The New York City High School Match
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
mechanism to match over 90,000 entering students to public high schools each year. This paper makes a very preliminary report on the design process and the first year of operation, in academic year 2003-04, for students entering high school in Fall 2004. In the first year, only about 3,000 students had to be assigned to a school for which they had not indicated a preference, which is only 10 % of the number of such assignments the previous year. New York City has the largest public school system in the country, with over a million students. In 1969 the system was decentralized into over thirty community school districts. In the 1990s, the city began to take more centralized control, and in 2002, a newly reorganized NYCDOE began to reform many aspects of the school system. In May 2003, Dr. Jeremy Lack, then the NYCDOE Director of Strategic Planning, contacted one of us for advice on designing a new high school matching process. The NYCDOE was aware of the matching process for American physicians, the National Resident Matching Program (Roth 1984; Roth and Peranson 1999). They wanted to know if it could be appropriately adapted to the city’s schools. The three authors of the present paper (and, at several crucial junctures, also Tayfun Sönmez) advised (and often convinced) Dr.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-04-01
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 364-367
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162195070
- Cited by
- 654
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 43.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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