The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles
Open accessAbstract
This paper explains why some firms prefer to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. When institutional investors are relatively less taxed than individual investors, dividends induce “ownership clientele” effects. Firms paying dividends attract relatively more institutions, which have a relative advantage in detecting high firm quality and in ensuring firms are well managed. The theory is consistent with some documented regularities, specifically both the presence and stickiness of dividends, and offers novel empirical implications, e.g., a prediction that it is the tax difference between institutions and retail investors that determines dividend payments, not the absolute tax payments.
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Citations
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Cited by
Payout policy in the 21st century
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Environmental risk management and the cost of capital
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Metadata
- Authors
- Allen, F., Bernardo, A. E., & Welch, I.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-12
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2499-2536
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2122925298
- Cited by
- 852
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 39.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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