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Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
Abstract
If I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue-a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of attitudes. When I hear a patter and expect Bruce, for instance, there may or may not be some legitimate sense in which Bruce the cat is an object of my attitude. But, be that as it may, according to received opinion my expectation has a propositional object. It is directed upon a proposition to the effect that Bruce is about to turn up. If instead I expect a cat but no particular cat, then the object of my expectation is a different proposition to the effect that some cat or other is about to turn up. Likewise for our other examples. The case of expecting a cat shows one advantage of our policy of uniformly assigning propositional objects. If we do not need a Meinongian incomplete cat as object of this attitude, then
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Citations
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“…haecceities); and our immediate, fundamental self-acquaintance (cf., Kripke, 2011), without which there could be no conceptually mediated de se awareness or representation in the first place [and, arguably, no de re or de dicto representation objects either (cf., Lewis, 1979; Chisholm, 1982)].”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, D.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979-10
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 513
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1994248508
- Cited by
- 1,941
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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