Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic experiments
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Abstract
High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's “moral sentiments.” Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments reviewed here suggest that economic incentives may be counterproductive when they signal that selfishness is an appropriate response; constitute a learning environment through which over time people come to adopt more self-interested motivations; compromise the individual's sense of self-determination and thereby degrade intrinsic motivations; or convey a message of distrust, disrespect, and unfair intent. Many of these unintended effects of incentives occur because people act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals. Good organizational and institutional design can channel the material interests for the achievement of social goals while also enhancing the contribution of the moral sentiments to the same ends.
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Demotivating Workers: Retrenchment of pensionrights and negative reciprocity
Montizaan, R. M., de Grip, A., Cörvers, F., & Dohmen, T. (2009) · Cited by 3
Does peer monitoring influence choices between cash and food? Findings from a field experiment
Lentz, E., Ouma, R., & Mude, A. G. (2016) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.10.004 · Cited by 3
“Our findings are consistent with Bowles (2009) who argues that social reputation is not separable from economic decisions, with Little et al. (2008) who argue that pastoralists manage their social assets when making choices, and with Fafchamps (2011) who argues that in the face of new economic…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialBetter Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
Stoelhorst, J. W. (2017) · Complexity Governance & Networks · doi:10.20377/cgn-39 · Cited by 2
“This prediction is borne out by a host of empirical findings (e.g. Bowles, 2008).”
BackgroundDeCaro, D. A., DeCaro, M. S., Hotaling, J. M., & Johnson, J. G. (2020) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500007464 · Cited by 4
DeCaro, D. A., & DeCaro, M. S. (2022) · Motivation and Emotion · doi:10.1007/s11031-022-09974-x · Cited by 3
“Traditional economic theory suggests that strict enforcement is always beneficial, whereas more recent behavioral theories suggest that enforcement can backfire (Bowles, 2008; Deci & Ryan, 1987; Ostrom, 2000, p. 200).”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Siena (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Bowles, Samuel
- ORCID
- Bowles, Samuel
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2008-06-20
- Volume
- 320
- Issue
- 5883
- Pages
- 1605-1609
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W1998053404
- Cited by
- 833
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 74 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 48 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 70
- FWCI
- 19.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- moral sentiments, self-interest, economic incentives, altruism, intrinsic motivation, self-determination, organizational design, institutional design, Adam Smith, public policy, behavioral economics
- MeSH terms
- Economics, Games, Experimental, Humans, Morals, Motivation, Policy Making, Public Policy, Social Behavior, Personal Autonomy
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.