Cited by 211Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningDigital Media Forensic DetectionSecurity and Verification in Computing

LIRA: Learnable, Imperceptible and Robust Backdoor Attacks

Doan, Khoa, Lao, Yingjie, Zhao, Weijie, Li, Ping·2021·2021 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)

Abstract

Recently, machine learning models have demonstrated to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, primarily due to the lack of transparency in black-box models such as deep neural networks. A third-party model can be poisoned such that it works adequately in normal conditions but behaves maliciously on samples with specific trigger patterns. However, the trigger injection function is manually defined in most existing backdoor attack methods, e.g., placing a small patch of pixels on an image or slightly deforming the image before poisoning the model. This results in a two-stage approach with a sub-optimal attack success rate and a lack of complete stealthiness under human inspection.In this paper, we propose a novel and stealthy backdoor attack framework, LIRA, which jointly learns the optimal, stealthy trigger injection function and poisons the model. We formulate such an objective as a non-convex, constrained optimization problem. Under this optimization framework, the trigger generator function will learn to manipulate the input with imperceptible noise to preserve the model performance on the clean data and maximize the attack success rate on the poisoned data. Then, we solve this challenging optimization problem with an efficient, two-stage stochastic optimization procedure. Finally, the proposed attack framework achieves 100% success rates in several benchmark datasets, including MNIST, CIFAR10, GTSRB, and T-ImageNet, while simultaneously bypassing existing backdoor defense methods and human inspection.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/iccv48922.2021.01175

Cites

56 of 56 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

3 of the 59 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Doan, K., Lao, Y., Zhao, W., & Li, P.
Affiliations
  • Virginia Tech (US)
  • Clemson University (US)
  • Baidu (China) (CN)
Venue
2021 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2021-10
Pages
11946-11956
OpenAlex
W3201941857
Cited by
211
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 48 · 2024: 73 · 2023: 39 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 2
FWCI
15.48
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
backdoor attacks, backdoor defense evasion, stealthy attacks, data poisoning, deep neural network, adversarial robustness, nonconvex constrained optimization, two-stage stochastic programming, image classification security

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review