Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriation threat that reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments. In addition, we show that equity implements state contingent control, a feature usually associated with debt. Finally, we demonstrate that monitoring, and hence ownership concentration, may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes.
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Citations
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Cited by
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“In principle, firms could utilize private equity financing, but it has many of the same problems of excessive investor power suppressing entrepreneurial initiative as monopoly banking does (Myers 1977, Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-08-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 693-728
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2005998587
- Cited by
- 1,509
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 140.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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