Cited by 5,642Digital Platforms and EconomicsMerger and Competition AnalysisAuction Theory and Applications

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets

Open access
Rochet, Jean-Charles, Tirole, Jean·2003·Journal of the European Economic Association

Abstract

Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board.” Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is, to how they court each side while making money overall. This paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-user surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/154247603322493212

Cites

14 of 14 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 14 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. 1982, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure.
  2. 2003, On the Receiver Pays Principle, Rand Journal of Economics
  3. 2001, Competing with Network Externalities and Price Competition
  4. 2000, Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product Design
  5. 2002, Cooperation among Competitors: The Economics of Payment Card Associations., Rand Journal of Economics, 33, 1
  6. 2000, Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages
  7. 1993, Nonlinear Pricing.
  8. 1996, Are Advertisers Ready to Pay Viewers, Wall Street Journal

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 201–300 of 1,007

Metadata

Authors
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J.
Affiliations
Institut d'Économie Industrielle (FR)
Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
Published
2003-06-01
Volume
1
Issue
4
Pages
990-1029
ISSN
  • 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
  • 1542-4774
OpenAlex
W1516051863
Cited by
5,642
References
14
Citations by year
2026: 477 · 2025: 384 · 2024: 338 · 2023: 408 · 2022: 411 · 2021: 424 · 2020: 415 · 2019: 374 · 2018: 330 · 2017: 247 · 2016: 238 · 2015: 207 · 2014: 182 · 2013: 188 · 2012: 178
FWCI
259.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of the European Economic Association (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole) (submittedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
  • OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
Keywords
platform competition, two-sided markets, network effects, platform business models, platform governance

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review