The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Narrow Bracketing and Dominated Choices
Abstract
We show that any decision maker who “narrowly brackets” (evaluates decisions separately) and does not have constant-absolute-risk-averse preferences will make a first-order stochastically dominated combined choice in some simple pair of independent binary decisions. We also characterize the preference-contingent monetary cost from this mistake. Empirically, in a real-stakes laboratory experiment that replicates Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) experiment, 28 percent of participants choose dominated combinations. In a representative survey eliciting hypothetical large-stakes choices, higher proportions do so. Violation rates vary little with personal characteristics. Average preferences are prospect-theoretic, with an estimated 89 percent of people bracketing narrowly. (JEL D12, D81)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rabin, M., & Weizsäcker, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-08-01
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1508-1543
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2141292470
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 8.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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