Economic Games on the Internet: The Effect of $1 Stakes
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Abstract
Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) offer an unprecedented opportunity to run economic game experiments quickly and inexpensively. Using Mturk, we recruited 756 subjects and examined their behavior in four canonical economic games, with two payoff conditions each: a stakes condition, in which subjects' earnings were based on the outcome of the game (maximum earnings of $1); and a no-stakes condition, in which subjects' earnings are unaffected by the outcome of the game. Our results demonstrate that economic game experiments run on MTurk are comparable to those run in laboratory settings, even when using very low stakes.
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“While decision-making experiments on MTurk allow high control over confounding variables and are comparable to those in laboratory settings, even in low-stakes scenarios (Amir et al., 2012)”
From Exploring the effects of human-centered AI explanations on trust and reliance (2023) · cites this paper as Amir et al., 2012
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Self-citationTesting Social Science Network Theories with Online Network Data: An Evaluation of External Validity
BISBEE, J., & LARSON, J. M. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000120 · Cited by 56
Religious Motivations for Cooperation: An Experimental Investigation Using Explicit Primes
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Haque, O. S., Kane, R. J., Nowak, M. A., & Coakley, S. (2012) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2013.775664 · Cited by 63
“Similar results have been found for the repeated public goods game (Suri & Watts, 2011) and the one-shot DG, public goods game, ultimatum game, and trust game (Amir et al., 2012).”
Self-citationLab-like findings from online experiments
Buso, I. M., Cagno, D. T. D., Ferrari, L., Larocca, V., Lorè, L., Marazzi, F., Panaccione, L., & Spadoni, L. (2021) · Journal of the Economic Science Association · doi:10.1007/s40881-021-00114-8 · Cited by 75
“The validity of these protocols has been demonstrated by successfully replicating a series of classic experiments (Crump et al. 2013; Amir et al. 2012; Horton et al. 2013).”
BackgroundThink global, act local: Preserving the global commons
Hauser, O., Hendriks, A., Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep36079 · Cited by 67
Self-citationExploring the effects of human-centered AI explanations on trust and reliance
Scharowski, N., Perrig, S. A. C., Svab, M., Opwis, K., & Brühlmann, F. (2023) · Frontiers in Computer Science · doi:10.3389/fcomp.2023.1151150 · Cited by 57
The effect of the stake size on the evolution of fairness
Zhang, Y.-L., Chen, X.-J., Liu, A.-Z., & Sun, C.-Y. (2018) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2017.11.013 · Cited by 49
Capraro, V., Corgnet, B., Espín, A. M., & Hérnan-Gonzalez, R. (2017) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.160605 · Cited by 65
Group size and the (in)efficiency of pure public good provision
Diederich, J., Goeschl, T., & Waichman, I. (2016) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.001 · Cited by 79
İşler, O., Gächter, S., Maule, A. J., & Starmer, C. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-93412-4 · Cited by 62
Lab vs online experiments: No differences
Prissé, B., & Jorrat, D. (2022) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101910 · Cited by 60
Porumbescu, G. A., & Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2018) · The American Review of Public Administration · doi:10.1177/0275074017734642 · Cited by 49
Urbanska, K., McKeown, S., & Taylor, L. K. (2019) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2019.01.010 · Cited by 55
A study of computational and human strategies in revelation games
Peled, N., Gal, K., & Kraus, S. (2011) · doi:10.5555/2030470.2030521 · Cited by 48
The wages of dishonesty: The supply of cheating under high-powered incentives
Balasubramanian, P., Bennett, V. M., & Pierce, L. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.022 · Cited by 57
The Effects of Performance-Contingent Financial Incentives in Online Labor Markets
Yin, M., Chen, Y., & Sun, Y. (2013) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8461 · Cited by 59
“Amir, Rand, and Gal (2012) replicated results of some classical lab experiments in MTurk, suggesting that workers in MTurk reacted to performance-contingent financial incentives in a similar way as people in labs.”
BackgroundResultOld age and prosocial behavior: Social preferences or experimental confounds?
Kettner, S. E., & Waichman, I. (2016) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2016.01.003 · Cited by 54
Neural correlates of social decision-making in severely antisocial adolescents
van den Bos, W., Vahl, P., Güroğlu, B., van Nunspeet, F., Colins, O. F., Markus, M. T., Rombouts, S. A. R. B., van der Wee, N. J. A., Vermeiren, R. R. J. M., & Crone, E. A. (2014) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsu003 · Cited by 57
“The reason for using different pay offs was practical, but prior results showed that rejection rates on the Ultimatum Game are relatively robust against variations in magnitude of payment (Falk et al., 2008; Amir et al., 2012).”
ResultCrosman, K. M., Bostrom, A., & Hayes, A. L. (2019) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/risa.13334 · Cited by 52
Scopelliti, I., Min, H. L., McCormick, E. N., Kassam, K., & Morewedge, C. K. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2668 · Cited by 49
“In general, these findings in studies using small stakes on AMT are consistent with the findings of studies using larger stakes with other populations (Amir et al. 2012).”
ResultNatural Disasters, Preferences, and Behaviors: Evidence from the 2011 Mega Flood in Cambodia
Chantarat, S., Oum, S., Samphantharak, K., & Vathana, S. (2019) · Journal of Asian Economics · doi:10.1016/j.asieco.2019.05.001 · Cited by 43
The effect of communication channels on dishonest behavior
Conrads, J., & Lotz, S. (2015) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.006 · Cited by 47
Metadata
- Authors
- Amir, O., Rand, D. G., & Gal, Y. K.
- Affiliations
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Amir, Ofra
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2012-02-21
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- e31461
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3283743
- OpenAlex
- W3124416153
- Cited by
- 364
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 53.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- European Commission (268362)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- Amazon Mechanical Turk, digital labour markets, financial incentives, experimental design, participant behavior
- MeSH terms
- Behavior, Economics, Games, Experimental, Humans, Internet
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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