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Constitutions and Economic Policy
Open accessAbstract
This paper discusses theoretical and empirical research on how two constitutional features, electoral rules and forms of government, affect economic policymaking. The authors begin by outlining some key objectives of democratic political constitutions and by pointing out the inertia and systematic selection that characterize real-world constitutions. They then introduce the main concepts used to categorize work on constitutions: different kinds of electoral rules and forms of government. They then discuss how these elements of constitutions affect the accountability of government and the size of political rents and corruption, as well as the representativeness of government and a variety of fiscal policy choices.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2004-02-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 75-98
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2073521786
- Cited by
- 306
- References
- 61
- FWCI
- 33.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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