Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic experiments
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Abstract
High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's “moral sentiments.” Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments reviewed here suggest that economic incentives may be counterproductive when they signal that selfishness is an appropriate response; constitute a learning environment through which over time people come to adopt more self-interested motivations; compromise the individual's sense of self-determination and thereby degrade intrinsic motivations; or convey a message of distrust, disrespect, and unfair intent. Many of these unintended effects of incentives occur because people act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals. Good organizational and institutional design can channel the material interests for the achievement of social goals while also enhancing the contribution of the moral sentiments to the same ends.
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“Overall, punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment45–47.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [45]
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“Paying donors for giving blood, for example, actually decreases willingness to donate [14]”
From The social motivation theory of autism (2012) · cites this paper as [14]
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Applying conservation social science to study the human dimensions of Neotropical bird conservation
Dayer, A. A., Silva‐Rodríguez, E. A., Albert, S. M., Chapman, M., Zukowski, B., Ibarra, J. T., Gifford, G., Echeverri, A., Martínez‐Salinas, A., & Luque, C. S. (2020) · Ornithological Applications · doi:10.1093/condor/duaa021 · Cited by 51
“More critically, without an understanding of the human dimensions, PES programs run the risk of crowding out farmers’ intrinsic motivations for conservation (Bowles 2008, Muradian et al.”
BackgroundVollan, B. (2010) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.003 · Cited by 51
Searching for the place of biodiversity in the ecosystem services discourse
Jax, K., & Heink, U. (2015) · Biological Conservation · doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2015.06.032 · Cited by 55
Using financial incentives to motivate conservation of an at-risk species on private lands
Ramsdell, C. P., Sorice, M. G., & Dwyer, A. M. (2015) · Environmental Conservation · doi:10.1017/s0376892915000302 · Cited by 53
“This hidden cost has been identified in the psychological and behavioural economics literature (Dwyer et al. 1993; Heyman & Ariely 2004; Bowles 2008), and questioned on moral grounds (Sandel 2012).”
BackgroundGrossmann, I., & Brienza, J. P. (2018) · Journal of Intelligence · doi:10.3390/jintelligence6020022 · Cited by 41
“However interesting and well-meaning these courses may be, their effectiveness for guiding wise decision making may be occluded by a hard focus on the notion of economic, self-interested rationality [95,112] as a chief basis for sound judgment in the majority of courses students are required to complete (e.”
BackgroundCivic duty and turnout in the UK referendum on AV: What shapes the duty to vote?
Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (2012) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.10.011 · Cited by 40
“Butt and Curtice (2010) show a secular decline in that sense of duty among the UK electorate and especially among the young.”
BackgroundChoi, A. S. (2014) · Journal of Environmental Planning and Management · doi:10.1080/09640568.2014.940515 · Cited by 40
“However, this offsetting behaviour might be contradictory to the previous understanding of rational behaviour that reflects personal choices depending on how responsibilities are shared by others (Shaw and Thomas 2006), and to the ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis (Bowles 2008).”
BackgroundWhittle, C., Jones, C. R., & While, A. H. (2020) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111343 · Cited by 45
“Such technologies are often promoted to end-users on individualistic, monetary-based grounds (which have been found to be ineffective for some and could undermine peoples’ moral motivations to act; Bowles, 2008; Spence et al., 2015).”
BackgroundOur Moral Fate: Evolution and the Escape from Tribalism
Buchanan, A. E. (2020) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/12826.001.0001 · Cited by 58
The Signaling Power of Sanctions in Social Dilemmas
van der Weele, J. J. (2009) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewp039 · Cited by 47
The divisive and disruptive effect of a weight-based waste fee
Heller, M. H., & Vatn, A. (2016) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.09.002 · Cited by 67
“There is a debate in the literature regarding if, respectively under what conditions economic incentives are effective in promoting prosocial and/or environmentally friendly behavior – e.g., Bowles (2008), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Scott (1995).”
BackgroundBator, R. J., Phelps, K., Tabanico, J. J., Schultz, P. W., & Walton, M. L. (2019) · Energy Research & Social Science · doi:10.1016/j.erss.2019.05.008 · Cited by 41
Maca‐Millán, S., Arias‐Arévalo, P., & Restrepo-Plaza, L. M. (2021) · Ecosystem Services · doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2021.101375 · Cited by 39
Improving Ethical Review of Research Involving Incentives for Health Promotion
London, A. J., Borasky, D., Bhan, A., & for the Ethics Working Group of the HIV Prevention Trials Network (2012) · PLoS Medicine · doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001193 · Cited by 50
EAGER FOR FAIRNESS OR FOR REVENGE? PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM IN ECONOMICS
Clavien, C., & Klein, R. A. (2010) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267110000374 · Cited by 48
“There is also the difficulty of preventing the subject’s tendency to consider an economic game as a setting in which the main goal is to win money (Frohlich et al. 2001; Bowles 2008).”
BackgroundFeldman, Y., & Perez, O. (2012) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5893.2012.00493.x · Cited by 42
Boschetti, F., Cvitanovic, C., Fleming, A., & Fulton, E. A. (2016) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-016-0382-4 · Cited by 56
“Fur- thermore, each source of power comes with different types of knowledge which can be perceived as supporting specific interests (Brugnach et al. 2008; Fiske and Dupree 2014).”
BackgroundThe evolution of charitable behaviour and the power of reputation
Barclay, P. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586073.003.0010 · Cited by 45
“Unfortunately, much research shows that the presence of extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation for tasks (for reviews, see Deci et al. 1999 ; Bowles 2008 ).”
BackgroundBehavioural Economics and Environmental Incentives
Shogren, J. F. (2012) · OECD environment working papers · doi:10.1787/5k8zwbhqs1xn-en · Cited by 61
Escape from Democracy: The Role of Experts and the Public in Economic Policy
Levy, D. M., & Peart, S. J. (2016) · Cited by 37
What Every Conservation Biologist Should Know about Economic Theory
Gowdy, J. M., Hall, C. A. S., Klitgaard, K. A., & Krall, L. (2010) · Conservation Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2010.01563.x · Cited by 36
Kolinjivadi, V., Charré, S., Adamowski, J., & Kosoy, N. (2016) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.06.029 · Cited by 42
Farmer perceptions, policy and reforestation in Santa Catarina, Brazil
Trevisan, A. C. D., Filho, A. L. S., Farley, J., Fantini, A. C., & Longo, C. (2016) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.06.024 · Cited by 45
Is altruism bad for cooperation?
Hwang, S., & Bowles, S. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.06.001 · Cited by 50
Self-citation“Evolution for Everyone”: A Course that Expands Evolutionary Theory Beyond the Biological Sciences
O'Brien, D. T., Wilson, D. S., & Hawley, P. H. (2009) · Evolution Education and Outreach · doi:10.1007/s12052-009-0161-0 · Cited by 35
“An example for humans is a recent Science article by Bowles (2008) showing how economic policy predicated on the assumption of self-interest can fail when people have a more complex set of social preferences that can be discerned on the basis of evolutionary game theory.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Siena (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Bowles, Samuel
- ORCID
- Bowles, Samuel
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2008-06-20
- Volume
- 320
- Issue
- 5883
- Pages
- 1605-1609
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W1998053404
- Cited by
- 833
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 74 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 48 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 70
- FWCI
- 19.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- moral sentiments, self-interest, economic incentives, altruism, intrinsic motivation, self-determination, organizational design, institutional design, Adam Smith, public policy, behavioral economics
- MeSH terms
- Economics, Games, Experimental, Humans, Morals, Motivation, Policy Making, Public Policy, Social Behavior, Personal Autonomy
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.