The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Abstract
This essay synthesizes the results of the large number of studies of late–20th-century democratization published during the last 20 years. Strong evidence supports the claims that democracy is more likely in more developed countries and that regime transitions of all kinds are more likely during economic downturns. Very few of the other arguments advanced in the transitions literature, however, appear to be generally true. This study proposes a theoretical model, rooted in characteristics of different types of authoritarian regimes, to explain many of the differences in democratization experience across cases in different regions. Evidence drawn from a data set that includes 163 authoritarian regimes offers preliminary support for the model proposed.
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“Authoritarian governments often use repression, such as torture or killings, strategically when faced with civil unrest. 41”
From Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as [41]
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“…von O’Donnell/Schmitter (1986) „Transitionsforschung“ nennt, erfährt man kaum etwas über Strömungen und Kräfte in der Bevölkerung, wenn es darum geht, Demokratisierungsprozesse zu erklären (zur Literatur siehe: Geddes 1999; Merkel 1999; Berg-Schlosser/ Mitchell 2000; Bunce 2000; Vanhanen 2003).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Geddes, B.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Geddes, Barbara
- ORCID
- Geddes, Barbara
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-144
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2166749687
- Cited by
- 2,025
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 127 · 2023: 114 · 2022: 133 · 2021: 74 · 2020: 173 · 2019: 128 · 2018: 132 · 2017: 100 · 2016: 95 · 2015: 101 · 2014: 84 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 84
- FWCI
- 21.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Annual Review of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Keywords
- democratization, tipping points, authoritarian regimes, political regimes, economic downturn, economic development and democracy, late 20th century
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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