The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Open accessAbstract
Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board.” Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is, to how they court each side while making money overall. This paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-user surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner.
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In the citing paper
“Since network effects are present in most platform markets, the nonlinear properties of network effects create a dynamic situation in multi-platform spaces.”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Rochet and Tirole 2003
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“By acting as matchmaking intermediaries with strong network effects (Rochet and Tirole, 2003), platforms reduce the search costs of accessing specialized content, from social connections (Van Dijck, 2013) to products in the gig economy (Scholz, 2017; Van Doorn, 2017; Wachsmuth and Weisler, 2018), yet this infrastructure of intermediation is by no means neutral (Gillespie, 2010, 2017).”
From Google Arts & Culture and the platformization of cultural heritage: Convergence, gamification, and shifting positions of institutional partners (2026) · cites this paper as Rochet and Tirole, 2003
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Due to network interaction, individual actors' choices affect other actors' value (Jacobides et al., 2024;Rochet & Tirole, 2003)”
From What role do data network effects play for multihoming complements? An empirical analysis of platform complementors’ strategies for consumer value creation (2025) · cites this paper as Rochet & Tirole, 2003
In the citing paper
“While conventional inter-firm competition focuses on moves and counter-moves as strategic actions that enable rivaling firms to capture greater shares of a given market value, platform competition reshapes markets as a whole (Rochet & Tirole, 2003).”
From Digital platform ecosystems in flux: From proprietary digital platforms to wide-spanning ecosystems (2023) · cites this paper as Rochet & Tirole, 2003
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Citations
Cites
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility
Katz, M. L. (1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 6,052
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261409 · Cited by 2,622
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555589 · Cited by 2,554
Installed base and compatibility : innovation, product preannouncements and predation
Farrell, J. P., & Saloner, G. (1986) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,547
A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service
Rohlfs, J. H. (1974) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003090 · Cited by 1,019
Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets
Baye, M. R., & Morgan, J. W. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.454 · Cited by 631
Payment Systems and Interchange Fees
Schmalensee, R. (2002) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00170 · Cited by 275
Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle
Laffont, J., Marcus, S., Rey, P., & Jean Tirole, Z. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593723 · Cited by 205
The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided MarketsPreprint
Evans, D. S. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.332022 · Cited by 176
Ownership and Control Rights in Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999
Elfenbein, D. W., & Lerner, J. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593722 · Cited by 129
Research works printed but not linked: 8
- 1982, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure.
- 2003, On the Receiver Pays Principle, Rand Journal of Economics
- 2001, Competing with Network Externalities and Price Competition
- 2000, Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product Design
- 2002, Cooperation among Competitors: The Economics of Payment Card Associations., Rand Journal of Economics, 33, 1
- 2000, Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages
- 1993, Nonlinear Pricing.
- 1996, Are Advertisers Ready to Pay Viewers, Wall Street Journal
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 1,001–1,007 of 1,007
Landoni, P., & Trabucchi, D. (2024) · European Journal of Innovation Management · doi:10.1108/ejim-08-2023-0641 · Cited by 5
Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets
Aydin Ozden, S., Suarez, F. F., Libaers, D., & Bart, Y. (2026) · Journal of Product Innovation Management · doi:10.1111/jpim.70005 · Cited by 4
Build Agent Advocates, Not Platform Agents
Kapoor, S., Kolt, N., & Lazar, S. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.04345 · Cited by 1
Cao, T. L. (2026) · Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies · doi:10.1177/13548565261431167
Knorr, C., Erath, M., Saesen, J., Kindermann, B., & Strese, S. (2025) · Electronic Markets · doi:10.1007/s12525-025-00817-4 · Cited by 2
“First, they can potentially charge consumers for the initial app download and pursue pricing strategies such as price discrimination across customer groups or cross-subsidization of products (Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Rochet & Tirole, 2003).”
Magentic Marketplace: An Open-Source Environment for Studying Agentic Markets
Bansal, G., Hua, W., Huang, Z., Fourney, A., Swearngin, A., Epperson, W., Payne, T., Hofman, J. M., Lucier, B., Singh, C., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2510.25779
"Rich-Get-Richer"? Platform Attention and Earnings Inequality using Patreon Earnings Data
Strauss, I., Yang, J., & Mazzucato, M. (2025) · arXiv
Metadata
- Authors
- Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J.
- Affiliations
- Institut d'Économie Industrielle (FR)
- ORCID
- Rochet, Jean-Charles
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-06-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 990-1029
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W1516051863
- Cited by
- 5,642
- References
- 14
- Citations by year
- 2026: 477 · 2025: 384 · 2024: 338 · 2023: 408 · 2022: 411 · 2021: 424 · 2020: 415 · 2019: 374 · 2018: 330 · 2017: 247 · 2016: 238 · 2015: 207 · 2014: 182 · 2013: 188 · 2012: 178
- FWCI
- 259.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.idref.fr
- Locations
- Journal of the European Economic Association (publishedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole) (submittedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- platform competition, two-sided markets, network effects, platform business models, platform governance
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