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Cited by 132Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationMedia Influence and PoliticsSocial Media and Politics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Affective Polarization and Ideological Sorting: A Reciprocal, Albeit Weak, Relationship

Lelkes, Yphtach·2018·The Forum
DOI 10.1515/for-2018-0005
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Abstract

American partisans are far more hostile towards out-party members than they were 40 years ago. While this phenomenon, often called affective polarization, is well-documented, political scientists disagree on its cause. One group of scholars believes that affective polarization is driven by processes related to social identity theory. In particular, cross-cutting identities have declined in America, and toxic political communication continuously primes partisan identities and resentment. Recently, several scholars have pointed to another phenomenon as the root cause of affective polarization: partisan sorting, i.e. the alignment of partisan identities with ideologically consistent issue positions. I review evidence in favor of each claim, and provide additional evidence that affective polarization has increased about as much among those who are not sorted as among those who are sorted. Furthermore, while sorting is only related to affective polarization among the most politically knowledgeable, affective polarization has increased across all levels of political knowledge. Finally, affective polarization may also increase sorting, further complicating any clear cut causal relationship.

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48 of 48 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Campbell, A., P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes. 1960. The {A}merican Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
  2. Converse, P. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics.” In Ideology and Discontent, edited by D. Apter, 206–261. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
  3. Fiorina, M. P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Metadata

Authors
Lelkes, Y.
Affiliations
Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania , 3620 Walnut Street , Philadelphia, PA , USA
Venue
The Forum
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Published
2018-04-01
Volume
16
Issue
1
Pages
67-79
ISSN
  • 1540-8884 (ISSN-L)
  • 2194-6183
DOI
10.1515/for-2018-0005
OpenAlex
W2892753038
Cited by
132
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
FWCI
35.90
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The Forum (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
Keywords
affective polarization, partisan sorting, partisan identity, social identity theory, political communication, political knowledge, ideological consistency

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