Cited by 52Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in ComputingPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data

FENCE: Feasible Evasion Attacks on Neural Networks in Constrained Environments

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Chernikova, Alesia, Oprea, Alina·2022·ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security

Abstract

As advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) demonstrate unprecedented levels of performance in many critical applications, their vulnerability to attacks is still an open question. We consider evasion attacks at testing time against Deep Learning in constrained environments, in which dependencies between features need to be satisfied. These situations may arise naturally in tabular data or may be the result of feature engineering in specific application domains, such as threat detection in cyber security. We propose a general iterative gradient-based framework called FENCE for crafting evasion attacks that take into consideration the specifics of constrained domains and application requirements. We apply it against Feed-Forward Neural Networks trained for two cyber security applications: network traffic botnet classification and malicious domain classification, to generate feasible adversarial examples. We extensively evaluate the success rate and performance of our attacks, compare their improvement over several baselines, and analyze factors that impact the attack success rate, including the optimization objective and the data imbalance. We show that with minimal effort (e.g., generating 12 additional network connections), an attacker can change the model’s prediction from the Malicious class to Benign and evade the classifier. We show that models trained on datasets with higher imbalance are more vulnerable to our FENCE attacks. Finally, we demonstrate the potential of performing adversarial training in constrained domains to increase the model resilience against these evasion attacks.

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  • Advanced detection methods mainly rely on DNN-based binary classification models, which are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples.

    “the advanced detection methods mainly rely on DNN-based binary classiication models, which are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples”

    From DEEPFAKER: A Unified Evaluation Platform for Facial Deepfake and Detection Models (2024) · cites this paper as [9]

    The Introduction states that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and §2.1 describes a DNN-based binary classifier. Sections 4.1–4.2 apply classification to threat detection, but the paper does not establish that advanced detection methods mainly rely on DNN-based binary models. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Karel Bartos, Michal Sofka, and Vojtech Franc. 2016. Optimized Invariant Representation of Network Traffic for Detecting Unseen Malware Variants. In 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16). USENIX Association, 807-822.
  2. Ambra Demontis, Marco Melis, Maura Pintor, Matthew Jagielski, Battista Biggio, Alina Oprea, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Fabio Roli. 2019. Why do adversarial attacks transfer? Explaining transferability of evasion and poisoning attacks. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). 321-338.
  3. Shasha Li, Ajaya Neupane, Sujoy Paul, Chengyu Song, Srikanth V Krishnamurthy, Amit K Roy-Chowdhury, and Ananthram Swami. 2019. Stealthy Adversarial Perturbations Against Real-Time Video Classification Systems.. In NDSS.
  4. Yingzhen Li, John Bradshaw, and Yash Sharma. 2019. Are generative classifiers more robust to adversarial attacks?. In International Conference on Machine Learning. PMLR, 3804-3814.
  5. Alina Oprea, Zhou Li, Robin Norris, and Kevin Bowers. 2018. MADE: Security Analytics for Enterprise Threat Detection. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. ACM, 124-136.
  6. Reza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2017. Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models. In Proc. IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium (S&P).
  7. Octavian Suciu, Radu Marginean, Yigitcan Kaya, Hal Daume III, and Tudor Dumitras. 2018. When does machine learning {𝐹𝐴𝐼 𝐿}? generalized transferability for evasion and poisoning attacks. In 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). 1299-1316.
  8. Liang Tong, Bo Li, Chen Hajaj, Chaowei Xiao, Ning Zhang, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 2019. Improving Robustness of ML Classifiers against Realizable Evasion Attacks Using Conserved Features. In 28th USENIX Security Sympo- sium (USENIX Security 19). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 285-302. https://www.usenix.org/conference/ usenixsecurity19/presentation/tong
  9. Weilin Xu, Yanjun Qi, and David Evans. 2016. Automatically evading classifiers. In Proceedings of the 2016 Network and Distributed Systems Symposium. 21-24.

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Authors
Chernikova, A., & Oprea, A.
Affiliations
Northeastern University (US)
Venue
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
Published
2022-07-21
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
1-34
ISSN
  • 2471-2566 (ISSN-L)
  • 2471-2574
OpenAlex
W3102844060
Cited by
52
References
86
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 1
FWCI
3.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • NSF (CNS-1717634)
  • Google Security and Privacy Award
  • U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory under Cooperative Agreement (W911NF-13-2-0045)
  • U.S. Army Contracting Command - Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (W911NF-18-C0019)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Keywords
evasion attacks, adversarial examples, neural network security, constrained environments, feature dependencies, tabular data, network traffic classification, class imbalance, adversarial training

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