The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds
Open accessAbstract
We present a new attack framework for conducting cache-based side-channel attacks and demonstrate this framework in attacks between tenants on commercial Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds. Our framework uses the FLUSH-RELOAD attack of Gullasch et al. as a primitive, and extends this work by leveraging it within an automaton-driven strategy for tracing a victim's execution. We leverage our framework first to confirm co-location of tenants and then to extract secrets across tenant boundaries. We specifically demonstrate attacks to collect potentially sensitive application data (e.g., the number of items in a shopping cart), to hijack user accounts, and to break SAML single sign-on. To the best of our knowledge, our attacks are the first granular, cross-tenant, side-channel attacks successfully demonstrated on state-of-the-art commercial clouds, PaaS or otherwise.
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Cites
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Cited by
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
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Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
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Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical
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Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
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Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
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Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2014-11-03
- Pages
- 990-1003
- OpenAlex
- W2001759130
- Cited by
- 327
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 20.75
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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