The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND U.S. BANK PERFORMANCE
Abstract
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Does corporate governance explain US bank performance during the period leading up to the financial crisis? We adopt the factor structure by Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) to measure multiple dimensions of corporate governance for 236 public commercial banks. Research Findings/Insights: Findings reveal corporate governance factors explain financial performance better than loan quality. We find strong support for a negative association between leverage and both financial performance and loan quality. CEO duality is negatively associated with financial performance. The extent of executive incentive pay is positively associated with financial performance but exhibits a negative association with loan quality in the long-run. We find a concave relationship between financial performance and both board size and average director age. We provide weak evidence of an association of anti-takeover devices, board meeting frequency, and affiliated nature of committees with financial performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We apply agency theory to the banking industry and expect that the governance-performance linkage might differ due to the unique regulatory and business environment. Results extend Larcker et al. (2007), especially regarding the concave relationship between board size and performance, and the role of leverage. Given the lack of support for our agency theory predictions, we suggest that alternative theories are needed to understand the performance implications of corporate governance at banks. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We offer contributions to regulators, especially for ongoing financial reforms of capital requirements and executive compensation. Specifically, we show a consistent negative association between leverage and performance, which supports the current debate on Tier I capital limits for banks.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(93)90023-5 · Cited by 25,754
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 1×
“Shleifer & Vishny (1997) show that large shareholders often play an active monitoring role of corporate managers, such as leading securities fraud class actions, selecting board members, and voting initiatives.”
BackgroundThe Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
Klein, A. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00059-9 · Cited by 4,622
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
(1997) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79 · Cited by 3,518
The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1 · Cited by 3,283
The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (2011) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 2,585
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8161 · Cited by 2,498
Board meeting frequency and firm performance
Vafeas, N. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00018-5 · Cited by 2,071
Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks
Berger, A. N., & DeYoung, R. (1997) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(97)00003-4 · Cited by 1,985
NUMBER OF DIRECTORS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A META-ANALYSIS.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256988 · Cited by 1,764
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition
(1985) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036883 · Cited by 1,736
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329018 · Cited by 1,666
Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance
Larcker, D. F., Richardson, S. A., & Tuna, I. (2007) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2007.82.4.963 · Cited by 1,534
Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00559 · Cited by 1,479
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555702 · Cited by 1,308
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B., & Liebman, J. (1997) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6213 · Cited by 1,291
Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry
Morgan, D. P. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344506 · Cited by 1,241
Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors
Andres, P. D., & Vallelado, E. (2008) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.008 · Cited by 1,099
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2012) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_10 · Cited by 1,051
The role of capital in financial institutions
Berger, A. N., Herring, R. J., & Szegö, G. P. (1995) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(95)00002-x · Cited by 980
The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis
Kirkpatrick, G. (2009) · OECD Journal Financial Market Trends · doi:10.1787/fmt-v2009-art3-en · Cited by 914
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
Zeiler, L. J. (2004) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v34.n1.1410 · Cited by 888
The Corporate Governance of BanksPreprint
Macey, J. R., & O’Hara, M. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 590
Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.387561 · Cited by 547
The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence
Levine, R. (2004) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3404 · Cited by 528
Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2003) · Swedish economic policy review · Cited by 475
Appraising boardroom performance.
CONGER, J. A., Finegold, D., & Lawler, E. E. (1998) · PubMed · Cited by 432
Chen, C. R., Steiner, T. L., & Whyte, A. M. (2005) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.06.004 · Cited by 395
Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure
Mehran, H. (1992) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331139 · Cited by 395
Boards and Company Performance ‐ Research Challenges the Conventional Wisdom
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1994) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.1994.tb00071.x · Cited by 361
Methods and applications of linear models: regression and the analysis of variance
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-3361 · Cited by 350
Too Busy To Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors
Harris, I. C., & Shimizu, K. (2004) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00453.x · Cited by 293
Audit Committee and Firm Value: Evidence on Outside Top Executives as Expert‐Independent Directors
Chan, K. C., & Li, J. (2008) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00662.x · Cited by 282
Executive pay and shareholder litigation
Peng, L., & Röell, A. (2008) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfl003 · Cited by 264
Beltratti, A., & Stulz, R. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w15180 · Cited by 245
Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria
Beck, T., Cull, R., & Jerome, A. T. (2005) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.018 · Cited by 228
Merchant, K. A., Van der Stede, W. A., & Zheng, L. (2003) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00051-4 · Cited by 219
Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influence CEO Compensation Practices?
Newman, H. A., & Mozes, H. A. (1999) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3666182 · Cited by 204
The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure
Lasfer, M. A. (2006) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.00600.x · Cited by 166
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.607364 · Cited by 162
Sun, J., & Cahan, S. F. (2009) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00726.x · Cited by 131
Firm Complexity and Board of Director Composition
Markarian, G., & Parbonetti, A. (2007) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00643.x · Cited by 131
Methods and Applications of Linear Models
Hocking, R. R. (2003) · Wiley series in probability and statistics · doi:10.1002/0471434159 · Cited by 116
Tobin's Q Does Not Measure Performance: Theory, Empirics, and Alternative MeasuresPreprint
Dybvig, P. H., & Warachka, M. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1562444 · Cited by 75
Hagendorff, J., Collins, M., & Keasey, K. (2010) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00815.x · Cited by 63
Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks
Prowse, S. D. (1994) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 34
Dossi, A., Patelli, L., & Zoni, L. (2010) · Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance · doi:10.1177/0148558x1002500404 · Cited by 15
Self-citation
Cited by
Jizi, M. I., Salama, A., Dixon, R., & Stratling, R. (2014) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1929-2 · Cited by 1,080
Bătae, O. M., Dragomir, V. D., & Feleagă, L. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.125791 · Cited by 432
Board Diversity: Moving the Field Forward
Adams, R. B., de Haan, J., Terjesen, S., & van Ees, H. (2015) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12106 · Cited by 397
CEO Narcissism, Risk-Taking, and Resilience: An Empirical Analysis in U.S. Commercial Banks
Buyl, T., Boone, C., & Wade, J. B. (2019) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206317699521 · Cited by 367
Metadata
- Authors
- Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., & Xu, P. T.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-09
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 418-436
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2137846363
- Cited by
- 403
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 41.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.