input anomaly detection, re-training, and input preprocessing. All the techniques are proven effective. The input anomaly detection approach is able to detect 99.8% of Trojan triggers although with 12.2% false positive. The re-training approach is able to prevent 94.1% of Trojan triggers from triggering the Trojan although it requires that the neural IP be reconfigurable. In the input preprocessing approach, 90.2% of Trojan triggers are rendered ineffective and no assumption about the neural IP is needed.

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  • Detection methods exploit activation statistics or model properties to determine whether a model is backdoored or whether a training/test example is a backdoor example.

    “Detection methods exploit activation statistics or model properties to determine whether a model is backdoored [151], [152], or whether a training/test example is a backdoor example [47].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 12

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Authors
Liu, Y., Xie, Y., & Srivastava, A.
Affiliations
University of Maryland, College Park (US)
Venue
2017 IEEE International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2017-11
Pages
45-48
ISSN
1063-6404 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4252979261
Cited by
241
References
15
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 4
FWCI
4.49
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE International Conference on Computer Design: VLSI in Computers and Processors (ICCD) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
neural network security, neural network hardware, IP core, retraining, input preprocessing, reconfigurable neural networks

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