The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all system—where all the spoils go to the winner—to a proportional system—where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. In a winner-take-all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable. We then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency. (JEL D82, L15)
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Citations
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Cited by
Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth
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“First, in our data, relief spending consists mostly of direct payments, whereas preparedness spending consists mainly of public goods, and voters may prefer receiving private goods to public ones (Green 1992; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Sears and Citrin 1985).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-03-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 225-239
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2007674873
- Cited by
- 821
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 51.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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