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Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?
Abstract
This article addresses an issue often neglected by the current literature on political corruption: Why do citizens support corrupt governments? The authors argue that people in countries where government institutions are weak and patron-client relationships strong are more likely to support a corrupt leader from whom they expect to receive tangible benefits. Using a cross-national analysis of citizens in 14 countries, the authors find statistical evidence consistent with the hypothesis, which also complements some of the recent works on clientelism and institutional development. This has important implications for scholars and practitioners working on accountability and good governance issues because its shows that as long as corrupt leaders can satisfy their clientelistic networks by manipulating government resources, they are likely to retain political support. This, in turn, questions the assumption that a few administrative reforms can weed out corruption in countries where formal and informal institutions provide opportunities for this phenomenon to thrive.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Manzetti, L., & Wilson, C. J.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-08
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 949-970
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W2026999751
- Cited by
- 306
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 21.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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