The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles
Open accessAbstract
This paper explains why some firms prefer to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. When institutional investors are relatively less taxed than individual investors, dividends induce “ownership clientele” effects. Firms paying dividends attract relatively more institutions, which have a relative advantage in detecting high firm quality and in ensuring firms are well managed. The theory is consistent with some documented regularities, specifically both the presence and stickiness of dividends, and offers novel empirical implications, e.g., a prediction that it is the tax difference between institutions and retail investors that determines dividend payments, not the absolute tax payments.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares
Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1961) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/294442 · Cited by 6,558
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Miller, M. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03267.x · Cited by 2,898
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments
Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith, C. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90047-5 · Cited by 1,599
Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?
Maug, E. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.35053 · Cited by 1,452
Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
JOHN, K., & WILLIAMS, J. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02363.x · Cited by 1,421
Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS
SMITH, M. P. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05208.x · Cited by 1,288
Cited by
Environmental risk management and the cost of capital
Sharfman, M. P., & Fernando, C. S. (2008) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.678 · Cited by 1,530
Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money
Fernando, C. S., Sharfman, M. P., & Uysal, V. B. (2017) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109017000680 · Cited by 241
Taste, information, and asset prices: implications for the valuation of CSR
Friedman, H. L., & Heinle, M. S. (2016) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-016-9359-x · Cited by 237
Farre-Mensa, J., Michaely, R., & Schmalz, M. (2014) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034259 · Cited by 224
An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility
Fernando, C. S., Uysal, V. B., & Abeysekera, A. P. (2019) · Journal of Applied Corporate Finance · doi:10.1111/jacf.12351 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Allen, F., Bernardo, A. E., & Welch, I.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-12
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2499-2536
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2122925298
- Cited by
- 852
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 39.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/0022-1082.00298
- The paper
- Allen, F., Bernardo, A. E., & Welch, I. (2000). A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00298
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.