Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic experiments
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's “moral sentiments.” Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments reviewed here suggest that economic incentives may be counterproductive when they signal that selfishness is an appropriate response; constitute a learning environment through which over time people come to adopt more self-interested motivations; compromise the individual's sense of self-determination and thereby degrade intrinsic motivations; or convey a message of distrust, disrespect, and unfair intent. Many of these unintended effects of incentives occur because people act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals. Good organizational and institutional design can channel the material interests for the achievement of social goals while also enhancing the contribution of the moral sentiments to the same ends.
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“Overall, punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment45–47.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Siena (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Bowles, Samuel
- ORCID
- Bowles, Samuel
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2008-06-20
- Volume
- 320
- Issue
- 5883
- Pages
- 1605-1609
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W1998053404
- Cited by
- 833
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 74 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 48 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 70
- FWCI
- 19.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- moral sentiments, self-interest, economic incentives, altruism, intrinsic motivation, self-determination, organizational design, institutional design, Adam Smith, public policy, behavioral economics
- MeSH terms
- Economics, Games, Experimental, Humans, Morals, Motivation, Policy Making, Public Policy, Social Behavior, Personal Autonomy
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.