A Dollar for Your Thoughts: Feedback-Conditional Rebates on eBay
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We run a series of controlled field experiments on eBay where buyers are rewarded for providing feedback. Our results provide little support for the hypothesis of buyers’ rational economic behavior: the likelihood of feedback barely increases as we increase feedback rebate values; also, the speed of feedback, bid levels, and the number of bids are all insensitive to rebate values. By contrast, we find evidence consistent with reciprocal buyer behavior. Lower transaction quality leads to a higher probability of negative feedback as well as a speeding up of such negative feedback. However, when transaction quality is low (as measured by slow shipping), offering a rebate significantly decreases the likelihood of negative feedback. All in all, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that buyers reciprocate the sellers’ “good deeds” (feedback rebate, high transaction quality) with more frequent and more favorable feedback. As a result, sellers can “buy” feedback, but such feedback is likely to be biased. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2074 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundPremiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
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BackgroundDoing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
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THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
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Self-citationPrice, quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment
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Self-citationReputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust
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BackgroundMoney Talks: Rebate Mechanisms in Reputation System Design
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Self-citation
Cited by
Stimulating Online Reviews by Combining Financial Incentives and Social Norms
Burtch, G., Hong, Y., Bapna, R., & Griskevicius, V. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2715 · Cited by 405
The impact of social nudges on user-generated content for social network platforms
Zeng, Z., Dai, H., Zhang, D. J., Zhang, H., Zhang, R., Xu, Z., & Shen, Z.-J. M. (2023) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4622 · Cited by 76
Lin, F., Tian, H., Zhao, J., & Chi, M. (2023) · Internet Research · doi:10.1108/intr-05-2021-0292 · Cited by 22
Song, H., Wei, J., & Jiang, Q. (2023) · Systems · doi:10.3390/systems11110540 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Cabral, L., & Li, L. (.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2015-09
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 2052-2063
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W1872735986
- Cited by
- 156
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 8.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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