Neural Trojans
Open accessAbstract
While neural networks demonstrate stronger capabilities in pattern recognition nowadays, they are also becoming larger and deeper. As a result, the effort needed to train a network also increases dramatically. In many cases, it is more practical to use a neural network intellectual property (IP) that an IP vendor has already trained. As we do not know about the training process, there can be security threats in the neural IP: the IP vendor (attacker) may embed hidden malicious functionality, i.e neural Trojans, into the neural IP. We show that this is an effective attack and provide three mitigation techniques: input anomaly detection, re-training, and input preprocessing. All the techniques are proven effective. The input anomaly detection approach is able to detect 99.8% of Trojan triggers although with 12.2% false positive. The re-training approach is able to prevent 94.1% of Trojan triggers from triggering the Trojan although it requires that the neural IP be reconfigurable. In the input preprocessing approach, 90.2% of Trojan triggers are rendered ineffective and no assumption about the neural IP is needed.
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Detection methods exploit activation statistics or model properties to determine whether a model is backdoored or whether a training/test example is a backdoor example.
“Detection methods exploit activation statistics or model properties to determine whether a model is backdoored [151], [152], or whether a training/test example is a backdoor example [47].”
From Privacy and Robustness in Federated Learning: Attacks and Defenses (2024) · cites this paper as [47]
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Self-citation
- Authors
- Liu, Y., Xie, Y., & Srivastava, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Maryland, College Park (US)
- Venue
- 2017 IEEE International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-11
- Pages
- 45-48
- ISSN
- 1063-6404 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4252979261
- Cited by
- 241
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 4
- FWCI
- 4.49
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Computer Design: VLSI in Computers and Processors (ICCD) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- neural network security, neural network hardware, IP core, retraining, input preprocessing, reconfigurable neural networks
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