The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Belief-Based Account of Decision Under Uncertainty
Abstract
We develop a belief-based account of decision under uncertainty. This model predicts decisions under uncertainty from (i) judgments of probability, which are assumed to satisfy support theory; and (ii) decisions under risk, which are assumed to satisfy prospect theory. In two experiments, subjects evaluated uncertain prospects and assessed the probability of the respective events. Study 1 involved the 1995 professional basketball playoffs; Study 2 involved the movement of economic indicators in a simulated economy. The results of both studies are consistent with the belief-based account, but violate the partition inequality implied by the classical theory of decision under uncertainty.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
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Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
On the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function
Gonzalez, R., & Wu, G. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0710 · Cited by 1,387
Metadata
- Authors
- Fox, C. R., & Tversky, A.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1998-07
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 879-895
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2145866011
- Cited by
- 395
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 6.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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