Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 168

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

Gibler, Douglas M., Randazzo, Kirk A.·2011·American Journal of Political Science

Abstract

We test the efficacy of judicial independence in preventing regime reversals toward authoritarianism. Using a dataset of judicial constraints across 163 different countries from 1960 to 2000, we find that established independent judiciaries prevent regime changes toward authoritarianism across all types of states. Established courts are also capable of thwarting regime collapses in nondemocracies. These results provide some of the first large-n evidence confirming the ability of the judiciary to maintain regime stability. Unfortunately, however, the beneficial effects of court systems seem to take time to develop. The evidence indicates that newly formed courts are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 4 references

Research works printed but not linked: 70

  1. Alivizatos, 1995, Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, 566
  2. Barnum, 1985, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, Journal of Politics, 47, 652, 10.2307/2130901 · DOI
  3. Baros, 2008, Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes
  4. Boix, 2003, Endogenous Democratization, World Politics, 55, 517, 10.1353/wp.2003.0019 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Bumin, 2009, Institutional Viability and High Courts: A Comparative Analysis, Australian Journal of Political Science, 44, 127, 10.1080/10361140802657052 · doi:10.1080/10361140802657052
  6. Burbank, 2002, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 10.4135/9781452229577 · DOI
  7. Caldeira, 1987, Public Opinion and the US Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing Plan, American Political Science Review, 81, 1139, 10.2307/1962582 · DOI · Paper page
  8. Carrubba, 2009, “A Model of the Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions in Federal and International Systems, Journal of Politics, 71, 55, 10.1017/S002238160809004X · DOI · Paper page
  9. Cooter, 1996, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, International Review of Law & Economics, 16, 295, 10.1016/0144-8188(96)00018-X · doi:10.1016/0144-8188(96)00018-x
  10. Crowther, 1986, Philippine Authoritarianism and the International Economy, Comparative Politics, 18, 339, 10.2307/421615 · DOI
  11. Dahl, 1957, Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, Journal of Public Law, 6, 279
  12. Dakolias, 199596, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, Virginia Journal of International Law, 36, 167
  13. DeRouen, 2000, Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note, International Studies Quarterly, 44, 317, 10.1111/0020-8833.00160 · DOI
  14. Desch, 1996, War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?, International Organization, 50, 237, 10.1017/S0020818300028551 · DOI · Paper page
  15. Durr, 2000, Ideological Divergence and Public Support for the Supreme Court, American Journal of Political Science, 44, 768, 10.2307/2669280 · DOI · Paper page
  16. Epstein, 2006, Democratic Transitions, American Journal of Political Science, 50, 551, 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00201.x · DOI · Paper page
  17. Epstein, 2005, The Supreme Court during Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, New York University Law Review, 80, 1
  18. Epstein, 2001, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, Law & Society Review, 35, 117, 10.2307/3185388 · DOI
  19. Eskridge, 1991, Reneging on History-Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, California Law Review, 79, 613, 10.2307/3480831 · doi:10.2307/3480831
  20. Fiss, 199394, The Limits of Judicial Independence, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, 25, 57
  21. Franklin, 1989, Republican Schoolmaster: The US Supreme Court, Public Opinion and Abortion, American Political Science Review, 83, 751, 10.2307/1962059 · DOI
  22. Gelpi, 1997, Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, 255, 10.1177/0022002797041002003 · DOI · Paper page
  23. Gibler, 2010, Outside-In: The Effects of Territorial Threat on State Centralization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 519, 10.1177/0022002710370135 · DOI
  24. Gibler, 2012, The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict, 10.1017/CBO9781139060233 · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060233
  25. Gibson, 1998, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, American Political Science Review, 92, 343, 10.2307/2585668 · DOI · Paper page
  26. Gurr, 1998, War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State, Comparative Political Studies, 21, 45, 10.1177/0010414088021001003 · DOI · Paper page
  27. Helmke, 2002, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy, American Political Science Review, 96, 291, 10.1017/S0003055402000175 · DOI
  28. Henisz, 2002, The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment, Industrial and Corporate Change, 11, 355, 10.1093/icc/11.2.355 · DOI · Paper page
  29. Henisz , Witold J. Bennet A. Zelner 2005 Resistance to Multilateral Influence on Reform: The Political Backlash against Private Infrastructure Investments · DOI
  30. Herron, 2003, The Relationship between Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts, Journal of Politics, 65, 422, 10.1111/1468-2508.t01-3-00007 · doi:10.1111/1468-2508.t01-3-00007
  31. Hilbink, 2007, Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile, 10.1017/CBO9780511511509 · DOI · Paper page
  32. Hilbink, 2008, Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes
  33. Im, 1987, The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea, World Politics, 39, 231, 10.2307/2010441 · DOI
  34. Kaufman, 1976, Transition to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case
  35. Klerman, 2005, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England, American Law and Economics Review, 7, 1, 10.1093/aler/ahi005 · DOI
  36. Larkins, 1998, The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina, Comparative Politics, 30, 423, 10.2307/422332 · DOI
  37. Larkins, 1996, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, American Journal of Comparative Law, 44, 605, 10.2307/840623 · DOI · Paper page
  38. Lasswell, 1997, Essays on the Garrison State
  39. Levy, 1989, Handbook of War Studies, 259
  40. Lijphart, 1999, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries
  41. Linz, 1996, Toward Consolidated Democracies, Journal of Democracy, 7, 14, 10.1353/jod.1996.0031 · DOI · Paper page
  42. Lipset, 1959, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, American Political Science Review, 53, 69, 10.2307/1951731 · DOI · Paper page
  43. Mansfield, 2003, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War, International Organization, 56, 297, 10.1162/002081802320005496 · DOI · Paper page
  44. Marshall, 1989, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court
  45. Mishler, 1993, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, American Political Science Review, 87, 87, 10.2307/2938958 · DOI · Paper page
  46. Mishler, 1996, Public Opinion Attitudinal Model and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, Journal of Politics, 58, 169, 10.2307/2960354 · DOI · Paper page
  47. Moore, 1966, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
  48. O’Connor, 2003, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the Judiciary, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2, 1, 10.1093/oxfordjournals.cjilaw.a000463 · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.cjilaw.a000463
  49. O’Connor, 2008, Fair & Independent Courts, Daedalus, 137, 8, 10.1162/daed.2008.137.4.8 · doi:10.1162/daed.2008.137.4.8
  50. Oneal, 2006, Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921-2001, International Studies Quarterly, 50, 755, 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00424.x · DOI
  51. Olson, 1993, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, American Political Science Review, 87, 567, 10.2307/2938736 · DOI · Paper page
  52. Przeworski, 1996, What Makes Democracies Endure?, Journal of Democracy, 7, 39, 10.1353/jod.1996.0016 · DOI · Paper page
  53. Rasler, 1986, War, Accommodation, and Violence in the United States, 1890-1970, American Political Science Review, 80, 921, 10.2307/1960545 · DOI
  54. Rasler, 2004, The Democratic Peace and a Sequential, Reciprocal, Causal Arrow Hypothesis, Comparative Political Studies, 37, 879, 10.1177/0010414004267980 · DOI
  55. Ramseyer, 2005, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, American Political Science Review, 95, 331, 10.1017/S0003055401002040 · DOI
  56. Rueschemeyer, 1992, Capitalist Development and Democracy
  57. Shapiro, 1994, The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, Comparative Political Studies, 26, 397, 10.1177/0010414094026004001 · doi:10.1177/0010414094026004001
  58. Shapiro, 1981, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis, 10.7208/chicago/9780226161341.001.0001 · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226161341.001.0001
  59. Silverstein, 2008, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes
  60. Singer, 1972, Peace, War, and Numbers, 19
  61. Skidmore, 1977, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, 149
  62. Solomon, 2005, Threats of Judicial Counter-Reform in Putin's Russia, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 13, 325, 10.3200/DEMO.13.3.325-346 · doi:10.3200/demo.13.3.325-346
  63. Stone Sweet, 2000, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, 10.1093/0198297718.001.0001 · DOI · Paper page
  64. Tate, 1995, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power
  65. Thompson, 1996, Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart before the Horse?, International Organization, 50, 141, 10.1017/S0020818300001697 · DOI · Paper page
  66. Thompson, 2001, Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, 45, 557, 10.1111/0020-8833.00214 · DOI · Paper page
  67. Toharia, 1974, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Contemporary Spain, Law and Society Review, 9, 475, 10.2307/3053168 · DOI
  68. Tsebelis, 2002, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, 10.1515/9781400831456 · DOI · Paper page
  69. Verbitsky, 1993, Hacer la Corte: La Construccion de un Poder Absoluto sin Justiciani Control
  70. Wallerstein, 1980, Friends as Foes, Foreign Policy, 40, 119, 10.2307/1148344 · doi:10.2307/1148344

Cited by

See all 168

Metadata

Authors
Gibler, D. M., & Randazzo, K. A.
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2011-02-08
Volume
55
Issue
3
Pages
696-709
ISSN
0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2113932437
Cited by
168
References
4
FWCI
61.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1 (tdm, 1666 d)

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x
The paper
Gibler, D. M., & Randazzo, K. A. (2011). Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.