Cited by 549Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataSecurity and Verification in Computing

Towards Poisoning of Deep Learning Algorithms with Back-gradient Optimization

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Muñoz-González, Luis, Biggio, Battista, Demontis, Ambra, Paudice, Andrea, Wongrassamee, Vasin, Lupu, Emil C., Roli, Fabio·2017·Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security

Abstract

A number of online services nowadays rely upon machine learning to extract valuable information from data collected in the wild. This exposes learning algorithms to the threat of data poisoning, i.e., a coordinate attack in which a fraction of the training data is controlled by the attacker and manipulated to subvert the learning process. To date, these attacks have been devised only against a limited class of binary learning algorithms, due to the inherent complexity of the gradient-based procedure used to optimize the poisoning points (a.k.a. adversarial training examples). In this work, we first extend the definition of poisoning attacks to multiclass problems. We then propose a novel poisoning algorithm based on the idea of back-gradient optimization, i.e., to compute the gradient of interest through automatic differentiation, while also reversing the learning procedure to drastically reduce the attack complexity. Compared to current poisoning strategies, our approach is able to target a wider class of learning algorithms, trained with gradient-based procedures, including neural networks and deep learning architectures. We empirically evaluate its effectiveness on several application examples, including spam filtering, malware detection, and handwritten digit recognition. We finally show that, similarly to adversarial test examples, adversarial training examples can also be transferred across different learning algorithms.

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  • Under the LDP model, at least Ω(√n/ε) additive error in expectation must be incurred by any ε-DP mechanism for the same task.

    “In contrast, under the LDP model, at least Ω( √ n/ϵ ) additive error in expectation must be incurred by any ϵ -DP mechanism for the same task [117], [111].”
  • When the aggregator is untrusted, Local Differential Privacy or Distributed Differential Privacy are needed to protect privacy of individuals.

    “When the aggregator is untrusted which is often the case in distributed scenarios, Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [111] or Distributed Differential Privacy (DDP) are needed [112], [102] to protect privacy of individuals.”

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Research works printed but not linked: 16

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Authors
Muñoz-González, L., Biggio, B., Demontis, A., Paudice, A., Wongrassamee, V., Lupu, E. C., & Roli, F.
Affiliations
  • Imperial College London (GB)
  • University of Cagliari (IT)
Venue
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2017-11-03
Pages
27-38
OpenAlex
W2750650104
Cited by
549
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 54 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 82 · 2022: 79 · 2021: 92 · 2020: 75 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 1
FWCI
18.83
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • Spiral (Imperial College London) (submittedVersion)
  • UNICA IRIS Institutional Research Information System (University of Cagliari) (submittedVersion)
  • CINECA IRIS Institutial Research Information System (University of Genoa) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
UK EPSRC (EP/L022729/1, EP/L016796/1)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
data poisoning, deep learning security, model transferability, spam filtering, malware detection, handwritten digit recognition

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