ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In early 2018, Meltdown first showed how to read arbitrary kernel memory from user space by exploiting side-effects from transient instructions. While this attack has been mitigated through stronger isolation boundaries between user and kernel space, Meltdown inspired an entirely new class of fault-driven transient-execution attacks. Particularly, over the past year, Meltdown-type attacks have been extended to not only leak data from the L1 cache but also from various other microarchitectural structures, including the FPU register file and store buffer.
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Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
SoK: SGX.Fail: How Stuff Gets eXposed
Van Schaik, S., Seto, A., Yurek, T., Batori, A., AlBassam, B., Genkin, D., Miller, A., Ronen, E., Yarom, Y., & Garman, C. (2024) · 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp54263.2024.00260 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwarz, M., Lipp, M., Moghimi, D., Van Bulck, J., Stecklina, J., Prescher, T., & Gruss, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2019-11-06
- Pages
- 753-768
- OpenAlex
- W2976763854
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 16.73
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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