The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
Open accessAbstract
FLWNO
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Economics, Organization and Management.
Bhattacharya, S., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328903 · Cited by 4,644
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118338 · Cited by 1,506
Self-citationAnomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners
Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. H. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.2.209 · Cited by 1,334
Hart, O., & Holmström, B. (1987) · Advances in Economic Theory · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.003 · Cited by 1,330
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
Fehr, E., Kirchler, E., Weichbold, A., & Gächter, S. (1998) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209891 · Cited by 437
Self-citation
Cited by
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Self-citationFairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Self-citationWhat Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
Self-citationPay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
Self-citationMotivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2000) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.11.5.538.15204 · Cited by 1,724
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7 · Cited by 1,372
Self-citationMas, A., & Moretti, E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.112 · Cited by 1,280
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
Self-citationFalk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1611 · Cited by 1,040
Explaining altruistic behavior in humans
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2003) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(02)00157-5 · Cited by 1,037
Self-citationHow to identify trust and reciprocity
Cox, J. C. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00119-2 · Cited by 1,037
Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach
Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556338 · Cited by 943
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life
(2005) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4771.001.0001 · Cited by 928
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.2.368 · Cited by 917
Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
Sobel, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661530 · Cited by 899
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
Miller, G. J. (2005) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840 · Cited by 865
Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
Konow, J. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205103771800013 · Cited by 852
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Keser, C., & Van Winden, F. (2000) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00182 · Cited by 800
Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment
Dasgupta, P. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199247889.001.0001 · Cited by 794
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203194 · Cited by 784
Self-citationOn the Nature of Fair Behavior
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1093/ei/41.1.20 · Cited by 728
Self-citationFehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2006) · Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01008-6 · Cited by 706
Self-citationGneezy, U., & List, J. A. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00707.x · Cited by 699
Contracts as Reference Points*
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.1 · Cited by 670
A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
(2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845354 · Cited by 659
Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?
Ederer, F., & Manso, G. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1683 · Cited by 646
FELD, L. P., & FREY, B. S. (2007) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2007.00248.x · Cited by 643
A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Gjerstad, S. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.001 · Cited by 631
Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00131-1 · Cited by 554
Self-citationSocial Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment
Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. S. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.335 · Cited by 504
The personal norm of reciprocity
Perugini, M., Gallucci, M., Presaghi, F., & Ercolani, A. P. (2003) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.474 · Cited by 497
Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups
Sutter, M., & Kocher, M. G. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.006 · Cited by 473
Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives
Bridoux, F., & Stoelhorst, J. W. (2014) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2089 · Cited by 469
Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
Loch, C. H., & Wu, Y. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0910 · Cited by 457
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002 · Cited by 457
Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting
Sprinkle, G. B. (2003) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00058-7 · Cited by 453
Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0715 · Cited by 453
Fehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x · Cited by 452
Self-citationBuchan, N. R., Croson, R. T. A., & Dawes, R. M. (2002) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/344546 · Cited by 440
Managers’ green investment disclosures and investors’ reaction
Martin, P. R., & Moser, D. V. (2016) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.08.004 · Cited by 431
A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences
Gintis, H. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000581 · Cited by 416
List, J. A. (2006) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/498587 · Cited by 392
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
Falk, A. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00800.x · Cited by 361
Fehr, E., Hoff, K., & Kshetramade, M. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.2.494 · Cited by 356
Self-citationThe focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior
Krupka, E., & Weber, R. A. (2009) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2008.11.005 · Cited by 353
Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others' Incomes?
Zizzo, & Oswald (2001) · Annales d'Économie et de Statistique · doi:10.2307/20076295 · Cited by 353
Buchan, N. R., Johnson, E. J., & Croson, R. T. A. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.017 · Cited by 352
Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
Seinen, I., & Schram, A. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005 · Cited by 350
Blockchain and sustainable supply chain management in developing countries
Kshetri, N. (2021) · International Journal of Information Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2021.102376 · Cited by 344
Rationality, institutions and environmental policy
Vatn, A. (2005) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.12.001 · Cited by 327
Like ripples on a pond: Behavioral spillovers and their implications for research and policy
Dolan, P., & Galizzi, M. M. (2015) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.12.003 · Cited by 314
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_7 · Cited by 303
Self-citationMotivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.230010 · Cited by 290
Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment
Abbink, K., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z · Cited by 281
Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2000) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00046-x · Cited by 274
Self-citationFairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2004) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00372.x · Cited by 253
Self-citationSabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Harbring, C., & Irlenbusch, B. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1296 · Cited by 239
The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
Burnham, T. C., & Johnson, D. D. P. (2005) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2005-0107 · Cited by 231
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk
Duffy, J., & Feltovich, N. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0892 · Cited by 218
“Do the right thing:” The effects of moral suasion on cooperation
Dal Bó, E., & Dal Bó, P. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.05.002 · Cited by 157
A controlled field experiment on corruption
Armantier, O., & Boly, A. (2011) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007 · Cited by 146
Lazzarini, S. G., Miller, G. J., & Zenger, T. R. (2008) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0336 · Cited by 141
The shadow of indebtedness: bridewealth and norms constraining female reproductive autonomy
Horne, C., Dodoo, F. N.-A., & Dodoo, N. D. (2013) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/0003122413484923 · Cited by 108
Social Preferences: Some Thoughts from the Field
List, J. A. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142958 · Cited by 61
(2002) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 51
Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison
Balafoutas, L., García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Jaber-Lopez, T., & Mitrokostas, E. (2020) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.009 · Cited by 36
On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso
Armantier, O., & Boly, A. (2014) · Economics of Governance · doi:10.1007/s10101-013-0135-0 · Cited by 11
Effects of parity, sympathy and reciprocity in increasing social welfare
Sen, S., Crawford, C., Dees, A., Nanda Kumar, R., & Hale, J. (2020) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888920000120 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1997-07
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 833
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2151678399
- Cited by
- 1,169
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 83.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.