The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Abstract
This essay synthesizes the results of the large number of studies of late–20th-century democratization published during the last 20 years. Strong evidence supports the claims that democracy is more likely in more developed countries and that regime transitions of all kinds are more likely during economic downturns. Very few of the other arguments advanced in the transitions literature, however, appear to be generally true. This study proposes a theoretical model, rooted in characteristics of different types of authoritarian regimes, to explain many of the differences in democratization experience across cases in different regions. Evidence drawn from a data set that includes 163 authoritarian regimes offers preliminary support for the model proposed.
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“Authoritarian governments often use repression, such as torture or killings, strategically when faced with civil unrest. 41”
From Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as [41]
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“Building off this theoretical work, empirical research has generally found that party-based regimes are more stable than other autocracies (Geddes 1999; Smith 2005; Slater 2006; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Brownlee 2007, 2009; Magaloni 2008).1 Because of their regime-preserving functions, autocratic…”
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Grillo, E., Luo, Z., Nalepa, M., & Prato, C. (2024) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-025352 · Cited by 52
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Evans, A. B. (2010) · Journal of Eurasian Studies · doi:10.1016/j.euras.2010.10.001 · Cited by 51
“(Geddes, 1999, 131); none took place in a country that had beenunder a single-party regime that subdued the state and the military as thoroughly as in the Soviet Union.”
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“…lends further support to the comparative finding that single party states appear to have the most resilient form of authoritarianism (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999) and suggests the intriguing possibility that some of the historically conservative monarchies of the region may ultimately prove to be…”
ResultSocial Mobility, Middle Class, and Political Transitions
Leventoğlu, B. (2013) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002713478563 · Cited by 51
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“…even non-co-opted elites are discouraged from coup initiation because it becomes increasingly costly: even successful coups can be costly for those who have opposed intervention, as they may face “the same costs as unsuccessful conspirators: demotion, discharge, prison, death” (Geddes 1999, 127).”
BackgroundInfluentialAuthoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies
Escribà‐Folch, A., Böhmelt, T., & Pilster, U. H. (2019) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894219836285 · Cited by 60
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“Strong evidence supports the claims that democracy is more likely in economically developed countries and that regime changes of all kinds are more likely during economic downturns.(7) Zakaria argues that the best answer to what makes democracy endure is wealth.”
BackgroundThe Institutional Roots of Democratic Backsliding
Gandhi, J. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/700653 · Cited by 52
Magaloni, B. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791116.005 · Cited by 50
Carney, R. W. (2014) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2014.958091 · Cited by 48
“…a wider group of individuals in the regime’s membership as well as by institutionalizing mechanisms for attracting and retaining new members (Geddes, 1999, 121 134).10 These regimes also develop institutional mechanisms to co-opt the opposition either through the distribution of economic…”
BackgroundTezcür, G. M., Azadarmaki, T., Bahar, M., & Nayebi, H. (2011) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912910395326 · Cited by 48
The Growing Sustainability of Brazil's Low-Quality Democracy
Weyland, K. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791116.004 · Cited by 47
Property rights in dictatorships: kings protect property better than generals or party bosses
Knutsen, C. H., & Fjelde, H. (2013) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2013.773205 · Cited by 46
“The arguably most influential subdivision of dictatorial regimes in recent comparative politics is that constructed by Geddes (1999).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialResisting the Fall: The Single Dominant Party, Policies and Elections in Malaysia
Gomez, E. T. (2016) · Journal of Contemporary Asia · doi:10.1080/00472336.2016.1192214 · Cited by 47
The Political Economics of Non-democracy
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Voigt, S. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108764445 · Cited by 53
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Shin, D. C. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0014 · Cited by 47
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“…political elites choose their leaders, they tend to entrust those who are “known for correctness, adherence to rules, fairness, lack of personal ambition, and low charisma” (Geddes, 1999, p. 123), as these characteristics suggest someone who is unlikely to grab power at the expense of her peers.”
BackgroundKEEPING YOUR HEAD DOWN: PUBLIC PROFILES AND PROMOTION UNDER AUTOCRACY
Gueorguiev, D. D., & Schuler, P. (2016) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/jea.2015.1 · Cited by 46
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Undermining cooperation: donor-patrons and the failure of political conditionality
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BackgroundAffect and Autocracy: Emotions and Attitudes in Russia after Crimea
Greene, S. A., & Robertson, G. B. (2020) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592720002339 · Cited by 47
“The key focus has been on institutions and the incentives they create (Geddes 1999).”
BackgroundPinckney, J. C. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190097301.001.0001 · Cited by 45
Peksen, D. (2017) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1368258 · Cited by 45
Don't Call It a Comeback: Autocratic Ruling Parties After Democratization
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Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses
Manion, M. (2015) · Cited by 44
Rivals within: political factions, loyalty, and elite competition under authoritarianism
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Thomson, H. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108568951 · Cited by 61
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The latent characteristics that structure autocratic rule
Wright, J. (2019) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.50 · Cited by 44
“Scholars of dictatorships offer several categorizations of autocratic regimes (Huntington, 1968; Wintrobe, 1990; Huntington, 1991; Chehabi and Linz, 1998; Geddes, 1999; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Cheibub et al., 2010).”
BackgroundInfluentialComparing the Arab Revolts: The Lessons of 1989
Way, L. (2011) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0068 · Cited by 89
Bounded Democratization: How Military-Party Relations Shape Military-Led Democratization
Self, D. S. (2022) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140221116461 · Cited by 45
“While Geddes (1999) argued that military regimes were less durable, she did not explore whether these regimes were more likely to democratize at that time.”
The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration
Thyne, C. L. (2015) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894215570431 · Cited by 44
“This is based on work showing that coups destabilize an already tumultuous situation (Geddes, 1999; Onwumechili, 1998).”
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Papaioannou, K. J., & van Zanden, J. L. (2014) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137414000356 · Cited by 43
“Political scientists have studied the determinants of the years in office variable in order to explain why some rulers remained in power very long, whereas others were kicked out quickly (Acemoglu, 2006; Baker et al., 2010; Geddes, 1999; Weingast and Wittman, 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialWhy class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars
Houle, C. (2016) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343316652187 · Cited by 47
The Impact of Women Legislators on Humanitarian Military Interventions
Shea, P. E., & Christian, C. (2016) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002716631105 · Cited by 43
“Nondemocratic regimes have incentives to develop these types of representative mechanisms because they allow regimes to survive longer than regimes that do not develop these institutions (Geddes 1999).”
BackgroundExplaining the Paradox of Plebiscites
Qvortrup, M., O’Leary, B., & Wintrobe, R. (2018) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2018.16 · Cited by 42
“Although recent scholarship has suggested that certain non-democratic governments are more stable than others (Geddes 1999), continuing an older debate on the supposed greater durability of left-wing as opposed to right-wing dictatorships, and though research on varieties of authoritarianism…”
BackgroundAuthoritarian Durability: Public Opinion towards Democracy in Southeast Asia
Pietsch, J. (2014) · Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2014.933836 · Cited by 42
“In looking at these questions, it is argued that authoritarianism in Southeast Asia is not only sustained by strong state institutions (see Geddes, 1999; Levitsky & Way, 2012) but also by public opinion, which reflects different understandings and expectations of democracy.”
BackgroundBaturo, A. (2016) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.v4i2.602 · Cited by 46
“In a path-setting study of non-democratic regimes, Geddes (1999) argued that significant differences among dictatorships can be explained by the strength of autonomous political institutions and by different incentive structures in personal, party, and military dictatorships.”
Signals of Support From Great Power Patrons and the Use of Repression During Nonviolent Protests
Tolstrup, J., Seeberg, M. A., & Glavind, J. G. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018784047 · Cited by 42
“…also point to the size and character of the ruling coalition as an important determinant of how core elite supporters perceive their chances of retaining political influence after a regime transition and, thus, of how reluctant they will be to engage in costly repressive activities (Geddes, 1999).”
BackgroundTaking Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Reform Seriously
Carothers, C. (2020) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592720001371 · Cited by 53
“…to be motivated to carry out anti-corruption reforms because they often rely on distributing spoils and patronage to stay in power, benefit personally from corruption, and can use coercive means to suppress public criticism and unrest (Geddes 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Magaloni 2008).”
BackgroundAsh, K. (2014) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.899585 · Cited by 44
Jazayeri, K. B. (2015) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/0738894215570426 · Cited by 43
Contingent Democratization: When Do Economic Crises Matter?
Tang, M., Huhe, N., & Zhou, Q. (2015) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123415000095 · Cited by 41
Coups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies
Gilli, M., & Li, Y. (2015) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.011 · Cited by 41
No Easy Way Out: The Effect of Military Coups on State Repression
Lachapelle, J. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/707309 · Cited by 44
“On these coordination dynamics, see Boix and Svolik (2013), Casper and Tyson (2014), Geddes (1999), Little (2015), Singh (2014). loyal to the incumbent, an officer’s personal grievances or political opinions matter less than what he thinks his colleagues will do.”
BackgroundTeorell, J., & Lindberg, S. I. (2019) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592718002098 · Cited by 43
“3 Geddes 1999, 121.”
Explaining divergent transformation paths in Tunisia and Egypt: The role of inter-elite trust
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Revolutionary mass uprisings in authoritarian regimes
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“Personalistic and sultanistic regimes are said to be particularly vulnerable to seeing incumbents removed by mass uprisings (Escriba-Folch, 2013; Geddes, 1999; Goemans, 2008; Goldstone, 1986; Ulfelder, 2005; ).”
BackgroundHobbesian Hierarchy: The Political Economy of Political Organization
Lake, D. A. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.041707.193640 · Cited by 41
“Scholars have focused on the difference between developed democracies, between weak and failed states, and between different types of autocracies (Geddes 1999), but few have looked across these categories.”
BackgroundSocietal Empowerment and Europeanization: Revisiting the EU's Impact on Democratization
Noutcheva, G. (2015) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.12322 · Cited by 41
“The democratization literature, in turn, has favoured either elite accounts (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes, 1999) or structural factors (Lipset, 1959) for democratic transitions and democracy consolidation, focusing mainly on the domestic conditions for successful democratization.”
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Party Institutionalization and Welfare State Development
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“…a person rather than in the organization and its specified rules, party institutionalization is low.2 One example is ‘personalized rule’ (for example, Geddes 1999) where leaders can sometimes exercise power in a near-monopolistic manner despite formally belonging to a party (or absent any…”
Bolivia's Democracy at the Crossroads
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Chin, J., Escribà‐Folch, A., Song, W., & Wright, J. (2022) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140211024287 · Cited by 42
“Further, coups entail coordination in planning and implementation to succeed (Geddes, 1999; Singh, 2014).”
BackgroundPortela, C., & Mora‐Sanguinetti, J. S. (2023) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106370 · Cited by 40
The international dimension of authoritarian regime legitimation: insights from the Cuban case
Hoffmann, B. (2014) · Journal of International Relations and Development · doi:10.1057/jird.2014.9 · Cited by 42
Peksen, D. (2010) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512110372610 · Cited by 42
“Furthermore, educated people tend to support liberal and democratic values and put greater pressure on political leaders to become accountable toward the public (for example, Geddes, 1999; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al., 2000).”
BackgroundIntroduction: The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America
Mainwaring, S. P., & Hagopian, F. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791116.001 · Cited by 39
Who supports expanding surveillance? Exploring public opinion of Chinese social credit systems
Liu, C. (2022) · International Sociology · doi:10.1177/02685809221084446 · Cited by 40
How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New AuthoritarianismPreprint
Guriev, S. M., & Treisman, D. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2571905 · Cited by 18
Parties, Movements, and the Making of Democracy
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Taking it personal? Investigating regime personalization as an autocratic survival strategy
Grundholm, A. T. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1737677 · Cited by 42
Kuehn, D., & Croissant, A. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198803362.001.0001 · Cited by 40
Malaysia – towards a topology of an electoral one-party state
Wong, C.-H., Chin, J., & Othman, N. (2010) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2010.501179 · Cited by 39
Office or Officeholder? Regime Deinstitutionalization and Sources of Individual Political Influence
Baturo, A., & Elkink, J. A. (2014) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381614000280 · Cited by 40
Leadership succession in politics: The democracy/autocracy divide revisited
Helms, L. (2020) · The British Journal of Politics and International Relations · doi:10.1177/1369148120908528 · Cited by 38
“Some professionalised military regimes, which tend to be legalistic and rule bound, ‘may even negotiate the details of succession and the institutionalized formulas for rotation in power before staging a coup’, as happened in Argentina in the 1970s (Lindstaedt, in press; see also Geddes, 1999).”
BackgroundGrewal, S. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192873910.001.0001 · Cited by 39
Roller, E. (2013) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2013.773201 · Cited by 39
“My first point refers to the three existing data sets on types of autocratic regimes proposed by Geddes (1999) (expanded and updated by Geddes et al. 2012a, 2012b), Hadenius and Teorell (2007) (modified and updated by Hadenius et al. 2012) and Cheibub et al. (2010).”
BackgroundInfluentialRethinking Democratic Diffusion: Bringing Regime Type Back In
Goldring, E., & Greitens, S. C. (2019) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414019852701 · Cited by 37
“correlations between regime type and the conversion of breakdown into democracy (Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014; Lee, 2015; Ulfelder, 2005).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialLiu, A. H. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123421000181 · Cited by 45
The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships
Timoneda, J. C., Escribà‐Folch, A., & Chin, J. (2023) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123422000655 · Cited by 38
“Prior work on personalism mostly relied on the Geddes (1999) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) regime typology, which comparativists have used extensively to explore how different forms of dictatorship affect a wide range of political and economic outcomes.”
MethodAutoritäre Regime – Ein Überblick über die jüngere Literatur
Köllner, P. (2008) · Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft · doi:10.1007/s12286-008-0013-2 · Cited by 37
The Prince—or Better No Prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor
Konrad, K. A., & Mui, V. (2016) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002716631103 · Cited by 37
“and we add up the respective sides of equations (18) and (19) and multiply by (1−λδ) to obtain”
BackgroundDoes democracy foster entrepreneurship?
Farè, L., Audretsch, D. B., & Dejardin, M. (2023) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-023-00737-7 · Cited by 39
“On the other hand, prior studies suggest that democracy can take time to produce socio-economic outcomes (Gao et al., 2017; Geddes, 1999; Rodrik & Wacziarg, 2005).”
BackgroundPolitical Connections and Firm Performance: The Case of Hong Kong
Wong, S. H. (2010) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/s1598240800003465 · Cited by 37
Paik, W. (2012) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512111409528 · Cited by 37
“Many would expect so because a large number of authoritarian regimes with a good record of economic development have experienced some steady increase of their citizens’ political participation, ending in democratization (Geddes, 1999, 2007).”
BackgroundHarbers, I., & Ingram, M. C. (2013) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2013.20 · Cited by 36
Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism
Brownlee, J. M. (2004) · Cited by 36
Censorship and the Impact of Repression on Dissent
Pop-Elecheș, G., & Way, L. A. (2021) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12633 · Cited by 36
“While earlier studies of authoritarian durability focused mostly on institutions of cooptation such as parties and legislatures (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008), more recent scholarship has concentrated on the crucial role of coercion in ensuring regime survival.46 These studies have…”
BackgroundStrategic Uncertainty and Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies: A Cross-National Analysis
del Río, A. (2022) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140221074273 · Cited by 37
“Yet, ruling elites are self-interested actors and politically ambitious: they want to advance their careers and expand their power in exchange for providing political services to the ruler (Aldrich & Bianco, 1992; Geddes, 1999; Desposato, 2006).”
BackgroundGerschewski, J., Merkel, W., Schmotz, A., Stefes, C. H., & Tanneberg, D. (2013) · Nomos eBooks · doi:10.5771/9783845244655-111 · Cited by 37
Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China
Dickson, B. J., Shen, M., & Yan, J. (2016) · Modern China · doi:10.1177/0097700416672419 · Cited by 37
“After reviewing the extensive literature on this topic, Barbara Geddes concluded, “we can be reasonably certain that a positive relationship between development and democracy exists, though we do not know why” (Geddes, 1999: 119).”
BackgroundThe Fate of Former Authoritarian Elites Under Democracy
Albertus, M. (2018) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002718761791 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Geddes, B.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Geddes, Barbara
- ORCID
- Geddes, Barbara
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-144
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2166749687
- Cited by
- 2,025
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 127 · 2023: 114 · 2022: 133 · 2021: 74 · 2020: 173 · 2019: 128 · 2018: 132 · 2017: 100 · 2016: 95 · 2015: 101 · 2014: 84 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 84
- FWCI
- 21.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Annual Review of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Keywords
- democratization, tipping points, authoritarian regimes, political regimes, economic downturn, economic development and democracy, late 20th century
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