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Deception: The Role of Consequences

Gneezy, Uri · 2005 · American Economic Review
Cited by 1,729

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This paper studies the role of consequences in a person’s decision to lie. Based on findings from an experiment with a deception game, as well as from questionnaires, I propose a simple formulation of preferences to describe deception behavior. The decision maker uses the “truth telling ” outcome as a reference level when evaluating the benefits of lying. The monetary consequences of the lie are compared to this reference level. In the formulation used in this paper the decision maker’s utility depends on her own intentions. She is selfish in the sense of maximizing her own payoffs, but sensitive to the cost her lie imposes on the other side. Sensitivity diminishes with the size of payoffs. Moreover, since perception of the counterpart’s cost is subjective. When there are differences in wealth as in employee-employer relations or a consumer-insurer interactions, the decision maker is more likely to lie the wealthier the counterpart.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/0002828053828662

Cites

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Citations

Cites

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Gneezy, U.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2005-02-01
Volume
95
Issue
1
Pages
384-394
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2063855068
Cited by
1,729
References
53
FWCI
70.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.