Misinformation lingers in memory: Failure of three pro-vaccination strategies
Open accessAbstract
People's inability to update their memories in light of corrective information may have important public health consequences, as in the case of vaccination choice. In the present study, we compare three potentially effective strategies in vaccine promotion: one contrasting myths vs. facts, one employing fact and icon boxes, and one showing images of non-vaccinated sick children. Beliefs in the autism/vaccines link and in vaccines side effects, along with intention to vaccinate a future child, were evaluated both immediately after the correction intervention and after a 7-day delay to reveal possible backfire effects. Results show that existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation are ineffective and often backfire, resulting in the unintended opposite effect, reinforcing ill-founded beliefs about vaccination and reducing intentions to vaccinate. The implications for research on vaccines misinformation and recommendations for progress are discussed.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Three common pro-vaccination correction strategies—myths vs. facts, fact/icon boxes, and fear-inducing images—failed to improve vaccination beliefs or intentions and often backfired. Misconceptions about vaccines and autism and side effects increased over a 7-day delay, especially after myths-vs.-facts and fear-based messages.
Key findings
- Among 120 participants who completed both waves, beliefs that vaccines cause autism increased from Time 1 to Time 2 in the myths-vs.-facts condition (M = 1.13, SE = .20, p < .001) and visual condition (M = .13, SE = .06, p = .043); the overall intervention × time interaction was significant, F(3, 116) = 23.263, p < .001, partial η² = .376.
- Fear-based correction produced the strongest beliefs in vaccine side effects at Time 2 compared with myths-vs.-facts (M = 1.57, SE = .25, p < .001), visual (M = 2.07, SE = .25, p < .001), and control (M = 2.17, SE = .25, p < .001); side-effect beliefs also increased over time in the fear condition (M = 1.60, SE = .16, p < .001).
- No corrective strategy improved vaccination intention. Vaccine hesitancy increased over time in the fear condition (M = .60, SD = .13, p < .001), and at Time 2 myths-vs.-facts showed higher hesitancy than control (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001).
- Table 1 shows overall means rose from Time 1 to Time 2 for vaccines-cause-autism (1.80 to 2.12), vaccines-side-effects (2.10 to 2.72), and vaccine hesitancy (1.66 to 2.02).
Methods
- Experimental study with 134 initial university-student participants from Edinburgh and Naples; 120 completed both waves (47 men, 73 women; mean age 25.35 years, SD 3.52). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: Myths vs. Facts Correction, Visual Correction, Fear Correction, or Control.
- Outcomes were assessed immediately after the intervention (Time 1) and after a 7-day delay (Time 2) using three items: beliefs that vaccines cause autism, beliefs about MMR side effects, and intention to vaccinate a future child (reverse-coded as vaccine hesitancy).
- Analyses used mixed-design ANOVAs in SPSS version 20, with correction intervention as between-subjects and time as within-subjects; Tukey’s HSD corrected multiple comparisons, with significance at p < .05.
Limitations
- Stated: the convenience sample had limited variability in age and education; future research should use more representative samples such as parents and health practitioners and examine moderators like age, education, and socioeconomic status.
- Stated: participants were from Italy or Scotland, raising possible between-country heterogeneity in vaccine attitudes; the small sample limited ability to test such differences.
- Stated: vaccine uptake was self-reported and should be supplemented with objective primary records; prospective longitudinal data are needed because beliefs change over time. Evident from the text: the sample was university students rather than parents making vaccination decisions, and the follow-up delay was only 7 days.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 36 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
Beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for the visual condition.
“Pairwise comparisons indicated that these beliefs were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for both the myths vs. facts (M = 1.13, SE = .2, p < .001) and visual condition (M = .13, SE = .06, p = .043).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant interaction between correction interventions and time on beliefs in the vaccines/autism link.
“Concerning beliefs in the vaccines/autism link, there was a statistically significant interaction between correction interventions and time [F(3, 116) = 23.263, p < .001, partial η2 = .376].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for the myths vs. facts condition.
“Pairwise comparisons indicated that these beliefs were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for both the myths vs. facts (M = 1.13, SE = .2, p < .001) and visual condition (M = .13, SE = .06, p = .043).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in the vaccines/autism link for the myths vs. facts condition.
“Simple main effect for time confirmed that there was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in the vaccines/autism link for the myths vs. facts [F(1, 29) = 31.508, p < .001, partial η2 = .521] and the visual condition [F(1, 29) = 4.462, p = .043, partial η2 = .133].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in the vaccines/autism link for the visual condition.
“Simple main effect for time confirmed that there was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in the vaccines/autism link for the myths vs. facts [F(1, 29) = 31.508, p < .001, partial η2 = .521] and the visual condition [F(1, 29) = 4.462, p = .043, partial η2 = .133].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Findingown data
At Time 2, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the control condition.
“This time, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the visual (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001) and control condition (M = .8, SE = .22, p = .002), and in the fear condition compared to visual condition (M = .67, SE = .22, p = .016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
At Time 2, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the visual condition.
“This time, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the visual (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001) and control condition (M = .8, SE = .22, p = .002), and in the fear condition compared to visual condition (M = .67, SE = .22, p = .016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
At Time 2, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were significantly higher in the fear condition compared to the visual condition.
“This time, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the visual (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001) and control condition (M = .8, SE = .22, p = .002), and in the fear condition compared to visual condition (M = .67, SE = .22, p = .016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The fear appeal materials (images of sick children) actually elicited fear in participants.
- Findingown data
At Time 1, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were significantly greater in the fear correction intervention compared to the myths vs. facts and visual conditions.
“Indeed, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were significantly greater in the fear correction intervention compared to the myths vs. facts (M = .83, SE = .22, p = .001) and visual condition (M = .8, SE = .22, p = .002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The fear appeal materials (images of sick children) actually elicited fear in participants.
- Findingown data
Beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for the fear condition, M=1.6, SE=.16, p<.001.
“Pairwise comparisons indicated that these beliefs were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for both the myths vs. facts (M = .7, SE = .23, p = .005) and fear condition (M = 1.6, SE = .16, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
At Time 2, vaccine hesitancy was statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the control condition, M=.97, SE=.22, p<.001.
“Vaccine hesitancy was statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the fear (M = .6, SE = .22, p = .04) and control condition (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
At Time 2, vaccine hesitancy was statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the fear condition, M=.6, SE=.22, p=.04.
“Vaccine hesitancy was statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the fear (M = .6, SE = .22, p = .04) and control condition (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in vaccines side effects for the myths vs. facts condition, F(1,29)=9.207, p=.005, partial η2=.241.
“Simple main effect for time revealed that there was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in vaccines side effects for the myths vs. facts [F(1, 29) = 9.207, p = .005, partial η2 = .241] and fear intervention [F(1, 29) = 96.000, p < .001, partial η2 = .768].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant difference between conditions in Vaccines Side Effects Change Score, F(3,116)=18.914, p<.001.
“There was also a significant difference between conditions in Vaccines Side Effects Change Score [F(3,116) = 18.914, p < .001] (Fig 6B).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for the myths vs. facts condition, M=.7, SE=.23, p=.005.
“Pairwise comparisons indicated that these beliefs were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for both the myths vs. facts (M = .7, SE = .23, p = .005) and fear condition (M = 1.6, SE = .16, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant difference between conditions in Vaccine Hesitancy Change Score, F(3,116)=2.828, p=.042.
“There was a significant difference between conditions in Vaccine Hesitancy Change Score [F(3,116) = 2.828, p = .042], (Fig 6C) as the fear correction led to larger changes in scores and higher vaccine hesitancy than the control condition (M = .6, SE = .23, p = .045).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
No corrective strategy was useful in enhancing vaccination intention.
“Our findings also suggest that no corrective strategy was useful in enhancing vaccination intention.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in vaccines side effects for the fear intervention, F(1,29)=96.000, p<.001, partial η2=.768.
“Simple main effect for time revealed that there was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in vaccines side effects for the myths vs. facts [F(1, 29) = 9.207, p = .005, partial η2 = .241] and fear intervention [F(1, 29) = 96.000, p < .001, partial η2 = .768].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant effect of time on vaccination intentions for the fear condition, F(1,29)=20.605, p<.001, partial η2=.415.
“Simple main effects for time showed that there was a statistically significant effect of time on vaccination intentions for the fear condition [F(1, 29) = 20.605, p < .001, partial η2 = .415].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant interaction between interventions and time for vaccine hesitancy, F(3,116)=2.828, p=.042, partial η2=.068.
“Concerning vaccine hesitancy, there was a statistically significant interaction between interventions and time [F(3, 116) = 2.828, p = .042, partial η2 = .068].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Exposure to fear appeals through images of sick children led to more increased misperceptions about vaccines causing autism.
“Also the exposure to fear appeals through images of sick children led to more increased misperceptions about vaccines causing autism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant interaction between interventions and time for beliefs in vaccines side effects, F(3,116)=18.914, p<.001, partial η2=.328.
“Concerning beliefs in vaccines side effects, there was a statistically significant interaction between interventions and time [F(3, 116) = 18.914, p < .001, partial η2 = .328].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant difference in beliefs concerning vaccines side effects between interventions at Time 2, F(3,116)=32.919, p<.001, partial η2=.46.
“A statistically significant difference in beliefs concerning vaccines side effects between interventions was also detected at Time 2 [F(3, 116) = 32.919, p < .001, partial η2 = .46].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
At Time 1, beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly higher in the fear correction intervention compared to the myth vs. facts, visual, and control conditions.
“Beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly higher in the fear correction intervention compared to the myth vs. facts (M = .67, SE = .24, p = .035), visual (M = .63, SE = .24, p = .05), and control condition (M = .67, SE = .24, p = .035).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
At Time 1, vaccine hesitancy was statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the fear condition, M=.67, SE=.21, p=.01.
“Vaccine hesitancy was statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the fear condition (M = .67, SE = .21, p = .01).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant difference in vaccination hesitancy between interventions at Time 2, F(3,116)=6.413, p<.001, partial η2=.142.
“A statistically significant difference in vaccination hesitancy between interventions was also detected at Time 2 [F(3, 116) = 6.413, p < .001, partial η2 = .142].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The fear corrective strategy induced the strongest beliefs in vaccines side effects.
“Moreover, this corrective strategy induced the strongest beliefs in vaccines side effects, highlighting the negative consequences of using loss-framed messages and fear appeals to promote preventive health behaviours [45, 38].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant difference between conditions in Vaccine Cause Autism Change Score, F(3,116)=23.263, p<.001.
“As shown in Fig 6A, there was a significant difference between conditions in Vaccine Cause Autism Change Score [F(3,116) = 23.263, p < .001].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant difference in vaccination intentions between interventions at Time 1, F(3,116)=3.613, p=.015, partial η2=.085.
“Simple main effects for condition revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in vaccination intentions between interventions at Time 1[F(3, 116) = 3.613, p = .015, partial η2 = .085].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
At Time 2, beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly greater in the fear correction intervention compared to the myth vs. facts, visual, and control conditions.
“Again, beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly greater in the fear correction intervention compared to the myth vs. facts (M = 1.57, SE = .25, p < .001), visual (M = 2.07, SE = .25, p < .001), and control condition (M = 2.17, SE = .25, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a statistically significant difference in beliefs in vaccines side effects between interventions at Time 1, F(3,116)=3.651, p=.015, partial η2=.086.
“Simple main effect for condition revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in these beliefs between interventions at Time 1 [F(3, 116) = 3.651, p = .015, partial η2 = .086].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation often backfire, resulting in the unintended opposite effect.
“Results show that existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation are ineffective and often backfire, resulting in the unintended opposite effect, reinforcing ill-founded beliefs about vaccination and reducing intentions to vaccinate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The three pro-vaccination strategies tested (myths vs. facts, visual fact/icon boxes, fear appeals) are representative of existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation.
- Rests on an assumption: The sample of university students is representative of the population for whom vaccine promotion strategies are intended.
- Interpretationown data
The backfire reinforces ill-founded beliefs about vaccination.
“Results show that existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation are ineffective and often backfire, resulting in the unintended opposite effect, reinforcing ill-founded beliefs about vaccination and reducing intentions to vaccinate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The three pro-vaccination strategies tested (myths vs. facts, visual fact/icon boxes, fear appeals) are representative of existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation.
- Rests on an assumption: The sample of university students is representative of the population for whom vaccine promotion strategies are intended.
- Interpretationown data
Existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation are ineffective.
“Results show that existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation are ineffective and often backfire, resulting in the unintended opposite effect, reinforcing ill-founded beliefs about vaccination and reducing intentions to vaccinate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The three pro-vaccination strategies tested (myths vs. facts, visual fact/icon boxes, fear appeals) are representative of existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation.
- Rests on an assumption: The sample of university students is representative of the population for whom vaccine promotion strategies are intended.
- Premisecitation
People can still be influenced by retracted misinformation even when they clearly remember and understand a subsequent correction.
“Even when people clearly remember and understand a subsequent correction when asked about it immediately (suggesting that they have encoded it and can retrieve and potentially comply with it), they can still be influenced by the effect of the retracted misinformation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [10] AL Wilkes, 1988, Editing episodic memory following the identification of error, Q J Exp Psychol source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [6] HM Johnson, 1994, Sources of the continued influence effect: when misinformation in memory affects later inferences, J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The study provided further support to the growing literature showing how corrective information may have unexpected and even counter-productive results.
“Our study provided further support to the growing literature showing how corrective information may have unexpected and even counter-productive results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Immediate tests following the presentation of inaccurate information are less likely to detect people's susceptibility to misinformation compared to longer time intervals.
“Classical laboratory research on the lasting effect of misinformation in memory confirms that immediate tests following the presentation of inaccurate information are less likely to detect people’s susceptibility to misinformation compared to longer time intervals [20, 21].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [20] EF Loftus, 1978, Semantic integration of verbal information into a visual memory, J Exp Psychol Hum Learn source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [21] RF Belli, 1992, Detecting memory impairment with a modified test procedure: manipulating retention interval with centrally presented event items, J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Corrective strategies may appear effective immediately yet backfire even after a short delay, when the message they tried to convey gradually fades from memory, allowing common misconceptions to be more easily remembered and identified as true.
“This is especially true because corrective strategies may appear effective immediately yet backfire even after a short delay, when the message they tried to convey gradually fades from memory, allowing common misconceptions to be more easily remembered and identified as true [25].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [25] N Schwarz, 2007, Metacognitive experiences and the intricacies of setting people straight: implications for debiasing and public information campaigns, Adv Exp Soc Psychol source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
In the case of vaccines, providing evidence about the safety of immunisation may not be enough because false information persists in people's minds.
“In the case of vaccines, providing evidence about the safety of immunisation may not be enough as people may have heard or read somewhere that, for example, vaccines are not necessary, that they cause autism or contain dangerous chemicals. This false information persists in their minds.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In the same study, the more participants were warned that a statement was false, the more they accepted it as true.
“Even worse, the more they were warned that a statement was false, the more they accepted it as true.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [28] I Skurnik, 2005, How warnings about false claims become recommendations, J Cons Res source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The myths versus facts format often backfires because the simple repetition of the myth amplifies the familiarity of that false claim, making it seem even more believable and widely-shared.
“This is the case of one of the most frequently used corrective strategy employing the myths versus facts format, which often backfires because the simple repetition of the myth, though well-intended and necessary in order to contrast it with the available evidence, paradoxically amplifies the familiarity of that false claim making it seem even more believable and widely-shared [46].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [46] N Schwarz, 2016, Making the truth stick and the myths fade: lessons from Cognitive Psychology, Behavioral Science & Policy Association source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Continued reliance on discredited information is very difficult to correct.
“Classical laboratory research on memory for inferences [10, 6] demonstrates that the continued reliance on discredited information is very difficult to correct.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [10] AL Wilkes, 1988, Editing episodic memory following the identification of error, Q J Exp Psychol source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [6] HM Johnson, 1994, Sources of the continued influence effect: when misinformation in memory affects later inferences, J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The backfire reduces intentions to vaccinate.
“Results show that existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation are ineffective and often backfire, resulting in the unintended opposite effect, reinforcing ill-founded beliefs about vaccination and reducing intentions to vaccinate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The three pro-vaccination strategies tested (myths vs. facts, visual fact/icon boxes, fear appeals) are representative of existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation.
- Rests on an assumption: The sample of university students is representative of the population for whom vaccine promotion strategies are intended.
- Premisecitation
In a study by Skurnik et al., participants who read either true or false health-related statements could not distinguish fact from fiction after a 3-day delay.
“Similarly, in a study by Skurnik et al. [28] participants who read either true or false health-related statements could not distinguish fact from fiction after a 3-day delay.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [28] I Skurnik, 2005, How warnings about false claims become recommendations, J Cons Res source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The use of inaccurate information may not emerge immediately after its presentation but may occur after a delay.
“An added complication is that the use of inaccurate information does not necessarily emerge immediately after its presentation but may occur after a delay between the initial presentation and later test points [18, 19].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
People tend to mistake repetition for truth, a phenomenon known as the "illusory truth" effect.
“This happens, at least partly, because people tend to mistake repetition for truth, a phenomenon known as the “illusory truth” effect [22, 23].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [22] L Hasher, 1977, Frequency and the conference of referential validity, J Verbal Learning Verbal Behav source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [23] A Dechêne, 2010, The truth about the truth: a meta-analytic review of the truth effect, Pers Soc Psychol Rev source
Not checked in the free run.
- May combine two claims. 18
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 16
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe myths vs. facts condition led to larger changes in Vaccine Cause Autism Change Score, and therefore stronger beliefs in vaccines causing autism, than the visual, fear, and control conditions.
“This effect was driven by the myths vs. facts condition, which led to larger changes in scores and therefore strongest beliefs in vaccines causing autism compared to the other two correction interventions, that is the visual (M = 1, SE = .16, p < .001) and the fear condition (M = 1.13, SE = .16, p < .001), and the control condition (M = 1.13, SE = .16, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe myths vs. facts format induced stronger beliefs in the vaccine/autism link and in vaccines side effects over time.
“Specifically, we found that the myths vs. facts format, at odds with its aims, induced stronger beliefs in the vaccine/autism link and in vaccines side effects over time, lending credit to the literature showing that countering false information in ways that repeat it may further contribute to its dissemination [25].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe fear condition led to larger changes in Vaccines Side Effects Change Score, and therefore stronger beliefs in vaccines causing side effects, than the myths vs. facts, visual, and control conditions.
“This time, this effect was driven by the fear condition, which led to larger changes in scores and therefore strongest beliefs in vaccines causing side effects than the other two correction interventions, that is the myths vs. facts (M = .9, SE = .22, p = .001) and the visual condition (M = 1.43, SE = .22, p < .001), and the control condition (M = 1.5, SE = .22, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the fear condition, vaccine hesitancy increased over time, M=.6, SD=.13, p<.001.
“Pairwise comparisons indicated that vaccine hesitancy increased over time (M = .6, SD = .13, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe fear correction led to larger changes in scores and higher vaccine hesitancy than the control condition, M=.6, SE=.23, p=.045.
“There was a significant difference between conditions in Vaccine Hesitancy Change Score [F(3,116) = 2.828, p = .042], (Fig 6C) as the fear correction led to larger changes in scores and higher vaccine hesitancy than the control condition (M = .6, SE = .23, p = .045).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductown dataParticipants were randomly assigned to 1 of the 4 conditions.
“Next, they were randomly assigned to 1 of the 4 conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationThe second questionnaire (post-manipulation survey) has been used in previous studies.
“The second questionnaire was a post-manipulation survey that assessed whether and how participants’ beliefs and attitudes toward vaccines changed compared to the baseline measure. The three-item post-manipulation survey has also been used in previous studies [4].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [4] B Nyhan, 2014, Effective messages in vaccine promotion: a randomized trial, Pediatrics source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningThe length of each myth and fact was matched to reduce the risk of individuals devoting more attention to one text rather than the other.
“The length of each myth and fact was matched to reduce the risk of individuals devoting more attention to one text rather than the other.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationRepeating myths might contribute to increasing their acceptance due to their perceived familiarity.
“However, repeating myths might contribute to increasing their acceptance due to their perceived familiarity [22, 23, 24].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [22] L Hasher, 1977, Frequency and the conference of referential validity, J Verbal Learning Verbal Behav source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [23] A Dechêne, 2010, The truth about the truth: a meta-analytic review of the truth effect, Pers Soc Psychol Rev source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [24] C Peter, 2016, When debunking scientific myths fails (and when it does not). The backfire effect in the context of journalistic coverage and immediate judgments as prevention strategy, Sci Commun source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThere is little systematic research on correcting vaccine misinformation and no strong evidence recommending any specific intervention to address vaccine hesitancy.
“Notwithstanding the centrality of the vaccine issue, there is little systematic research on correcting vaccine misinformation and we found no strong evidence recommending any specific intervention to address vaccines hesitancy [3, 40, 41].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [3] HJ Larson, 2014, Understanding vaccine hesitancy around vaccines and vaccination from a global perspective: a systematic review of published literature, 2007–2012, Vaccine source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [40] C Jarrett, 2015, Strategies for addressing vaccine hesitancy–A systematic review, Vaccine source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [41] C Betsch, 2015, Using behavioral insights to increase vaccination policy effectiveness, Policy Insights Behav Brain Sci source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationFear appeals are particularly effective at positively influencing attitudes, intentions, and behaviour under specific circumstances.
“Results from a comprehensive meta-analysis by Tannenbaum et al. [35] showed that fear appeals are particularly effective at positively influencing attitudes, intentions, and behaviour under specific circumstances.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [35] MB Tannenbaum, 2015, Appealing to fear: a meta-analysis of fear appeal effectiveness and theories, Psychol Bull source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenParticipants were unaware of the other experimental conditions and researchers were blind to condition allocation until printed materials were delivered.
“Participants were unaware of the other experimental conditions and researchers were blind to condition allocation until printed materials were delivered to the study participants.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationThe first questionnaire assessing baseline beliefs and attitudes towards vaccines has been used in previous studies.
“The first questionnaire was a preliminary survey aimed at assessing participants’ baseline beliefs and attitudes towards vaccines, which has been used in previous studies [42, 4].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationA recent study by Cameron et al. found that participants exposed to facts, myths, and evidence to counteract those myths gained more knowledge and had better recall accuracy than those merely presented with factual information.
“A recent study by Cameron et al. [29] employing different facts versus myths message formats justifies the use of myths to overcome health misinformation, as participants who were exposed to facts, myths, and evidence to counteract those myths gained more knowledge regarding a specific health topic and had a better recall accuracy than those who were merely presented with factual information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [29] KA Cameron, 2013, Patient knowledge and recall of health information following exposure to “facts and myths” message format variations, Patient Educ Couns source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSimply retracting a piece of information does not stop its influence because outdated pieces of information linger in memory.
“Therefore, simply retracting a piece of information does not stop its influence because outdated pieces of information linger in memory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFear appeals can increase the perception of the severity of the health threat, inducing behaviour changes, at least as long as individuals believe they can protect themselves.
“An early meta-analysis by Witte and Allen [34] revealed that fear appeals can actually increase the perception of the severity of the health threat inducing behaviour changes, at least as long as the individuals believe that they are able to protect themselves and avert the threat.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [34] K Witte, 2000, A meta-analysis of fear appeals: implications for effective public health campaigns, Health Educ Behav source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Study design and conductnone givenRespondents who dropped out and those who completed both waves did not differ on any relevant aspect.
“Respondents who dropped out from the study and those who completed both waves did not differ on any relevant aspect (a complete report can be provided by the authors upon request).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningCompared to the other techniques, the usage of fact/icon boxes resulted in less damage but did not bring any effective result.
“Compared to the other techniques, the usage of fact/icon boxes resulted in less damage but did not bring any effective result.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPeople build mental models of unfolding events; if a central piece of the model is invalidated, people prefer a more readily available and complete model, albeit inaccurate, over a correct but incomplete one, sticking to the original idea and ignoring the retraction.
“Another explanation for the lingering effect of misinformation assumes that people build mental models of unfolding events. If a central piece of the model is invalidated, people are left with a gap in their knowledge of the event, whose representation simply does not make any sense unless one decides to maintain the false and invalidated information. Thus, feeling uncomfortable with gaps in their”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [52] S Lewandowsky, 2012, Misinformation and its correction continued influence and successful debiasing, Psychol Sci
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: People build mental models of unfolding events.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationSome studies report a general shift towards a more positive perception of vaccines in both the UK and Italy.
“However, some studies report a general shift towards a more positive perception of vaccines in both countries [54, 55].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [54] P Impicciatore, 2000, Mothers as active partners in the prevention of childhood diseases: maternal factors related to immunization status of preschool children in Italy, Prev Med source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [55] A Smith, 2007, Tracking mothers’ attitudes to MMR immunisation 1996–2006, Vaccine source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningParticipants were domiciled in Italy or Scotland, which raises the question of possible effects of between-country heterogeneity in vaccine attitudes, which might introduce uncontrolled variance into the data.
“Also, our participants were domiciled in Italy or Scotland, which raises the question of possible effects of between-country heterogeneity in vaccine attitudes, which might introduce uncontrolled variance into our data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Comparative data on vaccine attitudes and uptake in the UK and Italy are still lacking.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataBecause of the small sample size, the study is not able to ascertain whether between-country differences actually exist and are reflected in the findings.
“Because of the small sample size of our study, we are not able to ascertain whether these differences actually exist and are reflected in our findings.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Comparative data on vaccine attitudes and uptake in the UK and Italy are still lacking.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAccording to a cognitive consistency perspective, rejecting a belief would generate numerous inconsistencies that threaten one's self-concept.
“This effect can be better understood within a cognitive consistency perspective [51], according to which rejecting a belief would generate numerous inconsistencies that threaten one’s self-concept.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [51] L Festinger, 1957
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationown dataThe findings offer a useful example of how factual information is misremembered over time.
“Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings offer a useful example of how factual information is misremembered over time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPeople's worldview, or personal ideology, can override unwelcome facts and determine the effectiveness of retractions, which can even backfire when they are attitude-incongruent and strengthen the initial held beliefs.
“People’s worldview, or personal ideology, can indeed override unwelcome facts and determine the effectiveness of retractions, which can even backfire when they are attitude-incongruent and strengthen the initial held beliefs (i.e., “attitude bolstering” [50]).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [50] M Prasad, 2009, “There must be a reason”: Osama, Saddam, and inferred justification, Sociol Inq source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFamiliarity is a key determinant of the illusory truth effect; when something seems familiar it is easier to process and one is more inclined to believe it, regardless of whether the statement is factually true or false or was initially rated as credible or questionable.
“Familiarity appears as a key determinant of this effect; indeed, when something seems familiar is easier to process and one is more inclined to believe it [24], regardless of whether the statement is factually true or false [22, 47] or was initially rated as credible or questionable [48].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 4 sources checked- cites [24] C Peter, 2016, When debunking scientific myths fails (and when it does not). The backfire effect in the context of journalistic coverage and immediate judgments as prevention strategy, Sci Commun source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [22] L Hasher, 1977, Frequency and the conference of referential validity, J Verbal Learning Verbal Behav source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [47] G Gigerenzer, 1984, External validity of laboratory experiments: the frequency-validity relationship, Am J Psychol source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [48] HR Arkes, 1989, The generality of the relation between familiarity and judged validity, J Behav Decis Making source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningBecause participants were randomly allocated to conditions, there is no reason to expect the results to be systematically biased by between-country heterogeneity.
“Because our participants were randomly allocated to conditions, there is no reason to expect our results to be systematically biased by between-country heterogeneity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe study used a convenience sample with limited variability in age and educational level, which may limit the generalization of the findings.
“Some aspects of our experimental procedures may limit the generalization of the findings. Firstly, we used a convenience sample with limited variability in age and educational level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationOnce a belief is formed, people generate explanations that fit and further reinforce this belief and tend to vigorously reject counter-arguments that make them uncomfortable, regardless of their validity.
“A strong argument is that, once a belief is formed, people generate explanations that fit and further reinforce this belief and tend to vigorously reject counter-arguments that make them uncomfortable, regardless of their validity [49].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [49] B Nyhan, 2010, When corrections fail: the persistence of political misperceptions, Polit Behav source
Not checked in the free run.
The paper relies on this without support.
The three pro-vaccination strategies tested (myths vs. facts, visual fact/icon boxes, fear appeals) are representative of existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation.
“Results show that existing strategies to correct vaccine misinformation are ineffective and often backfire, resulting in the unintended opposite effect, reinforcing ill-founded beliefs about vaccination and reducing intentions to vaccinate.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The fear appeal materials (images of sick children) actually elicited fear in participants.
“In the third condition (Fear Correction) participants were presented with pictures of unvaccinated children with measles, mumps, and rubella, along with the description of the symptoms of each disease and a brief warning about the importance of vaccinating one’s own child (Fig 3).”
The paper relies on this without support.
The sample of university students is representative of the population for whom vaccine promotion strategies are intended.
“Participants were students from diverse departments of the University of Edinburgh, the Suor Orsola Benincasa University of Naples, and the Second University of Naples, resulting in an initial sample of 134 individuals.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There has been little systematic comparison of different forms of correction of vaccine misinformation.
“However, there has been little systematic comparison of different forms of correction of vaccine misinformation.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
People build mental models of unfolding events.
“Another explanation for the lingering effect of misinformation assumes that people build mental models of unfolding events.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Comparative data on vaccine attitudes and uptake in the UK and Italy are still lacking.
“To the best of our knowledge, comparative data on vaccine attitudes and uptake in the UK and Italy are still lacking.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Even after a brief exposure, misinformation can result in long-term attitudinal and behavioural shifts that pro-vaccination messaging may find hard to overcome.
“even after a brief exposure, misinformation can result in long-term attitudinal and behavioural shifts 45,57 that pro-vaccination messaging may find hard to overcome 57 .”
From Measuring the impact of COVID-19 vaccine misinformation on vaccination intent in the UK and USA (2021) · cites this paper as [57]
The Discussion reports that a myths-versus-facts message strengthened vaccine misconceptions over time and that none of the tested corrections improved vaccination intention. The Methods specify that outcomes were measured immediately and after seven days, and that the behavioural measure was intention to vaccinate, not vaccination behaviour. Thus the paper supports persistent attitudinal effects and difficulty correcting them, but not long-term behavioural shifts. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 23.263reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 116) = 23.263, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 6.183reported p = .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 116) = 6.183, p = .001”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 8.194reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 116) = 8.194, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(1, 29) = 31.508reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 29) = 31.508, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(1, 29) = 4.462reported p = .043 · recomputed p = .043
“F(1, 29) = 4.462, p = .043”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 23.263reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3,116) = 23.263, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 18.914reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 116) = 18.914, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 3.651reported p = .015 · recomputed p = .015
“F(3, 116) = 3.651, p = .015”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 32.919reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 116) = 32.919, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(1, 29) = 9.207reported p = .005 · recomputed p = .005
“F(1, 29) = 9.207, p = .005”
- ConsistentF(1, 29) = 96reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 29) = 96.000, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 18.914reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3,116) = 18.914, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 2.828reported p = .042 · recomputed p = .042
“F(3, 116) = 2.828, p = .042”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 3.613reported p = .015 · recomputed p = .015
“F(3, 116) = 3.613, p = .015”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 6.413reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(3, 116) = 6.413, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(1, 29) = 20.605reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 29) = 20.605, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(3, 116) = 2.828reported p = .042 · recomputed p = .042
“F(3,116) = 2.828, p = .042”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Discussion attributes an increase in autism misperceptions to the fear condition
MajorThe discussion says the fear appeal increased misperceptions about vaccines causing autism, but the results attribute the larger change in autism-belief scores to the myths-vs.-facts condition, including a 1.13-point larger change than in the fear condition. The results report significant increases over time for the myths-vs.-facts and visual conditions, not the fear condition.
“Also the exposure to fear appeals through images of sick children led to more increased misperceptions about vaccines causing autism.”
“This effect was driven by the myths vs. facts condition, which led to larger changes in scores and therefore strongest beliefs in vaccines causing autism compared to the other two correction interventions, that is the visual (M = 1, SE = .16, p < .001) and the fear condition (M = 1.13, SE = .16, p < .001)”
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 56 · Cited by 273
- Authors
- Pluviano, S., Watt, C., & Della Sala, S.
- Affiliations
- Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa (IT)
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pluviano, Sara
- Venue
- PLOS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2017-07-27
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- e0181640
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC5547702
- OpenAlex
- W2736876412
- Cited by
- 273
- References
- 56
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 4
- FWCI
- 69.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Health › Vaccine Coverage and Hesitancy
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Risk Perception and Management
- Keywords
- vaccine misinformation, memory updating, corrective information, backfire effect, vaccine side effects, vaccination intention, vaccine promotion strategies, belief persistence
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Autistic Disorder, Communication, Fear, Female, Humans, Health Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice, Male, Parents, Patient Acceptance of Health Care, Vaccination, Vaccines, Young Adult, Memory, Long-Term
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-10.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-10.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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