Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’
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Citations
Cites
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I—Crispin Wright: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?
Wright, C. (2004) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x · Cited by 712
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705 · cited 1×
“…undermine the doxastic justification of one’s belief that p, but it does not thereby defeat one’s propositional justification to believe that p. James Pryor (2004) draws a related distinction between which propositions one has justification to believe and which propositions one is rationally…”
BackgroundPutting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief
Christensen, D. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199263256.001.0001 · Cited by 613
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
Alston, W. P. (1988) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214077 · Cited by 578
McDowell, J. (1995) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108338 · Cited by 568
White, R. (2005) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x · Cited by 539
Feldman, R. (2000) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2653823 · Cited by 505
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Bergmann, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 · Cited by 504
Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (1985) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00372404 · Cited by 455
Concepts of Epistemic Justification
Alston, W. P. (1985) · The Monist · doi:10.5840/monist198568116 · Cited by 382
Epistemic justification: internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-2097 · Cited by 339
Highlights of Recent Epistemology
Pryor, J. (2001) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.95 · Cited by 335
WEDGWOOD, P. (2002) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00206.x · Cited by 311
DEFEATERS AND HIGHER-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
Bergmann, M. (2005) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x · Cited by 255
Byrne, A., & University of Arkansas Press (2005) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics20053312 · Cited by 227
Introspection and Consciousness
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001 · Cited by 179
Themes from G.E. Moore: new essays in epistemology and ethics
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-0817 · Cited by 177
Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.2307/1522948 · Cited by 170 · cited 1×
“21 For a range of other externalist options, see Bergmann (2006), Goldman (1993), Sosa (2007), and Williamson (2000).”
Background
Cited by
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
(2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001 · Cited by 482
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Worsnip, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12246 · Cited by 317
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason)
Titelbaum, M. G. (2015) · Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0009 · Cited by 303
Weatherson, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 · Cited by 302
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Smithies, D. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199917662.001.0001 · Cited by 271
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- SMITHIES, D.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-07-21
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 273-300
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2162151374
- Cited by
- 275
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 34.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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