The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets
Abstract
The authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers. They consider both monopolistic and perf ectly-competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se. When a bank is a monopolist on the loan side, they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding. Under perfect competition, collateral has a useful sorting rol e. Moreover, rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly-elastic deposit supply. In this setting, the authors sh ow co-signers are valuable. Social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared. Copyright 1987 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
(1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,432
Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing
Jaffee, D. M., & Russell, T. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885327 · Cited by 1,411
A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
Wilson, C. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7 · Cited by 1,035
Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1983) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d80k2kjv · Cited by 549
Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements
Chan, Y.-S., & Kanatas, G. (1985) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1992508 · Cited by 473
A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing
Jaffee, D. M., & Modigliani, F. (1969) · American Economic Review · Cited by 382
CREDIT RATIONING AND THE COMMERCIAL‐LOAN MARKET*
Jaffee, D. M. (1969) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00401.x · Cited by 142
The Horizontal Integration of the Banking Firm, Credit Rationing and Monetary Policy
Cukierman, A. (1978) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297092 · Cited by 24
Cited by
N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00038-7 · Cited by 3,690
“…pledging outside collateral may help resolve adverse selection problems when the borrower has more information about the quality of the investment than the lender, and may help prevent credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1986, Bester 1985, Chan and Kanatas 1985, Besanko and Thakor 1987a,b).”
Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
DEGRYSE, H., & ONGENA, S. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00729.x · Cited by 1,563
Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms
Bharath, S. T., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A., & Srinivasan, A. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp064 · Cited by 1,277
FinTech and banking: What do we know?
Thakor, A. V. (2020) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2019.100833 · Cited by 1,378
Self-citationCovenants and collateral as incentives to monitor
RAJAN, R., & WINTON, A. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x · Cited by 1,193
The Theory of Corporate Finance
Webb, D. (2006) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01134.x · Cited by 1,171
Collateral, loan quality and bank risk
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1990) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(90)90042-3 · Cited by 1,013
Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data
Degryse, H., & Van Cayseele, P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.1999.0278 · Cited by 971
The Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price
Stiglitz, J. E. (1987) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.7916/d8348wdh · Cited by 958
Lending Booms and Lending Standards
DELL'ARICCIA, G., & MARQUEZ, R. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01065.x · Cited by 877
Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
Self-citationIs relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany
Elsas, R., & Krahnen, J. P. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00063-6 · Cited by 709
The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle
Acharya, V., & Naqvi, H. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.014 · Cited by 650
The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers
Chava, S., & Purnanandam, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.006 · Cited by 626
Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence
THAKOR, A. V. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05210.x · Cited by 586
Self-citationSome evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261851 · Cited by 550
Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets
Jappelli, T., Pagano, M., & Bianco, M. (2005) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2005.0021 · Cited by 547
Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity
RAMPINI, A. A., & VISWANATHAN, S. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01616.x · Cited by 525
JIMENEZ, G., SALAS, V, & SAURINA, J. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.06.003 · Cited by 514
Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results
Boot, A. W. A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1991) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233552 · Cited by 512
Self-citationCollateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks
Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696390 · Cited by 504
The Economics of Bank Regulation
Bhattacharya, S., Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1998) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2601127 · Cited by 500
Self-citationThe Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants
Demiroglu, C., & James, C. M. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq054 · Cited by 467
Collateral, debt capacity, and corporate investment: Evidence from a natural experiment
Gan, J. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.06.007 · Cited by 457
Collateral, type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk
Jiménez, G., & Saurina, J. (2004) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.09.002 · Cited by 434
Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect
Ghatak, M. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00556 · Cited by 416
Dennis, S. A., & Mullineaux, D. J. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2000.0298 · Cited by 402
Sun, J., Lang, J., Fujita, H., & Li, H. (2018) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2017.10.017 · Cited by 385
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MACRO-ECONOMICS
STIGLITZ, J. E., & WEISS, A. (1992) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042071 · Cited by 381
Bank Market Power and SME Financing Constraints
Carbó-Valverde, S., Rodríguez-Fernández, F., & Udell, G. F. (2009) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfp003 · Cited by 377
Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90108-6 · Cited by 361
Self-citationDo lending relationships matter?
Lehmann, E., & Neuberger, D. (2001) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00151-2 · Cited by 327
Greenbaum, S. I., & Thakor, A. V. (1987) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(87)90040-9 · Cited by 298
Self-citationInformation asymmetry and market power in the African banking industry
Boateng, A., Asongu, S., Akamavi, R., & Tchamyou, V. (2018) · Journal of Multinational Financial Management · doi:10.1016/j.mulfin.2017.11.002 · Cited by 292
Benmelech, E., & Bergman, N. K. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.03.003 · Cited by 291
Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems
Ortiz-Molina, H., & Penas, M. F. (2008) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-007-9053-2 · Cited by 291
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1998) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.1998.15 · Cited by 273
Household Debt Sustainability: What Explains Household Non-Performing Loans? An Empirical Analysis
Rinaldi, L., & Sanchis-Arellano, A. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.872528 · Cited by 265
Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments
Boot, A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1987) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(87)90043-4 · Cited by 170
Self-citationLending terms, financial literacy and formal credit accessibility
Korutaro Nkundabanyanga, S., Kasozi, D., Nalukenge, I., & Tauringana, V. (2014) · International Journal of Social Economics · doi:10.1108/ijse-03-2013-0075 · Cited by 149
Bob, S., Juma, B., Isaac, N. N., & Zainabu, T. (2018) · Journal of Economics and International Finance · doi:10.5897/jeif2017.0848 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. V.
- Venue
- International Economic Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 671
- ISSN
- 0020-6598 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044464163
- Cited by
- 964
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 18.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.