A De Jure Criticism of Theism
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Abstract
An evolutionary by-product explanation entails that religious belief is an unintended consequence of a cognitive process selected for by evolution. In this paper, I argue that if a by-product explanation is true, then religious belief is unwarranted (even if God exists). In particular, I argue that if the cause of religious belief is the god-faculty (HADD + ToM + eToM + MCI), then it is likely unreliable; thus, religious belief is unwarranted. Plantinga argues that de jure criticisms are not independent of de facto criticisms: without knowing whether or not God exists, one can’t say that belief in God is unwarranted, since if God exists, it is possible that God has planned that this mechanism would lead to belief in Him. Against Plantinga, I show that in order for de jure criticisms to have force, it is not necessary to know that God does not exist. Instead, one only needs to doubt His existence. And if by-product explanations turn out to be supported by the evidence, this fact alone gives us reason to doubt God’s existence. Thus, if the by-product explanation is true, belief in God is not warranted; if we know this, then we have reason to doubt theism.
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“Goodnick rightly notes that (many) CSR-theories state that the mechanisms at the root of supernatural belief were selected by natural selection.”
From Is supernatural belief unreliably formed? (2019) · cites this paper as Goodnick 2016
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Cited by
Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?
Van Eyghen, H. (2019) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-018-9671-4 · Cited by 16
“(Goodnick 2016: 26) Goodnick’s argument can be summarized as follows: (1) The scientific evidence shows that the mechanisms that produce supernatural beliefs were selected by natural selection.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Cognitive Science of Religion, Philosophy and Theology: A Survey of the Issues
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“Since natural selection is not primarily aimed at truth, these faculties cannot be trusted (Goodnick 2016).”
BackgroundDEBUNKING ARGUMENTS GAIN LITTLE FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION
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“Consider an argument developed by Goodnick (2016).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Goodnick, L.
- Affiliations
- Metropolitan State University of Denver (US)
- Corresponding author
- Goodnick, Liz
- Venue
- Open Theology
- Publisher
- Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Published
- 2016-02-22
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2300-6579 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2342807773
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 50
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 6.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Open Theology (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Keywords
- religious beliefs, theism, Alvin Plantinga, theory of mind, moral cognition, evolution of religion
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