When Recruiters Meet Algorithms: Advice Taking and Bias in AI‐Assisted Recruitment
Open accessAbstract
This study examined whether professional recruiters revise their hiring decisions after receiving external advice under cognitive conflict, that is, when advice contradicts their initial evaluation. In a between‐subjects experiment, 1,208 recruitment professionals evaluated two candidates, made an initial hiring decision, and then received advice whose source (human expert vs. algorithmic recruitment system, ARS), accuracy (accurate vs. inaccurate), and number of advisors (one vs. two) were manipulated across eight conditions. Results revealed widespread egocentric advice discounting. Although trust predicted advice utilization, a trust–reliance paradox emerged: recruiters reported lower trust in the ARS yet were behaviorally more influenced by it. Convergent advice was most influential, and exploratory analyses suggested that inaccurate advice degraded decision quality more than accurate advice improved it. Findings underscore the need for calibrated reliance in AI‐assisted selection.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Professional recruiters showed egocentric advice discounting under cognitive conflict, revising their initial hiring decisions less often than chance. Although they reported lower trust in an algorithmic recruitment system than in a human expert, algorithmic advice influenced their behavior more strongly, revealing a trust-reliance paradox.
Key findings
- Only 44.2% of recruiters revised their initial judgment when advice was incongruent (335/758), significantly below the 50% chance rate, p < 0.001, supporting egocentric discounting.
- Trust in the advisor predicted decision change overall (AME = 0.078, p < 0.001), but the effect was significant only for human expert advice; mean trust in AI was lower than trust in human sources (mean difference = −0.43, p = 0.007, Cohen’s d = −0.32), yet human advice was less influential than ARS advice (AME = −0.205, p < 0.001).
- Convergent dual advice was more influential than divergent advice: participants exposed to divergent advice were 16% less likely to change their decision (AME = −0.16, p < 0.001).
- Exploratory accuracy analyses found accurate advice reduced decision deterioration (OR = 0.13, p < 0.001) and increased improvement (OR = 4.88, p < 0.001); inaccurate advice raised deterioration probability by 31.7 percentage points, while accurate advice raised improvement probability by 19.9 percentage points, though the apparent asymmetry was not inferentially tested.
Methods
- Between-subjects experiment with 1,208 recruitment professionals (33.5% male, 66.5% female; mean age 42.5 years, SD = 9.8; 61.6% with 3+ years recruitment experience), recruited via MIS Group/Panelabs. Participants evaluated two candidate CVs for an HR manager role, made an initial ranking/interview decision, then received advice manipulated by source (human expert vs. algorithmic recruitment system), accuracy (accurate vs. inaccurate), and number of advisors (one vs. two) across eight conditions plus a no-advice control.
- Main analyses were restricted to participants exposed to incongruent advice (N = 758); single-advice conditions (N = 298) tested source and trust effects, and dual-advice conditions (N = 460) tested convergence/divergence. Analyses used logistic regressions with average marginal effects, multinomial logistic regression for decision improvement/deterioration, and exact binomial tests.
Limitations
- Stated: measuring influence as binary hold-versus-shift in a single-choice task lacks granularity for subtle judgment adjustments; the recruitment task had baseline subjectivity, with 37% initially selecting the weaker candidate; and the advice-source manipulation was confounded because ARS advice used numerical scores/ranking while human advice was narrative with qualifying remarks, differing in format, richness, and cue consistency.
- Stated: the experiment involved a single decision round, so it cannot capture dynamic trust formation, trust calibration, or reliance updating over repeated interactions; the ARS was an opaque “black box,” and no pilot study was conducted because the material had been tested in an earlier study.
- Evident from the text: the exploratory asymmetry between deterioration and improvement effects was not formally tested inferentially, so the paper itself cautions that this pattern should be treated as descriptive rather than confirmed.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
8 of 55 cited sources checked · 4 supported · 1 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Existing research has focused primarily on attitudes, acceptance intentions, fairness perceptions, and self-reported trust, while fewer studies examine whether recruiters actually revise their decisions after receiving external recommendations.
“Existing research has focused primarily on attitudes, acceptance intentions, fairness perceptions, and selfreported trust, while fewer studies examine whether recruiters actually revise their decisions after receiving external recommendations”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Eisbach et al. 2023 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Neumann et al. 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
When trust falls below the system's actual capabilities, individuals may underuse or reject algorithmic recommendations, even when algorithms outperform humans.
“When trust falls below the system's actual capabilities, individuals may underuse or reject algorithmic recommendations, even when algorithms outperform humans (Dietvorst et al. 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Dietvorst et al. 2015 source
- Interpretationcitation
Human involvement does not necessarily guarantee effective control.
“Human involvement therefore does not necessarily guarantee effective control (Goddard et al. 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Goddard et al. 2012 source
- Findingown data
Recruiters reported significantly lower trust in the ARS than in human sources.
“recruiters reported lower trust in the ARS yet were behaviorally more influenced by it.”
- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
“Mean trust in AI was significantly lower than trust in human sources (mean difference = -0.43,t (296) = -2.73,p = 0.007, Cohen's d = -0.32)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Participants perceived the advice as originating from the intended source (human expert vs. ARS).
- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
- Findingown data
Recruiters were behaviorally more influenced by ARS advice than by human expert advice.
“recruiters reported lower trust in the ARS yet were behaviorally more influenced by it.”
- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
“human advice was significantly less influential than ARS advice (AME = -0.205,p < 0.001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Participants perceived the advice as originating from the intended source (human expert vs. ARS).
- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
- Findingown data
Trust in the advisor positively and significantly predicted decision change.
“Although trust predicted advice utilization, a trust-reliance paradox emerged: recruiters reported lower trust in the ARS yet were behaviorally more influenced by it.”
- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
“trust in the advisor positively and significantly predicted decision change (AME = 0.078, p <0.001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
- Findingown data
Convergent advice was most influential.
“Convergent advice was most influential”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Inaccurate advice degraded decision quality more than accurate advice improved it, as a descriptive pattern.
“exploratory analyses suggested that inaccurate advice degraded decision quality more than accurate advice improved it.”
- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
“Descriptively, the effect associated with deterioration was therefore larger than the effect associated with improvement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
- Findingown data
Trust did not significantly predict reliance on the ARS.
“Whereas trust significantly predicted reliance on human experts, it did not significantly predict reliance on the ARS.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Algorithmic input shaped recruiters' behavior more strongly than human advice.
“Although recruiters exhibited egocentric advice discounting when confronted with conflicting recommendations, algorithmic input still shaped their behavior more strongly than human advice.”
- Also stated in: § 8.1 | Theoretical Implications · boosted
“A clear dissociation also emerged: participants reported higher trust in human advisors, yet algorithmic advice exerted a stronger behavioral influence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 8.1 | Theoretical Implications · boosted
- Findingown data
Participants reported higher trust in human advisors than in the ARS.
“A clear dissociation also emerged: participants reported higher trust in human advisors, yet algorithmic advice exerted a stronger behavioral influence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Decision optimality deteriorated after participants received advice, decreasing by 9 percentage points relative to initial decision optimality.
“Decision optimality deteriorated after participants received advice, decreasing by 9 percentage points relative to initial decision optimality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Compared with inaccurate advice, accurate advice reduced the likelihood of decision deterioration (B = -2.02, OR = 0.13, p < 0.001).
“Compared with inaccurate advice, accurate advice reduced the likelihood of decision deterioration (B = -2.02,OR = 0.13, p < 0.001)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In convergent advice conditions (N = 159), advice quality had a limited and non-significant effect on the probability of revising the decision (AME = 0.06, p = 0.401).
“In convergent advice conditions, the effect of advice quality on the probability of revising the decision was limited and non-significant (AME = 0.06, p = 0.401, N = 159).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Inaccurate advice increased the probability of decision deterioration by 31.7 percentage points.
“inaccurate advice increased the probability of decision deterioration by 31.7 percentage points”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
Participants maintained their initial judgment more often than they revised it when confronted with incongruent advice.
“In line with the Judge-Advisor System literature, participants maintained their initial judgment more often than they revised it when confronted with incongruent advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The omnibus test of the interaction between advice source and advice accuracy indicated no significant effect (Waldχ2(1) = 0.01, p = 0.919).
“An omnibus test of the interaction between advice source and advice accuracy indicated no significant effect (Waldχ 2 (1) = 0.01, p = 0.919)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
General trust in the advisor positively predicted decision revision.
“Consistent with prior advicetaking research (Sniezek and Van Swol 2001), general trust in the advisor positively predicted decision revision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Advisor consensus increased behavioral influence.
“In line with established advice-taking research (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006;Soll et al. 2022;Wanzel et al. 2017;Yaniv et al. 2009), we found that advisor consensus increased behavioral influence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Compared with inaccurate advice, accurate advice increased the likelihood of decision improvement (B = 1.59, OR = 4.88, p < 0.001).
“and increased the likelihood of decision improvement (B = 1.59,OR = 4.88, p < 0.001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Trust significantly predicted reliance on human experts.
“Whereas trust significantly predicted reliance on human experts, it did not significantly predict reliance on the ARS.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Accurate advice increased the probability of decision improvement by 19.9 percentage points.
“accurate advice increased the probability of decision improvement by 19.9 percentage points.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Trust in AI had no impact on recruiters' decisions under cognitive conflict.
“and had no impact on recruiters' decisions under cognitive conflict.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The detrimental impact of inaccurate recommendations on decision quality appeared to outweigh the benefits of accurate recommendations.
“The detrimental impact of inaccurate recommendations on decision quality also appeared to outweigh the benefits of accurate recommendations.”
- Also stated in: § 8.1 | Theoretical Implications · hedged
“Although accurate advice improved decisions, inaccurate recommendations substantially degraded them, and the detrimental effect appeared larger than the beneficial one.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 8.1 | Theoretical Implications · hedged
- Findingown data
Under divergent advice conditions 7 and 8, decision optimality decreased significantly, by an average of 16 percentage points.
“Under divergent advice conditions 7 and 8, decision optimality decreased significantly, by an average of 16 percentage points.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
On average, 30.9% of respondents changed their decision after receiving advice.
“On average, 30.9% of respondents changed their decision after receiving advice (Table 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Divergent recommendations may generate cognitive conflict by requiring recruiters to arbitrate between competing sources of advice.
“Divergent recommendations may generate cognitive conflict by requiring recruiters to arbitrate between competing sources of advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: In hybrid recruitment contexts, divergent advice intensifies the tension between professional autonomy and reliance on external systems.
- Premisereasoning
Trust is a central mechanism linking the source of advice to behavioral reliance.
“Trust is therefore a central mechanism linking the source of advice to behavioral reliance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Egocentric advice discounting is particularly prevalent in complex, subjective tasks such as personnel selection.
“Egocentric advice discounting is particularly prevalent in complex, subjective tasks such as personnel selection (Gino and Moore 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gino and Moore 2007
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Even when external advice is objectively accurate, decision makers frequently maintain their original judgment, especially when that advice contradicts their prior beliefs or professional intuition.
“Even when external advice is objectively accurate, decision makers frequently maintain their original judgment, especially when that advice contradicts their prior beliefs or professional intuition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bonaccio and Dalal 2006 source
- Premisecitation
Individuals frequently discount recommendations that contradict their prior judgment, even when those recommendations are objectively accurate.
“Individuals frequently discount recommendations that contradict their prior judgment, even when those recommendations are objectively accurate (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bonaccio and Dalal 2006 source
- Premisecitation
Individuals tend to give greater weight to their initial judgments than to external recommendations, a phenomenon known as egocentric advice discounting.
“A consistent finding in this literature is that individuals tend to give greater weight to their initial judgments than to external recommendations, a phenomenon known as egocentric advice discounting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yaniv 2004 source
- Premisecitation
Egocentric advice discounting arises because decision makers have direct access to the reasoning behind their own estimates, but not to the reasoning behind the advisor's recommendation.
“This tendency arises because decision makers have direct access to the reasoning behind their own estimates, but not to the reasoning behind the advisor's recommendation (Yaniv 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yaniv 2004 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Behavioral reliance on algorithmic recommendations likely depends on contextual variables such as expertise, advice congruence, and source credibility.
“These contradictory findings suggest that behavioral reliance on algorithmic recommendations likely depends on contextual variables such as expertise, advice congruence, and source credibility.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The risks associated with this influence may be further amplified in multiple-advisor systems.
“The risks associated with this influence may be further amplified in multiple-advisor systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The deterioration in decision optimality can be explained by the fact that half of the experimental conditions included inaccurate advice.
“This deterioration can be explained by the fact that half of the experimental conditions included inaccurate advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Higher trust increases individuals' willingness to adjust their judgments in response to external recommendations.
“Similarly, Briggs et al. (2002), Haran and Shalvi (2020), and Pescetelli et al. (2021) found that higher trust increases individuals' willingness to adjust their judgments in response to external recommendations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Briggs et al. 2002
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Haran and Shalvi 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Pescetelli et al. 2021 source
- Interpretationcitation
Under cognitive conflict, recruiters may rely more strongly on algorithmic input despite reporting lower trust in it than in human advisors.
“Consistent with Himmelstein and Budescu (2023), who found that stated preferences rarely predict actual advice utilization, our study shows that, under cognitive conflict, recruiters may rely more strongly on algorithmic input despite reporting lower trust in it than in human advisors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Himmelstein and Budescu (2023)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Advice that contradicts a recruiter's initial impression may be experienced not only as information, but also as a challenge to professional judgment.
“Advice that contradicts a recruiter's initial impression may therefore be experienced not only as information, but also as a challenge to professional judgment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
ARS advice was more influential than human expert advice regardless of its accuracy.
“suggesting that ARS advice was more influential than human expert advice regardless of its accuracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Trust in advisors positively predicts advice utilization.
“Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) demonstrated that trust in advisors positively predicts advice utilization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sniezek and Van Swol 2001 source
- Interpretationown data
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
“Hypothesis 2 was therefore not supported.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Consensus among advisors acts as a social validation mechanism, reinforcing the perceived credibility of a recommendation even when it is objectively incorrect.
“Consensus among advisors acts as a social validation mechanism, reinforcing the perceived credibility of a recommendation even when it is objectively incorrect (Banas et al. 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Banas et al. 2022 source
- Interpretationown data
Hypothesis 3 was supported.
“Hypothesis 3 was therefore supported.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Recruiters exhibited egocentric advice discounting when confronted with conflicting recommendations.
“Although recruiters exhibited egocentric advice discounting when confronted with conflicting recommendations, algorithmic input still shaped their behavior more strongly than human advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Expertise may amplify discounting behavior; individuals who perceive themselves as highly competent generally show stronger resistance to external advice.
“Expertise may further amplify this discounting behavior.Individuals who perceive themselves as highly competent generally show stronger resistance to external advice (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bonaccio and Dalal 2006 source
- Study design and conductreasoning
The operationalization of the advice source constitutes a limitation.
“Second, the operationalization of the advice source constitutes a limitation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
This finding differs from the expectation that experienced judges may be more resistant to advice because they can generate more internal arguments supporting their initial view.
“This finding differs from the expectation that experienced judges may be more resistant to advice because they can generate more internal arguments supporting their initial view (Yaniv 2004;Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationown data
Recruiters' reactions to advice in hybrid settings cannot be reduced to a general tendency to underuse or overuse algorithmic advice.
“Our results suggest that recruiters' reactions to advice in hybrid settings cannot be reduced to a general tendency to underuse or overuse algorithmic advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The stronger influence of the ARS compared with human advisors may amplify the negative impact of inaccurate automated guidance.
“This susceptibility is reflected in the stronger influence of the ARS compared with human advisors, which may amplify the negative impact of inaccurate automated guidance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
This dissociation between attitude and behavior helps explain conflicting findings regarding underreliance and overreliance on algorithmic advice.
“This dissociation between attitude and behavior helps explain conflicting findings regarding underreliance (Acikgoz et al. 2020;Dietvorst et al. 2015;Langer et al. 2019;Oberst et al. 2020) and overreliance (Bogert et al. 2021;Logg et al. 2019) on algorithmic advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Trust is a central mechanism shaping behavioral reliance on algorithmic systems.
“Research on human-AI collaboration identifies trust as a central mechanism shaping behavioral reliance on algorithmic systems (Glikson and Woolley 2020;Solberg et al. 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisereasoning
Divergent recommendations require decision makers to arbitrate between competing sources of advice.
“Divergent recommendations, by contrast, require decision makers to arbitrate between competing sources of advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: In hybrid recruitment contexts, divergent advice intensifies the tension between professional autonomy and reliance on external systems.
- Premisecitation
Experienced judges possess richer internal knowledge structures, enabling them to retrieve more self-generated arguments to support their initial assessments.
“Experienced judges possess richer internal knowledge structures, enabling them to retrieve more selfgenerated arguments to support their initial assessments (Yaniv 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yaniv 2004 source
- Interpretationcitation
Directly measuring behavioral reliance reveals a trust-reliance paradox.
“Although the AI-assisted recruitment literature frequently treats trust as a prerequisite for acceptance (Feldkamp et al. 2023;Langer et al. 2021), directly measuring behavioral reliance reveals a trust-reliance paradox (Schmitt et al. 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schmitt et al. 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Successful AI adoption in recruitment goes beyond stated trust.
“This study suggests that successful AI adoption in recruitment goes beyond stated trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
These findings challenge a strictly trust-based model of AI adoption.
“These findings challenge a strictly trust-based model of AI adoption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 15
- May combine two claims. 39
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSome studies suggest that human expert advice has a stronger influence than algorithmic advice, but this assumption has not yet been thoroughly tested using designs that directly measure behavioral change after an initial decision.
“While some studies suggest that human expert advice has a stronger influence than algorithmic advice (Lacroux and Martin-Lacroux 2022;Lee 2018;Newman et al. 2020), this assumption has not yet been thoroughly tested using designs that directly measure behavioral change after an initial decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Lacroux and Martin-Lacroux 2022 source
The citation is attached to the claim that human expert advice has a stronger influence than algorithmic advice. In Analytical Strategy and Results, the paper reports that recruiters were more influenced by algorithmic recommendations; the Discussion reiterates that they trusted human experts more but did not behave accordingly. The later statement about designs measuring change after an initial decision is not attributed to this citation. (LLM, conf=0.90)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Lee 2018 source
- cites Newman et al. 2020 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe relative influence of, and trade-offs between, human and AI sources of advice in hybrid recruitment remain poorly understood.
“As Baines et al. (2024) note, the relative influence of, and trade-offs between, human and AI sources of advice in hybrid recruitment remain poorly understood.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Baines et al. 2024 source
In Discussion > Future research directions (page unavailable), the review says research has not sufficiently examined how agreement between human and AI advisors affects advice use. Practical implications (page unavailable) discusses AI in recruitment, but does not establish that the relative influence of, and trade-offs between, human and AI advice specifically in hybrid recruitment remain poorly understood. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationExisting studies often rely on vignette-based designs, samples of students or laypeople rather than professional recruiters, or indirect indicators of influence such as confidence ratings and ranking scores.
“Existing studies often rely on vignette-based designs (Oberst et al. 2020), samples of students (Cecil et al. 2024) or laypeople (Neumann and Kuncel 2025) rather than professional recruiters, or indirect indicators of influence such as confidence ratings and ranking scores.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Oberst et al. 2020 source
- cites Cecil et al. 2024 source
The Experiment 1a Method identifies a sample of 370 university students, supporting the part attributed to Cecil et al. But the Experiment 1b Method reports a replication with HRM employees, 54.5% of whom worked in selection or recruiting. The paper therefore does not support characterizing its samples as students rather than professional recruiters without qualification. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Neumann and Kuncel 2025 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThis pattern is consistent with recent findings in personnel selection and with the broader literature on overreliance on automated systems.
“This pattern is consistent with recent findings in personnel selection (Cecil et al. 2024) and with the broader literature on overreliance on automated systems (Parasuraman and Manzey 2010;Parasuraman and Riley 1997;Skitka et al. 1999), although it awaits confirmation through formal inferential comparison.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataRecruiters confronted with incongruent advice maintained their initial judgment more frequently than they revised it, with only 44.2% revising, significantly below the 50% chance rate.
“Results revealed widespread egocentric advice discounting.”
- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
“Only 44.2% of recruiters revised their initial judgment (335 out of 758), which was significantly lower than the chance rate of 50%, p < 0.001, one-sided 95% CI [0, 0.47].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 7.2 | Hypothesis Testing · plain
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe interaction between advice source and trust was significant (Waldχ2(1) = 12.8, p < 0.001), and trust in the source significantly affected the likelihood of changing one's decision only when the advice came from a human expert.
“This interaction was significant (Waldχ 2 (1) = 12.8, p < 0.001), and graphical analysis (see Figure 1) showed that trust in the source significantly affected the likelihood of changing one's decision only when the advice came from a human expert.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn dual-advice conditions (N = 460), convergent advice had a significantly stronger influence on decision revision than divergent advice (AME = -0.16, p < .001); participants exposed to divergent advice were 16% less likely to change their decision than those exposed to convergent advice.
“A logistic model estimated exclusively under dualrecommendation conditions (N = 460; Table 4) showed that convergent advice exerted a significantly stronger influence than divergent advice (AME = -0.16,p < 0.001).Participants exposed to divergent advice were 16% less likely to change their decision than those exposed to convergent advice, supporting Hypothesis 4.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataInaccurate advice from the ARS produced the highest rate of change (40%), whereas accurate advice from the human expert produced the lowest rate (22%).
“Inaccurate advice from the ARS produced the highest rate of change (40%), whereas accurate advice from the human expert produced the lowest rate (22%).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn divergent dual-advice conditions, a slight majority of participants aligned with the ARS (53.2%) rather than the human expert (46.8%), although this did not differ significantly from chance (p = 0.299, 95% CI [47.3%, 58.9%]).
“A slight majority of participants aligned with the ARS (53.2%) rather than the human expert (46.8%), although this did not differ significantly from chance, exact binomial test, p = 0.299, 95% CI [47.3%, 58.9%].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAdvice accuracy significantly predicted both the deterioration and the improvement of recruitment decisions.
“Advice accuracy significantly predicted both the deterioration and the improvement of recruitment decisions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAccurate advice improved decision optimality, with the largest gain observed for accurate AI advice, whereas inaccurate advice reduced it, with the largest decline also occurring for inaccurate AI advice.
“As expected, accurate advice improved decision optimality, with the largest gain observed for accurate AI advice, whereas inaccurate advice reduced it, with the largest decline also occurring for inaccurate AI advice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataIn congruent cases, 91.6% of participants maintained their initial decision.
“in these cases, 91.6% of participants maintained their initial decision.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataNeither objective expertise nor perceived self-efficacy in recruitment significantly affected decision change (AME = -0.02, p = 0.73 for objective expertise; AME = -0.0007, p = 0.96 for perceived self-efficacy).
“The results showed that neither objective expertise nor perceived selfefficacy in recruitment significantly affected decision change: average marginal effect (AME) = -0.02,p = 0.73 for objective expertise; and AME = -0.0007,p = 0.96 for perceived self-efficacy in recruitment (Table 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataRecruiters' expertise was not significantly related to the likelihood of changing their decision after receiving advice: neither objective recruitment expertise nor perceived self-efficacy significantly predicted decision change.
“Contrary to earlier findings (Bruun et al. 2022), recruiters' expertise was not significantly related to the likelihood of changing their decision after receiving advice: neither objective recruitment expertise nor perceived selfefficacy significantly predicted decision change.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe accuracy of the initial decision had no significant effect on decision change; the rate of change was slightly higher among respondents whose first decision was correct than among those whose first decision was incorrect (45.8% vs 41.4%, χ2(1, N = 758) = 1.37, p = 0.24).
“The accuracy of the initial decision had no significant effect.The rate of change was slightly higher among respondents whose first decision was correct than among those whose first decision was incorrect: 45.8% versus 41.4%, χ 2 (1, N = 758) = 1.37, p = 0.24.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataA trust-reliance paradox emerged: recruiters reported lower trust in the ARS yet were behaviorally more influenced by it.
“a trust-reliance paradox emerged: recruiters reported lower trust in the ARS yet were behaviorally more influenced by it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Participants perceived the advice as originating from the intended source (human expert vs. ARS).
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationHuman advisors are often perceived as more socially legitimate, trustworthy, and context-sensitive, whereas algorithmic systems may be perceived as more objective and consistent.
“Human advisors are often perceived as more socially legitimate, trustworthy, and contextsensitive, whereas algorithmic systems may be perceived as more objective and consistent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningConvergent recommendations may reinforce perceived validity and reduce decisional ambiguity, thereby increasing the likelihood of judgment revision.
“Convergent recommendations may reinforce perceived validity and reduce decisional ambiguity, thereby increasing the likelihood of judgment revision.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIndividuals often favor congruent information over objectively accurate but contradictory recommendations, a tendency driven by confirmation and self-validation processes.
“Existing research shows that individuals often favor congruent information over objectively accurate but contradictory recommendations, a tendency driven by confirmation and self-validation processes (Yaniv 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yaniv 2004 source
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe human and algorithmic advice differed in more respects than the source alone: the ARS provided numerical scores together with a ranking, whereas the human expert delivered a narrative verbal assessment that included qualifying remarks and no numerical scores.
“The human and algorithmic advice differed in more respects than the source alone: the ARS provided numerical scores (soft skills, hard skills, managerial profile, and overall match) together with a ranking, whereas the human expert delivered a narrative verbal assessment that included qualifying remarks and no numerical scores.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Interpretationown dataRecruiters overrely on algorithmic advice.
“At the organizational level, the observed overreliance on algorithmic advice suggests that organizations should not treat user trust as the sole metric of successful AI implementation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationDisagreement among advisors reduces trust and decreases the weight assigned to external inputs.
“Disagreement among advisors reduces trust and decreases the weight assigned to external inputs (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006;Wanzel et al. 2017;Yaniv et al. 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataFour human resource management experts reviewed the CVs and confirmed that the profiles were sufficiently distinguishable, with one application considered objectively stronger because it met a greater number of the job requirements.
“To ensure realism and relevance, four human resource management experts reviewed the CVs and confirmed that the profiles were sufficiently distinguishable: one of the two applications was considered objectively stronger because it met a greater number of the requirements listed in the job description.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataHuman oversight alone may be insufficient to mitigate algorithmic harm: rather than supervising the system objectively, recruiters may be influenced by its recommendations in ways that affect decision quality.
“These results suggest that human oversight alone may be insufficient to mitigate algorithmic harm: rather than supervising the system objectively, recruiters may be influenced by its recommendations in ways that affect decision quality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningAdvice influence was measured exclusively in cases in which the advice conflicted with participants' initial decisions; congruent cases were excluded because they involved no cognitive conflict and offered little opportunity to observe judgment revision.
“Advice influence was measured exclusively in cases in which the advice conflicted with participants' initial decisions.Congruent cases were excluded because they involved no cognitive conflict and offered little opportunity to observe judgment revision; in these cases, 91.6% of participants maintained their initial decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe two conditions differed not only in source, but also in the format, richness, and consistency of the informational cues provided.
“The two conditions therefore differed not only in source, but also in the format, richness, and consistency of the informational cues provided.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationOverreliance can negatively affect decision quality and progressively erode human expertise.
“Such overreliance can negatively affect decision quality and progressively erode human expertise (Diefenhardt 2023).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Diefenhardt 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationTrust formation, trust calibration, and reliance on automated advice are inherently dynamic processes that develop over repeated interactions, as users observe the accuracy of advice and adjust their reliance accordingly.
“Trust formation, trust calibration, and reliance on automated advice are inherently dynamic processes that develop over repeated interactions, as users observe the accuracy of advice and adjust their reliance accordingly (Lee and See 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lee and See 2004 source
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe experimental manipulations were effective: the different conditions produced significantly different effects (χ2(7, N = 1,208) = 16.68, p = 0.02).
“These results indicate that the experimental manipulations were effective: the different conditions produced significantly different effects (χ 2 (7, N = 1,208) = 16.68,p = 0.02).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationTrust is a key determinant of reliance on automation.
“This finding aligns with broader literature positioning trust as a key determinant of reliance on automation (Glikson and Woolley 2020; Lee and See 2004;Solberg et al. 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationEmpirical findings on behavioral reliance on algorithmic advice remain inconsistent, with some studies reporting reluctance to use algorithmic decision aids in recruitment and others showing that recruiters continue to follow algorithmic recommendations even when they are inaccurate.
“Empirical findings on behavioral reliance on algorithmic advice remain inconsistent.Some studies report reluctance to use algorithmic decision aids in recruitment contexts (Acikgoz et al. 2020;Langer et al. 2019;Oberst et al. 2020), whereas others show that recruiters continue to follow algorithmic recommendations even when they are inaccurate (Cecil et al. 2024;Lacroux and Martin-Lacroux 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationConvergent advice from multiple sources increases perceived validity and strengthens confidence in external recommendations.
“Research indicates that convergent advice from multiple sources increases perceived validity and strengthens confidence in external recommendations (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006;Soll et al. 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bonaccio and Dalal 2006 source
- cites Soll et al. 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBoth streams of research remain incomplete if they rely exclusively on self-reported preferences, as explicit distrust does not prevent individuals from relying on algorithmic advice.
“Both streams of research remain incomplete if they rely exclusively on self-reported preferences, as explicit distrust does not prevent individuals from relying on algorithmic advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenParticipants who failed to answer all four attention-check questions correctly were excluded from the analysis.
“Participants who failed to answer all four questions correctly were excluded from the analysis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe central challenge lies in behavioral integration under cognitive conflict.
“The central challenge lies in behavioral integration under cognitive conflict.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThis design choice was motivated by ecological validity, as human advice in real recruitment settings is rarely delivered as standardized scores; it nevertheless limits the internal validity of source comparisons.
“This design choice was motivated by ecological validity, as human advice in real recruitment settings is rarely delivered as standardized scores; it nevertheless limits the internal validity of source comparisons.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: In real recruitment settings, human advice is rarely delivered as standardized scores.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataRecruiters are subject to egocentric bias but remain capable of revising their initial decisions, sometimes at the expense of decision quality.
“Although recruiters are subject to egocentric bias, they remain capable of revising their initial decisions, sometimes at the expense of decision quality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenThe experiment involved a single decision round.
“Third, the experiment involved a single decision round.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationBecause judges make predictions with greater confidence when cues are coherent and unambiguous, the highly consistent quantitative output of the ARS may have appeared more diagnostic than the more nuanced human assessment, and the expert's explicit reservations may have signaled lower advisor confidence, which is known to reduce advice taking.
“Because judges make predictions with greater confidence when cues are coherent and unambiguous (Kahneman and Tversky 1973;Slovic 1966), the highly consistent quantitative output of the ARS may have appeared more diagnostic than the more nuanced human assessment, and the expert's explicit reservations may have signaled lower advisor confidence, which is known to reduce advice taking.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese findings highlight two distinct vulnerabilities in AI-assisted recruitment: insufficient reliance on valid but incongruent advice, driven by egocentric discounting, and susceptibility to overreliance on automated recommendations.
“These findings highlight two distinct vulnerabilities in AI-assisted recruitment: insufficient reliance on valid but incongruent advice, driven by egocentric discounting, and susceptibility to overreliance on automated recommendations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPersonnel selection remains a domain in which professional intuition is frequently valued despite evidence supporting more structured approaches.
“In recruitment, this tendency is particularly relevant because personnel selection remains a domain in which professional intuition is frequently valued despite evidence supporting more structured approaches (Highhouse 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Highhouse 2008 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAlthough egocentric discounting persists, algorithmic advice may exert stronger behavioral influence than human expertise despite lower explicit trust.
“By drawing on the JAS framework, we show that although egocentric discounting persists, algorithmic advice may exert stronger behavioral influence than human expertise despite lower explicit trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFor hybrid recruitment, multi-source advice is not inherently beneficial: consensus can reinforce accurate decisions, but it can also amplify errors when both human and algorithmic advisors are incorrect.
“For hybrid recruitment, this suggests that multi-source advice is not inherently beneficial: consensus can reinforce accurate decisions, but it can also amplify errors when both human and algorithmic advisors are incorrect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationWhen trust exceeds capabilities, individuals may rely too heavily on automated recommendations and reduce vigilant information processing.
“Conversely, when trust exceeds those capabilities, individuals may rely too heavily on automated recommendations and reduce vigilant information processing (Logg et al. 2019;Mosier et al. 1998;Parasuraman and Manzey 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningA one-shot decision scenario cannot capture these dynamics, and inferences about trust processes and human oversight drawn from a single decision should therefore be generalized with caution.
“A one-shot decision scenario cannot capture these dynamics, and inferences about trust processes and human oversight drawn from a single decision should therefore be generalized with caution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataDivergent advice created an arbitration problem and made recruiters less likely to revise their initial judgments, whereas convergent advice facilitated decision revision.
“Whereas divergent advice created an arbitration problem and made recruiters less likely to revise their initial judgments, convergent advice facilitated decision revision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningThe categorical approach (binary decision change) lacks the granularity needed to detect more subtle judgment adjustments.
“Although this categorical approach clarifies final outcomes, it lacks the granularity needed to detect more subtle judgment adjustments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationJudges tend to give greater weight to their own initial assessments because they have direct access to the reasoning underlying their own judgments, but not to the reasoning underlying external advice.
“This finding is consistent with Yaniv (2004) argument that judges tend to give greater weight to their own initial assessments because they have direct access to the reasoning underlying their own judgments, but not to the reasoning underlying external advice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Yaniv (2004) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe baseline subjectivity of the recruitment task, with 37% of respondents initially selecting the weaker candidate, highlights the need for stricter experimental control to isolate the unique variance of algorithmic influence from idiosyncratic biases.
“In addition, the baseline subjectivity of the recruitment task, with 37% of respondents initially selecting the weaker candidate, highlights the need for stricter experimental control to isolate the unique variance of algorithmic influence from idiosyncratic biases.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
Recruiters retain the agency to accept, reinterpret, discount, or reject external advice.
“Recruiters act as decision makers rather than passive recipients of ARS outputs; they retain the agency to accept, reinterpret, discount, or reject advice.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In hybrid recruitment contexts, divergent advice intensifies the tension between professional autonomy and reliance on external systems.
“In hybrid recruitment contexts, divergent advice intensifies the tension between professional autonomy and reliance on external systems.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Participants perceived the advice as originating from the intended source (human expert vs. ARS).
“Human advice was presented through excerpts from telephone conversations with a recruitment agency manager, described as an expert whose agency had previously collaborated with the organization.ARS advice was presented as originating from a predictive recruitment solution created by a fictional startup using an advanced algorithmic system.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In real recruitment settings, human advice is rarely delivered as standardized scores.
“as human advice in real recruitment settings is rarely delivered as standardized scores”
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Consistentχ²(1) = 1.37reported p = .24 · recomputed p = .242
“χ 2 (1, N = 758) = 1.37, p = .24”
- Consistentt(296) = -2.73reported p = .007 · recomputed p = .007
“t (296) = -2.73,p = .007”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Expertise effects differ from Table 2
MajorThe text cites Table 2 for negative average marginal effects of objective expertise and self-efficacy, with p-values of 0.73 and 0.96. Table 2 instead reports a positive expertise effect of 0.081 (p = 0.31) and a self-efficacy effect of -0.004 (p = 0.76).
“average marginal effect (AME) = -0.02,p = 0.73 for objective expertise; and AME = -0.0007,p = 0.96 for perceived self-efficacy in recruitment (Table 2).”
“| Expertise | 1.46 | [0.70, 3.05] | 0.081 | 0.08 | 0.31 | | Self-efficacy | 0.96 | [0.77, 1.21] | -0.004 | 0.02 | 0.76 |”
Reported trust effect differs from Table 2
MajorThe text reports a trust average marginal effect of 0.078 and cites Table 2, but the table gives 0.11.
“trust in the advisor positively and significantly predicted decision change (AME = 0.078, p <0.001).”
“| Trust in advisor | 1.75 | [1.40, 2.19] | 0.11 | 0.02 | < 0.001 |”
Five of eight conditions included inaccurate advice, not half
MinorThe listed conditions containing inaccurate advice are 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8: five of the eight conditions, rather than half.
“This deterioration can be explained by the fact that half of the experimental conditions included inaccurate advice.”
“The conditions were as follows: (1) accurate human expert, (2) inaccurate human expert, (3) accurate ARS, (4) inaccurate ARS, (5) accurate human expert and accurate ARS, (6) inaccurate human expert and inaccurate ARS, (7) accurate ARS and inaccurate human expert, and (8) inaccurate ARS and accurate human expert.”
Deterioration probabilities differ by 27, not 31.7, percentage points
MinorTable 3 gives deterioration probabilities of 0.32 with inaccurate advice and 0.05 with accurate advice, a difference of 27 percentage points. The stated 31.7 percentage points is approximately the probability with inaccurate advice alone, not the difference between advice conditions.
“inaccurate advice increased the probability of decision deterioration by 31.7 percentage points”
“| Deterioration | Inaccurate advice | 0.32 | 0.02 | 0.26 | 0.38 | | | | Accurate advice | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.08 | |”
Improvement probabilities differ by 16, not 19.9, percentage points
MinorTable 3 gives improvement probabilities of 0.20 with accurate advice and 0.04 with inaccurate advice, a difference of 16 percentage points. The stated 19.9 percentage points is approximately the probability with accurate advice alone.
“accurate advice increased the probability of decision improvement by 19.9 percentage points.”
“| Improvement | Inaccurate advice | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06 | | | | Accurate advice | 0.20 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.25 | |”
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Predicting decision-makers' algorithm use
Neumann, M., Niessen, A., & Meijer, R. (2023) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2023.107759 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Diefenhardt, F. (2025) · The International Journal of Human Resource Management · doi:10.1080/09585192.2025.2470302 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Bruun, A., White, N., Oostendorp, L. J. M., Vickerstaff, V., Harris, A. J. L., Tomlinson, C. D., Bloch, S., & Stone, P. C. (2022) · Cancer Medicine · doi:10.1002/cam4.5485 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Improving Advisor Systems: Algorithms that Explain Themselves
Neumann, M., & Kuncel, N. R. (2025) · Journal of Business and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s10869-025-10014-x · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Gibbons A. M., 2003, Symposium in Honor of Janet Sniezek. Symposium presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making
- Schmitt A., 2021, Towards a Trust Reliance Paradox? Exploring the Gap Between Perceived Trust in and Reliance on Algorithmic Advice, International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), 14, 1
- Authors
- Lacroux, A., & Martin Lacroux, C.
- Affiliations
- PRISM Sorbonne (FR)
- Univ. Grenoble‐Alpes, Grenoble INP, CERAG Grenoble France
- Corresponding author
- Lacroux, Alain
- Venue
- International Journal of Selection and Assessment
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2026-10-03
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 0965-075X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2389
- OpenAlex
- W7218392398
- Semantic Scholar
- dae37eeba69852a64f26727b8b4d9a7101ac36d3
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- International Journal of Selection and Assessment (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › AI and HR Technologies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Employer Branding and e-HRM
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- advice taking, cognitive conflict, trust in AI, hiring decisions, hiring discrimination
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-30.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-30.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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