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What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Abstract
This essay synthesizes the results of the large number of studies of late–20th-century democratization published during the last 20 years. Strong evidence supports the claims that democracy is more likely in more developed countries and that regime transitions of all kinds are more likely during economic downturns. Very few of the other arguments advanced in the transitions literature, however, appear to be generally true. This study proposes a theoretical model, rooted in characteristics of different types of authoritarian regimes, to explain many of the differences in democratization experience across cases in different regions. Evidence drawn from a data set that includes 163 authoritarian regimes offers preliminary support for the model proposed.
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“Authoritarian governments often use repression, such as torture or killings, strategically when faced with civil unrest. 41”
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Mainwaring, S. P., & Pérez‐Liñán, A. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791116.002 · Cited by 115
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BackgroundThe Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors
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Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force
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BackgroundResultCoup d’état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950-2008
Thyne, C. L., & Powell, J. M. (2014) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1111/fpa.12046 · Cited by 108
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“Different studies (Boix & Svolik, 2013; Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999; Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011, 2012; Magaloni, 2006; North & Weingast, 1989; Svolik, 2012; Wright, 2008 for democracies, see Iversen, 2005) point out that autocrats can reduce credible commitment problems through establishing institutions, such as regime pa…”
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“While military regimes are generally less stable than other author-itarian regime types (Geddes, 1999), we expect a revolutionary trajectory in end-game coups to result in even greater degrees of political instability than developments after coups that come about without prior mass mobilization.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence
Vreeland, J. R., & Dreher, A. (2014) · Cited by 101
Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships
Debs, A. (2016) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqv014 · Cited by 98
“Email: alexandre.debs@yale.edu.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSqueaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty
Johnson, J., & Thyne, C. (2018) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002716654742 · Cited by 76
Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks
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Political Investment: Remittances and Elections
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How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections
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Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective
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Who Democratizes? Western-educated Leaders and Regime Transitions
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Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships
Frantz, E., Kendall-Taylor, A., Wright, J., & Xu, X. (2019) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/706049 · Cited by 96
Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive?
von Soest, C., & Wahman, M. (2014) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.888418 · Cited by 95
Dominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies
Kroeger, A. M. (2018) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123417000497 · Cited by 95
“88 Geddes 1999, 73.”
Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies
Gallagher, M. E., & Hanson, J. K. (2015) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071213-041224 · Cited by 100
Authoritarian Power Sharing: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Strategies
Meng, A., Paine, J., & Powell, R. (2022) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052121-020406 · Cited by 102
Authoritarian Institutions and Women’s Rights
Donno, D., & Kreft, A.-K. (2019) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018797954 · Cited by 121
“…indicators).19 Turning to the right-hand side of our model, we code for party-based regimes using the Geddes et al. (2014) data set.20 This variable codes for regimes in which access to office and control over policy are determined by an autocratic political party (see Geddes, 1999, pp. 121-122).”
BackgroundMethodMass Organization and the Durability of Competitive Authoritarian Regimes
Handlin, S. P. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414016628186 · Cited by 92
“While many researchers have argued this position (Geddes, 1999; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995), others have questioned the explanatory power of economic conditions within the competitive authoritarian case universe (Greene, 2010; Levitsky & Way, 2010).”
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“Capital flight is also encouraged (Frieden 1991).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Geddes, B.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Geddes, Barbara
- ORCID
- Geddes, Barbara
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-144
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2166749687
- Cited by
- 2,025
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 127 · 2023: 114 · 2022: 133 · 2021: 74 · 2020: 173 · 2019: 128 · 2018: 132 · 2017: 100 · 2016: 95 · 2015: 101 · 2014: 84 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 84
- FWCI
- 21.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Annual Review of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Keywords
- democratization, tipping points, authoritarian regimes, political regimes, economic downturn, economic development and democracy, late 20th century
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