The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
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Citations
Cites
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
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Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
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Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
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An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
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Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118338 · Cited by 1,506
Self-citationAnomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners
Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. H. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.2.209 · Cited by 1,334
Hart, O., & Holmström, B. (1987) · Advances in Economic Theory · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.003 · Cited by 1,330
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A., & Gächter, S. (1998) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209891 · Cited by 437
Self-citationGüth, W., & Tietz, R. (1990) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-z · Cited by 396
Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols
Camerer, C. (1988) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228946 · Cited by 372
On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L. (1996) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf02425259 · Cited by 356
Economics, organization and management / Paul Milgrom, John Roberts
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An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
G�th, W. (1995) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01243036 · Cited by 268
Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
Carmichael, H. L., & MacLeod, W. B. (1997) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527277 · Cited by 193
The theory of incentives: an overview
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Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From IndonesiaPreprint
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Cited by
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Self-citationFairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Self-citationWhat Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1997-07
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 833
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2151678399
- Cited by
- 1,169
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 83.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.